# Ω 8

Crossposted from the AI Alignment Forum. May contain more technical jargon than usual.

I gave a rough sketch of a Dutch Book against CDT, with an example. I expect it can be turned into a fairly general theorem. What setting should we use to formalize this? What are the necessary assumptions? What's the general formulation of the Dutch Book? Are there interesting cases where this fails? How does it relate to anthropic decision problems, and anthropic Dutch-books?

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abramdemski

### Jun 12, 2020

Ω57

A much improved Dutch Book argument is now here.

A game with a large set of CDT agents. They can each output Sensible or Exceptional. If they Sensible, they receive 1$. Those who Exceptional don't get anything in that stage Next, if their output is the majority output, then an additional 2$ is subtracted from their score. If they're exceptionally clever, if they manage to disagree with the majority, then 2\$ is added to their score. A negative final score means they lose money to us. We will tend to profit, because generally, they're not exceptional. there are more majority betters than minority betters.