Abstract: as recollection serves, this was promised in one of the earlier articles. Useful for different ways of thinking of cognition, beyond that, it tends to support the ballyhooed "rationality" by obviating nonsense. Also is argument for more curious cosmologies.
The purport of the philosophy of "Later Wittgenstein" is, in effect, that meaning of language is never fixed, that no "object language" exists outside of social interaction's languages and, these latter being forever in flux, therefore no fixed meaning is obtainable; meaning is mutable relative to social circumstance. Moreover it is supposed that as meaning determines our thoughts, or perhaps, our thoughts give meaning - in either case, thought is conducted in language, and, that unfixed, our thoughts are unreflective of any fixed "objective reality".
From this is derived postmodern philosophy, that meaning is - most basically expressed - what society wishes it to be. And, meanings determining reality, or perceptions thereof, are socially determined. Postmodernism tends moreover to suggest that those individuals with such power as to produced cultural artifacts most-widely consumed, most influential, determine reality thereby; "Power determines perception; perception determines opinion; opinion determines reality".
This is nonsense, as shall be shown; since the foundation of postmodernism springs from Wittgenstein’s opining, then, that obviated, postmodernism, blessedly, goes away. In this connexion, note the implicit assumption from Wittgenstein, that thought is linguistic. And this is wrong, so he is wrong, so postmodernism is wrong.
For consider, or better, conjure in your own mind: a block - the meaning? Precisely what is evident - and this is the significance: a "block" is so called by is quality, intrinsic to its "being", if one will; it "blocks", it is an interference of any-thing else - perception included, interestingly, by its presence. Note this very well, as we shall have occasion to return to this fact: a block is, fundamentally, a unit of identity (that is: it is; this only is known, or need be known of it).
In your own mind's "eye" (the vagueness, here, too, we shall have occasion to remark upon) - though it is nothing like an eye, nothing of vision... assuming you can do it - summon in that void, or whatever "background" is natural to you, a block. But then, this block is not an image, only - rather, it is what blocks images, and any other phenomena you might summon forth.
Now one summons again - only another block. Set the two against one another, what occurs? They rebound from one another, or, at least, are set at variance. They pass through one another? Then you've not summoned a "block", at all (even this is no real objection to the thesis: you thereby only model a to-be suitably defined modular arithmetic).
What of it? But, we have just created logic. For what is that subject's most fundamental principle, but identity; that a = a; let the second block be a', it too has a' = a'. But at once we have the next principle: a ≠ a', or 
As with using the axiom of choice: one is rather sure it's true; given the means, to find a rule, and so, why not cite the rule? But annoyingly vague, to be unable to ascertain the means.
Yet, we have, then, thoughts - and meaningful ones; they exist, they interact, ineluctably, as well as intelligibly - and yet we have - we need - no words.
So is done what was proposed: thought is non-linguistic; meaning is non-linguistic (though, requiring of consciousness, perhaps, to be). Postmodernism, as an essential(ital.) feature of human mental life falls.
Moreover - it is here unnecessary to do more, having proved as we have - had we the inclination - that far more complex propositions, ideas, intuitions, full of meaning, are representable by these mere blocks - anything that requires no more than identity, contradiction. But much more, observe: we take as axiomatic that our thoughts to deductions run in sequence; the former thoughts in sequence ineluctably render the latter. There is, then, causality in thought. But now, so far as our thoughts are of identity-bearing abstractions, then these comport with the phenomena of daily life, which themselves exhibit identity. It follows, that as have in thought such identity-bearers, and have them correspond to objects of perception, then as infallibly as the interactions of these objects-in-mind interact, causally - then so too do objects in the world.
In short: if our thoughts are images of objects in the world, then, our thoughts being causal, the interactions of objects in thoughts corresponds to interactions in the world - and a causal relation, better than probability, is assured to be in the world. There again, as noted, as thoughts run counter to the observed character of objects in the world - then there is the causality of a world other than that in which we strictly are inhabitants (and our minds, able to manifest counter-factual thoughts, are beyond the strictly factual world).
To meet objections, that what is a block is "common knowledge", is derived from "society’s” teaching. Then imagine yourself all alone. And have you not thoughts, and those, of any object you encounter? Let them not be blocks, but they are, they exist, they've their identity, and will serve.
And, that this is social? But wherein is it said what color are these blocks? Or what phenomenal qualities have they? But who ever suggested they had any such, or that you must perceive it? So that, these blocks, they are yours - they not are this author's, only, those it has in mind. Nothing to do with any other: nothing of your "society". Ergo, there is an object language in which to reason: a "language" of objects. And, as it is known only to each person, their thoughts are private.
To be sure, propositions-meaningful can be communicated by language - but thought of it by blocks, subsequent is an intuition all one's own, the thoughts one's own, absent language - and language thus unneeded - neither is philosophy; indeed, the meaning as it is personal, is apt to be derived by the private thoughts; never before that, i.e., in the supposed communication; no meaning in language.
Too, from the observations of the essay "Empathy Does Not Exist" (which does not yet exist, at this writing), it is impossible for a cultural-specific meaning to be conveyed in observation, sans context. And, as each individual is a product of a familial micro-culture, this applies to all humans, be they raised by humans. This is the least-efficacious, most-available explanation; better to say that meaning is by definition personal; one's meaning can never by any means be conveyed to another. Better to offer a definition of meaning that it is product of one's individual consciousness; that unshared, it follows that communication of meaning, so of communication, or the empathy that is supposed to absorb another's meaning, is impossible.
One might object, that here again meaning is as mutable as personality, then. Only to a point, for, whereas personality and the meaning therefore may be subject to change, yet the fact that personality exists, has that whatever meaning it has, possesses the necessary identity. Meaning-as-identity - which is all that is required for abstract thought (which is all this article needs to establish), holds as long as some personality and its possibility holds.
So that only two other implications need be taken: first, that this analysis of the thoughts of one's "gedankenwelt" absent society, are applicable only to non-social, physical phenomena; Wittgenstein's analysis holds - for only-social knowledge.
In a phrase: humans, their world, doesn't matter, neither they; they don't matter, they didn't ever matter, nor you, candidly - except as you interact with the never your world; except as you are an "abstract rational entity"; dehumanizing - but it is possible, this one has done it, to have ethics and values for humans, to preserve even humans - absolutely separate from merely human values.
Philosophy, of humanity, only, is over. No more philosophy, only mathematics, subjects deducible therefrom. In which subsists identity, also.
And: identity in the world, and in mathematics - mathematics is, at least, in(ital.) the world. Since mathematics consists of relations between elements of identity, as does the world, it follows the world's relations are mathematical. Since mathematics predicts worldly events and relations, it is not too much to suspect that all mathematical relations are also in the world. And so is found out "the long way 'round", the Mathematical Universe hypothesis.
So still must Go-on.