I'm talking from a personal perspective here as Epoch director.

• I personally take AI risks seriously, and I think they are worth investigating and preparing for.
• I co-started Epoch AI to get evidence and clarity on AI and its risks and this is still a large motivation for me.
• I have drifted towards a more skeptical position on risk in the last two years. This is due to a combination of seeing the societal reaction to AI, me participating in several risk evaluation processes, and AI unfolding more gradually than I expected 10 years ago.
• Currently I am more worried about concentration in AI development and how unimproved humans will retain wealth over the very long term than I am about a violent AI takeover.
• I also selfishly care about AI development happening fast enough that my parents, friends and myself could benefit from it, and I am willing to accept a certain but not unbounded amount of risk from speeding up development. Id currently be in favour of slightly faster development, specially if it could happen in a less distributed way. I feel very nervous about this however, as I see my beliefs as brittle.

I'm also going to risk also sharing more internal stuff without coordinating on it, erring on the side of over sharing. There is a chance that other management at Epoch won't endorse these takes.

• At management level, we are choosing to not talk about risks or work on risk measurement publicly. If I try to verbalize it, it's due to a combination of us having different beliefs on AI risk, which makes communicating from a consensus view difficult, believing that talking about risk would alienate us from stakeholders skeptical of AI Risk, and the evidence about risk being below what we are comfortable writing about.
• My sense is that OP is funding us primarily to gather evidence relevant to their personal models. Eg two senior people at OP particularly praised our algorithmic progress paper because it directly informs their models. They do also care about us producing legible evidence on key topics for policy, such as the software singularity or post training enhancements. We have had complete editorial control and I feel confident in rejecting topic suggestions that come from OP staff when they don't match my vision of what we should be writing about (and have done so in the past).
• In term of overall beliefs, we have a mixture of people very worried and skeptical of risk. I think the more charismatic and outspoken people at Epoch err towards being more skeptical of risks, but no one at Epoch is dismissive of it.
• Some stakeholders I've talked to have expressed this view that they wish for Epoch AI to gain influence and then communicate publicly about AI risk. I don't feel comfortable with that strategy, one should expect Epoch AI to keep a similar level of communication about risk as we gain influence. We might be willing to talk more about risks if we gather more evidence of risk, or if we build more sophisticated tools to talk about it, but this isn't the niche we are filling or that you should expect us to fill.
• The podcast is actually a good example here. We talk toward the end about the share of the economy owned by biological humans becoming smaller over time, which is an abstraction we have studied and have moderate confidence in. This is compatible with an AI takeover scenario, but also a peaceful transition to an AI dominated society. This is the kind of communication about risks you can expect from Epoch, relying more on abstractions we have studied than stories we don't have confidence in.
• The overall theory of change of Epoch AI is that having reliable evidence on AI will help raise the standards of conversation and decision making elsewhere. To be maximally clear, we are willing to make some tradeoffs like publishing work like FrontierMath and our distributed training paper that plausibly speed up AI development in service of that mission.