When people complain that utilitarianism1 leads to the dust speck paradox or the trolley-car problem, I tell them that's a feature, not a bug. I'm not ready to say that respecting the utility monster is always the correct moral choice, but it is what most people everywhere do in practice.
The utility monster is a creature that is somehow more capable of experiencing pleasure (or positive utility) than all others combined. Most people consider sacrificing everyone else's small utilities for the benefits of this monster to be repugnant.
Let's suppose the utility monster is a utility monster because it has a more highly-developed brain capable of making finer discriminations, higher-level abstractions, and more associations than all the lesser minds around it. Does that make it less repugnant? (If so, I lose you here. I invite you to post a comment explaining why utility-monster-by-smartness is an exception.)
Suppose we have one utility monster and ten thousand others. Everything we do, we do for the one utility monster. Repugnant?
Multiply both by ten billion. We now have ten billion (1010) utility monsters and one hundred trillion (1014) others. Still repugnant?
There are roughly 1010 humans on Earth, and, conservatively, 1014 other individual vertebrates (mostly fish). Why do those ~10 billion humans weigh so heavily in our considerations?
These same enlightened, democratic societies whose philosophers decry the utility monster give approximately zero weight to the well-being of non-humans. We might try not to drive a species extinct, but when contemplating a new hydroelectric dam, nobody adds up the disutility to all the squirrels in the valley to be flooded.
If you believe the utility monster is a problem with utilitarianism, how do you take into account the well-being of squirrels? How about ants? Worms? Bacteria? You've gone to 1015 others just with ants.2 Maybe 1020 with nematodes.
"But humans are different!" our anti-utilitarian complains. "They're so much more intelligent and emotionally complex than nematodes that it would be repugnant to kill even one human to save any number of nematodes."
Well, that's what a real utility monster looks like.
1. I use the term in a very general way, meaning any action selection system that uses a utility function—which in practice means any rational, deterministic action selection system in which action preferences are well-ordered.
2. This recent attempt to estimate the number of different living beings of different kinds gives some numbers. The web has many pages claiming there are 1015 ants, but I haven't found a citation of any original source.
Would you like to upload your consciousness into a superior-in-all-ways body? Faster reflexes, more robust to disease, stronger, more and heightened senses, able to engage with reality in more ways, etc.
Even if you wouldn't, I think most people would, really, except for only the "fear of the unknown" aspect that it's never been done before, in the same way that people were terrified that trains were "too fast" and the speed would crush their occupants, when they were first invented.
See, the experiment is already being run. People exercise their bodies. People exercise their minds to become stronger. This happens by people's own free wills. They actively choose to have better bodies and minds, insofar as it's facilitated by physics, technology, and time limitations.
Pretend you're an ant. Would you like to become a human? I think: probably. It seems a massive upgrade in every conceivable way. As with many such transformative processes, there is a painful one-time experience as your mind is uploaded. Your ant body is destroyed in the process.
Now compare this situation to "an ant dies and a human is born", in the regular manner these things happen every day.
Now imagine that not just you, but you and 200 of your ant buddies will undergo this consciousness uploading procedure, and become not 200 consciousnesses, but one unified being.
When people complain that utilitarianism1 leads to the dust speck paradox or the trolley-car problem, I tell them that's a feature, not a bug. I'm not ready to say that respecting the utility monster is always the correct moral choice, but it is what most people everywhere do in practice.
The utility monster is a creature that is somehow more capable of experiencing pleasure (or positive utility) than all others combined. Most people consider sacrificing everyone else's small utilities for the benefits of this monster to be repugnant.
Let's suppose the utility monster is a utility monster because it has a more highly-developed brain capable of making finer discriminations, higher-level abstractions, and more associations than all the lesser minds around it. Does that make it less repugnant? (If so, I lose you here. I invite you to post a comment explaining why utility-monster-by-smartness is an exception.)
Suppose we have one utility monster and ten thousand others. Everything we do, we do for the one utility monster. Repugnant?
Multiply both by ten billion. We now have ten billion (1010) utility monsters and one hundred trillion (1014) others. Still repugnant?
There are roughly 1010 humans on Earth, and, conservatively, 1014 other individual vertebrates (mostly fish). Why do those ~10 billion humans weigh so heavily in our considerations?
These same enlightened, democratic societies whose philosophers decry the utility monster give approximately zero weight to the well-being of non-humans. We might try not to drive a species extinct, but when contemplating a new hydroelectric dam, nobody adds up the disutility to all the squirrels in the valley to be flooded.
If you believe the utility monster is a problem with utilitarianism, how do you take into account the well-being of squirrels? How about ants? Worms? Bacteria? You've gone to 1015 others just with ants.2 Maybe 1020 with nematodes.
"But humans are different!" our anti-utilitarian complains. "They're so much more intelligent and emotionally complex than nematodes that it would be repugnant to kill even one human to save any number of nematodes."
Well, that's what a real utility monster looks like.
1. I use the term in a very general way, meaning any action selection system that uses a utility function—which in practice means any rational, deterministic action selection system in which action preferences are well-ordered.
2. This recent attempt to estimate the number of different living beings of different kinds gives some numbers. The web has many pages claiming there are 1015 ants, but I haven't found a citation of any original source.