I don't think it's possible to evaluate a model without inhabiting it. Therefore we must routinely accept (and subsequently reject) propositions.
If this model is correct, Then we cannot NOT do this.
My point of this post was to ask "Does anyone here have any cognitive science background that could prove useful in investigating this further as to determine if it is worth delving into"
I think you need to include duration, or some other modification of common meaning of "believe" or "accept" in order to make this model coherent, let alone true.
It is ridiculous, given common usage of "belief", to simultaneously believe contradictory propositions. If I say "2+2=4" then a moment later,"2+2=3", what do you predict you'll believe after another second or two?
That doesn't mean the spinozan model is not useful - minds seem capable of parallel beliefs and very fast switching, so if the process of evaluating a proposition includes experiencing some amount of temporary compartmentalized belief, so be it.
But it does NOT follow that we need to guard our inputs to prevent experiencing these falsehoods. It just means we should (as in other models) become adept at not integrating them into our long-term reflective beliefs.
Yes, duration and the specifics of the model are important to understand. What I want to know is if the supporting research was conducted in an effective way and can be trusted as a sufficient bolstering of the model.
To be fair, if the models of belief involving encapsulation are true, then one can technically hold contradictory beliefs as long as these beliefs aren't activated at the same time. Is it possible that dissonance occurs when two contradictory beliefs are activated and held simultaneously?
In other words, imagine some stimulus prompts two contradictory beliefs to be activated and for them to encounter one another. This would result in confusion and by the model of dissonance, the creature would seek to resolve this contradiction.
This assumes that dissonance is a real thing.
Back to the Spinozan model, the issue of simultaneously believing contradictory propositions is not an issue for the model, but an issue for the model of beliefs in general.
To address this " If I say "2+2=4" then a moment later,"2+2=3", what do you predict you'll believe after another second or two?", we simply need to acknowledge that the conscious mind OR other beliefs override the clearly faulty belief of 2+2=3. The process of automatic acceptance is more subtle (according to the model). Both beliefs are automatically held as true, and then whether through conscious change or interaction with previously held beliefs, the apparent false belief is rejected.
The premise of the model is that ACCEPTANCE COMES FIRST AUTOMATICALLY, and THEN, rejection is a process coming after this in time, possibly from a part of the brain that evolved secondarily.
"But it does NOT follow that we need to guard our inputs to prevent experiencing these falsehoods. It just means we should (as in other models) become adept at not integrating them into our long-term reflective beliefs."
I agree with this on the basis that guarding inputs would be far too complicated and may not even be a net positive thing for the system in question.
MORE TO INVESTIGATE:
- How would a situation such as simultaneous exposure to 2+2=4 and 2+2=3 be resolved in the mind?
Spinoza suggested that we first passively accept a proposition in the course of comprehending it, and only afterward actively disbelieve propositions which are rejected by consideration.
Some distinctions that might be relevant:
If you ask me for what in my experience corresponds to a feeling of "passively accepting a proposition" when someone tells me, I think I'm doing a bunch of (1) and (2). This does feel like "accepting" or "taking in" the proposition, and can change how I see things if it works.
Epistemic Status: Exploratory (I'm searching for an expert or someone who has studied and rigorously investigated these claims/essays, as I intend to, but time doesn't permit me now)
16 years ago, Eliezer asked "Do we Believe Everything we're told?"
This was with respect to the Spinozan Model of the mind.
Spinoza suggested that we first passively accept a proposition in the course of comprehending it, and only afterward actively disbelieve propositions which are rejected by consideration.
My question I'd like to pose is, has anyone deeply investigated this? Cognitive Science is of interest to me, but I am not as educated as many in this field.
I'd like to call attention to work done by Eric Mandelbaum of CUNY[1].
Mandelbaum has investigated the Spinozan Model further and written multiple essays on it.
I want to reach out to the lesswrong community to see if anyone has deeply investigated the claim and research behind this paper Thinking is Believing, published in 2014. [2]
This idea of the Spinozan model has been on my mind for months, and upon taking an Intro to Philosophy of Cognitive Science class, I've wanted to dive into it more.
What's stopping me is lack of trust in my ability, and other projects going on.
I've been debating asking, but I figured I would put this out there to the community and hope I hear back.
The importance:
IF we automatically accept propositions AND we are truth seeking, THEN we ought to guard our mind from likely falsehoods.
Mandelbaum was a researcher at FHI in the past (date not found)
ABSTRACT
The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena. The proposed model is one where beliefs are the automatic output of a computationally null belief acquisition reflex. In short, the model holds that the mere activation of a mentally represented truth apt proposition leads to immediately believing it. The essay concludes by considering some consequences that the proposed model of belief acquisition has for our concept of rationality.