tl;dr: I know a bunch of EA/rationality-adjacent people who argue — sometimes jokingly and sometimes seriously — that the only way or best way to reduce existential risk is to enable an “aligned” AGI development team to forcibly (even if nonviolently) shut down all other AGI projects, using safe AGI. I find that the arguments for this conclusion are flawed, and that the conclusion itself causes harm to institutions who espouse it. Fortunately (according to me), successful AI labs do not seem to espouse this "pivotal act" philosophy.
[This post is also available on the EA Forum.]
How to read this post
Please read Part 1 first if you’re very impact-oriented and want to think about the consequences of various institutional policies more than the arguments that lead to the policies; then Parts 2 and 3.
Please read Part 2 first if you mostly want to evaluate policies based on the arguments behind them; then Parts 1 and 3.
I think all parts of this post are worth reading, but depending on who you are, I think you could be quite put off if you read the wrong part first and start feeling like I’m basing my argument too much on kinds-of-thinking that policy arguments should not be based on.
Part 1: Negative Consequences of Pivotal Act Intentions
Imagine it’s 2022 (it is!), and your plan for reducing existential risk is to build or maintain an institution that aims to find a way for you — or someone else you’ll later identify and ally with — to use AGI to forcibly shut down all other AGI projects in the world. By “forcibly” I mean methods that violate or threaten to violate private property or public communication norms, such as by using an AGI to engage in…
- cyber sabotage: hacking into competitors’ computer systems and destroy their data;
- physical sabotage: deploying tiny robotic systems that locate and destroy AI-critical hardware without (directly) harming any humans;
- social sabotage: auto-generating mass media campaigns to shut down competitor companies by legal means, or
- threats: demonstrating powerful cyber or physical or social threats, and bargaining with competitors to shut down “or else”.
Hiring people for your pivotal act project is going to be tricky. You’re going to need people who are willing to take on, or at least tolerate, a highly adversarial stance toward the rest of the world. I think this is very likely to have a number of bad consequences for your plan to do good, including the following:
- (bad external relations) People on your team will have a low trust and/or adversarial stance towards neighboring institutions and collaborators, and will have a hard time forming good-faith collaboration. This will alienate other institutions and make them not want to work with you or be supportive of you.
- (bad internal relations) As your team grows, not everyone will know each other very well. The “us against the world” attitude will be hard to maintain, because there will be an ever weakening sense of “us”, especially as people quit and move to other institutions and conversely. Sometimes, new hires will express opinions that differ from the dominant institutional narrative, which might pattern-match as “outsidery” or “norm-y” or “too caught up in external politics”, triggering feelings of internal distrust within the team that some people might defect on the plan to forcibly shut down other projects. This will cause your team to get along poorly internally, and make it hard to manage people.
- (risky behavior) In the fortunate-according-to-you event that your team manages to someday wield a powerful technology, there will be a sense of pressure to use it to “finally make a difference” or other argument that boils down to acting quickly before competitors would have a chance to shut you down or at least defend themselves. This will make it hard to stop your team from doing rash things that would actually increase existential risk.
Overall, building an AGI development team with the intention to carry out a “pivotal act” of the form “forcibly shut down all other A(G)I projects” is probably going to be a rough time, I predict.
Does this mean no institution in the world can have the job of preparing to shut down runaway technologies? No; see “Part 3: it matters who does things”.
Part 2: Fallacies in Justifying Pivotal Acts
For pivotal acts of the form “shut down all (other) AGI projects”, there’s an argument that I’ve heard repeatedly from dozens of people, which I claim has easy-to-see flaws if you slow down and visualize the world that the argument is describing.
This is not an argument that successful AI research groups (e.g., OpenAI, DeepMind, Anthropic) seem to espouse. Nonetheless, I hear the argument frequently enough to want to break it down and refute it.
Here is the argument:
- AGI is a dangerous technology that could cause human extinction if not super-carefully aligned with human values.
(My take: I agree with this point.)
- If the first group to develop AGI manages to develop safe AGI, but the group allows other AGI projects elsewhere in the world to keep running, then one of those other projects will likely eventually develop unsafe AGI that causes human extinction.
(My take: I also agree with this point, except that I would bid to replace “the group allows” with “the world allows”, for reasons that will hopefully become clear in Part 3: It Matters Who Does Things.)
- Therefore, the first group to develop AGI, assuming they manage to align it well enough with their own values that they believe they can safely issue instructions to it, should use their AGI to build offensive capabilities for targeting and destroying the hardware resources of other AGI development groups, e.g., nanotechnology targeting GPUs, drones carrying tiny EMP charges, or similar.
(My take: I do not agree with this conclusion, I do not agree that (1) and (2) imply it, and I feel relieved that every successful AI research group I talk to is also not convinced by this argument.)
The short reason why (1) and (2) do not imply (3) is that when you have AGI, you don’t have to use the AGI directly to shut down other projects.
In fact, before you get to AGI, your company will probably develop other surprising capabilities, and you can demonstrate those capabilities to neutral-but-influential outsiders who previously did not believe those capabilities were possible or concerning. In other words, outsiders can start to help you implement helpful regulatory ideas, rather than you planning to do it all on your own by force at the last minute using a super-powerful AI system.
To be clear, I’m not arguing for leaving regulatory efforts entirely in the hands of governments with no help or advice or infrastructural contributions from the tech sector. I’m just saying that there are many viable options for regulating AI technology without requiring one company or lab to do all the work or even make all the judgment calls.
Q: Surely they must be joking or this must be straw-manning... right?
A: I realize that lots of EA/R folks are thinking about AI regulation in a very nuanced and politically measured way, which is great. And, I don't think the argument (1-3) above represents a majority opinion among the EA/R communities. Still, some people mean it, and more people joke about it in an ambiguous way that doesn't obviously distinguish them from meaning it:
- (ambiguous joking) I've numerous times met people at EA/R events who were saying extreme-sounding things like "[AI lab] should just melt all the chip fabs as soon as they get AGI", who when pressed about the extremeness of this idea will respond with something like "Of course I don't actually mean I want [some AI lab] to melt all the chip fabs". Presumably, some of those people were actually just using hyperbole to make conversations more interesting or exciting or funny.
Part of my motivation in writing this post is to help cut down on the amount of ambiguous joking about such proposals. As the development of more and more advanced AI technologies is becoming a reality, ambiguous joking about such plans has the potential to really freak people out if they don't realize you're exaggerating.
- (meaning it) I have met at least a dozen people who were not joking when advocating for invasive pivotal acts along the lines of the argument (1-3) above. That is to say, when pressed after saying something like (1-3), their response wasn't "Geez, I was joking", but rather, "Of course AGI labs should shut down other AGI labs; it's the only morally right thing for them to do, given that AGI labs are bad. And of course they should do it by force, because otherwise it won't get done."
In most cases, folks with these viewpoints seemed not to have thought about the cultural consequences of AGI research labs harboring such intentions over a period of years (Part 2), or the fallacy of assuming technologists will have to do everything themselves (Part 1), or the future possibility of making evidence available to support global regulatory efforts from a broader base of consensual actors (see Part 3).
So, part of my motivation in writing this post is as a genuine critique of a genuinely expressed position.
Part 3: It Matters Who Does Things
I think it’s important to separate the following two ideas:
- Idea A (for “Alright”): Humanity should develop hardware-destroying capabilities — e.g., broadly and rapidly deployable non-nuclear EMPs — to be used in emergencies to shut down potentially-out-of-control AGI situations, such as an AGI that has leaked onto the internet, or an irresponsible nation developing AGI unsafely.
- Idea B (for “Bad”): AGI development teams should be the ones planning to build the hardware-destroying capabilities in Idea A.
For what it’s worth, I agree with Idea A, but disagree with Idea B:
Why I agree with Idea A
It’s indeed much nicer to shut down runaway AI technologies (if they happen) using hardware-specific interventions than attacks with big splash effects like explosives or brainwashing campaigns. I think this is the main reason well-intentioned people end up arriving at this idea, and Idea B, but I think Idea B has some serious problems.
Why I disagree with Idea B
A few reasons! First, there’s:
- Action Consequence 1: the action of having an AGI carry out or even prescribe such a large intervention on the world — invading others’ private property to destroy their hardware — is risky and legitimately scary. Invasive behavior is risky and threatening enough as it is; using AGI to do it introduces a whole range of other uncertainties, not least because the AGI could be deceptive or otherwise misaligned with humanity in ways that we don’t understand.
Second, before even reaching the point of taking the action prescribed in Idea B, merely harboring the intention of Idea B has bad consequences; echoing similar concerns as Part 1:
- Intention Consequence 1: Racing. Harboring Idea B creates an adversarial winner-takes-all relationship with other AGI companies racing to maintain
- a degree of control over the future, and
- the ability to implement their own pet theories on how safety/alignment should work, leading to more desperation, more risk-taking, and less safety overall.
- Intention Consequence 2: Fear. Via staff turnover and other channels, harboring Idea B signals to other AGI companies that you are willing to violate their property boundaries to achieve your goals, which will cause them to fear for their physical safety (e.g., because your incursion to invade their hardware might go awry and end up harming them personally as well). This kind of fear leads to more desperation, more winner-takes-all mentality, more risk-taking, and less safety.
Summary
In Part 1, I argued that there are negative consequences to AGI companies harboring the intention to forcibly shut down other AGI companies. In Part 2, I analyzed a common argument in favor of that kind of “pivotal act”, and found a pretty simple flaw stemming from fallaciously assuming that the AGI company has to do everything itself (rather than enlisting help from neutral outsiders, using evidence). In Part 3, I elaborated more on the nuance regarding who (if anyone) should be responsible for developing hardware-shutdown technologies to protect humanity from runaway AI disasters, and why in particular AGI companies should not be the ones planning to do this, mostly echoing points from Part 1.
Fortunately, successful AI labs like DeepMind, OpenAI, and Anthropic do not seem to espouse this “pivotal act” philosophy for doing good in the world. One of my hopes in writing this post is to help more EA/R folks understand why I agree with their position.
Tangent: I don't think I understand the distinction you've made between "AI designed nanotechnology" and "human technology". Human technology already includes "actual nanotechnology", e.g. nanolithography in semiconductor production.
I agree that if the AGI gives us a blueprint for the smallest self-replicating nanobot that we'll need to bootstrap the rest of the nanobot swarm, all we have to do is assemble that first nanobot, and the rest follows. It's very elegant.
We still need to build that very first self-replicating nanobot though.
We can either do so atom-by-atom with some type of molecular assembler like the ones discussed in Nanosystems, or we can synthesize DNA and use clever tricks to get some existing biology to build things we want for us, or maybe we can build it from a process that the AGI gives us that only uses chemical reactions or lab/industrial production techniques.
If we go with the molecular assembler approach, we need to build one of those first, so that we can build the first self-replicating nanobot. This is effectively the same argument I made above, so I'm going to skip it.
If we go with the DNA approach, then the AGI needs to give us that DNA sequence, and we have to hope that we can create it in a reasonable time despite our poor yield rate and time for on DNA synthesis on longer sequences. If the sequence is too long, we might be in a place where we first need to ask the AGI to design new DNA synthesis machines, otherwise we'll be stuck. In that world, we return to my arguments above. In the world where the AGI gave us a reasonably length DNA sequence, say the size of a very small cell or something, we can continue. The COVID-19 vaccine provides an example of how this goes. We have an intelligent entity (humans) writing code in DNA, synthesizing that DNA, converting it to mRNA, and getting a biological system (human cells) to read that code and produce proteins. Humanity has these tools. I am not sure why we would assume that the company that develops AGI has them. At multiple steps in the chain of what Pfizer and Moderna did to bring mRNA vaccines to market, there are single vendor gatekeepers who hold the only tooling or processes for industrial production. If we assume that you have all of the tooling and processes, we still need to talk about cycle times. I believe Pfizer aimed to get the cycle time (raw materials -> synthesized vaccines) for a batch of vaccine down from 15 weeks to 8 weeks. This is an incredibly complex, amazing achievement -- we literally wrote a program in DNA, created a way to deliver it to the human body, and it executed successfully in that environment. However, it's also an example of the current limitations we have. Synthesizing from scratch the mRNA needed to generate a single protein takes >8 weeks, even if you have the full assembly line figured out. This will get faster in time, and we'll get better at doing it, but I don't see any reason to think that we'll have some type of universal / programmable assembly line for an AGI to use anytime soon.
If we go with a series of chemical reactions/lab/industrial production techniques, we need to build clean rooms and labs and vacuum chambers and whatever else is used to implement whatever process the AGI gives us for synthesizing the nanobots. Conceptually this is the simplest idea for how you could get something to work quickly. If the AGI gave you a list of chemicals, metals, biological samples and a step-by-step process of how to mix, drain, heat, sift, repeat, and at the end of this process you had self-replicating nanobots, that would be pretty cool. This is basically taking evolution's random walk from a planetary petri dish to the life we see today and asking, "could an AGI shorten the duration from a billion years of random iterative development into mere weeks of some predetermined process to get the first self-replicating nanobots?" The problem with programming is that interpreting code is hard. Anything that can interpret the nanobot equivalent of machine code, like instructions for how and where to melt GPU factories, is going to be vastly more complex than the current state-of-the-heart R&D being done by any human lab today. I don't see a way where this doesn't reduce to the same Factorio problem I've been describing. We'll first need to synthesize A, so that we can synthesize B, so that we can synthesize C, so that we can synthesize D, and each step will require novel setups and production lines and time, and at the end of it we'll have a sequence of steps that looks an awful lot like a molecular assembly line for the creation of the very first self-replicating nanobots.
The hypothetical world(s) where these types of constraints aren't problems for a "pivotal act" are world(s) where the AGI can give us a recipe for the self-replicating nanobots that we can build in our living room at home with a pair of tweezers and materials from Amazon. The progression of human technology over the past ~60 years in the fields of nano-scale engineering or synthetic biology has been increasingly elaborate, complex, time-consuming, and low-yield processes or lab equipment to replicate the simplest structures that life produces ad-hoc. I am certain this limitation will be conquered, and I'm equally certain that AI/ML systems will be instrumental in doing so, but I have no evidence to rationally conclude that there's not a mountain of prerequisite tools still remaining for humanity to build before something like "design anything at any scale" capabilities are generally available in a way that an AGI could make use of them.
Tangent: If we're concerned about destroying the world, deliberately building self-replicating nanobots that start simple but rapidly assemble into something arbitrarily complex from the whims of an AGI seems like a bad idea, which is why my original post was focused on a top-down hardware/software systems engineering process where the humans involved could presumably understand the plans, schematics, and programming that the AGI handed to them prior to the construction and deployment of those nanobots.