I agree that there are two kinds of intuitions, but I would't call the second one normative. If we do a thought experiment (e.g. a Gettier case) and then say that intuitively some concept (like knowledge) does or doesn't apply to the hypothetical situation, that's not necessarily "normative". I would call them instead: semantic intuitions. Because these intuitions check facts about the meaning of words, to which we have presumably internal access, so no empirical predictions are necessary.
The principle of indifference or the law of non-contradiction can be justified with an appeal to semantic intuitions.
Now I agree there are mixed cases, particularly in ethics, where both the "predictors" and semantic intuitions overlap. I would argue this is because whether some outcome or action is "good" or "right" depends both on the meaning of these terms and potentially on empirical facts, e.g. long term consequences or second-order effects.
The principle of indifference or the law of non-contradiction can be justified with an appeal to semantic intuitions.
How so? POI at the very least seems irreducibly normative to me. I'm not merely giving an analysis of the meaning of concepts like "arbitrary", when I express my endorsement of POI.
If in any thought experiment where you would say "there is no reason to assign the hypothetical outcomes different subjective probabilities" you would also say "they have equal subjective probability", then that's presumably a semantic fact about what you mean with these words. Similar to if in any thought experiment where you would say "this is known" you would also say "this is justified". What you "would say", which words you would apply to a hypothetical situation, that's something your semantic intuitions tell you.
then that's presumably a semantic fact about what you mean with these words
I don't think so. This seems to conflate "A is coextensive with B" and "A is semantically identical to B". My intuition in favor of assigning equal subjective probability to symmetric outcomes (assuming there's a unique partition etc.) seems to be about the epistemic right-ness of doing so. (Where "right-ness" is compatible with normative anti-realism, I think.) That goes beyond semantics.
I don't think so. This seems to conflate "A is coextensive with B" and "A is semantically identical to B".
But I was talking about thought experiments, not just actual situations, so it's not just coextensive, but necessarily coextensive.
My intuition in favor of assigning equal subjective probability to symmetric outcomes (assuming there's a unique partition etc.) seems to be about the epistemic right-ness of doing so. (Where "right-ness" is compatible with normative anti-realism, I think.) That goes beyond semantics.
I don't think so. It's also epistemically rational to be certain of a tautology, even if you think (like I do) that being a tautology is a semantic fact. Because we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification. A priori justification is a form of epistemic rationality/right-ness. Indeed, it's hard to see where a priori justification could come from if not from semantic facts.
not just coextensive, but necessarily coextensive.
I meant to include necessarily coextensive, too.
It's also epistemically rational to be certain of a tautology, even if you think (like I do) that being a tautology is a semantic fact
This seems like a non sequitur. I wasn't claiming "norms of epistemic rationality can't be functions of [whether a given proposition is a semantic fact]". (Edit:) I was claiming "norms of epistemic rationality themselves aren't merely semantic". The semantic fact that X is a tautology doesn't, by itself, dictate that you should have P(X) = 1. You need an (in this case, very obviously compelling) norm to tell you that.
Indeed, it's hard to see where a priori justification could come from if not from semantic facts.
It can come from your intuitions in favor of some foundational norms. (Cf. "non-pragmatic principles" here.) Do you think that when, say, moral anti-realists talk about their bedrock moral intuitions, they're just talking about semantic facts?
The semantic fact that X is a tautology doesn't, by itself, dictate that you should have P(X) = 1. You need an (in this case, very obviously compelling) norm to tell you that.
I don't think this detour via separate "compelling" "norms" is necessary. As I said, "[b]ecause we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification."
It can come from your intuitions in favor of some foundational norms. (Cf. "non-pragmatic principles" here.)
I agree it can come from semantic intuitions, but only from those. Because our semantic intuitions give us internal access to semantic facts (whe know what we mean), and other intuitions generally don't give us direct access to any facts. They constitute at most limited evidence. Like the common intuition that your favorite team will win at football or that you should do certain things because God said so.
Do you think that when, say, moral anti-realists talk about their bedrock moral intuitions, they're just talking about semantic facts?
I do think something like "Other things being equal, suffering is bad" is pretty clearly analytic. But the vast majority of ethical statements also have some degree of empirical content, as I said initially in my last paragraph above. So in these cases we are not merely stating semantic facts.
(I think there are probably some significant differences in general philosophical framings that make this discussion tricky, so I'm not sure if I'll reply further.)
Because our semantic intuitions give us internal access to semantic facts (whe know what we mean),
I would say, we also know what we value — broadly construed, i.e., meant to encompass epistemic and decision-theoretic norms too. These normative attitudes are things we can directly introspect, and they're neither merely semantic (as people usually use that term) nor empirical.
If you want to say claims about our values are really just semantic claims about our evaluative concepts, then I think:
(Cross-posted from my Substack.)
Here’s an important way people might often talk past each other when discussing the role of intuitions in philosophy.[1]
Intuitions as predictors
When someone appeals to an intuition to argue for something, it typically makes sense to ask how reliable their intuition is. Namely, how reliable is the intuition as a predictor of that “something”? The “something” in question might be some fact about the external world. Or it could be a fact about someone’s own future mental states, e.g., what they’d believe after thinking for a few years.
Some examples, which might seem obvious but will be helpful to set up the contrast:[2]
Intuitions as normative expressions
But, particularly in philosophy, not all intuitions are “predictors” in this (empirical) sense. Sometimes, when we report our intuition, we’re simply expressing how normatively compelling we find something.[3] Whenever this really is what we’re doing — if we’re not at all appealing to the intuition as a predictor, including in the ways discussed in the next section — then I think it’s a category error to ask how “reliable” the intuition is. For instance:
It seems bizarre to say, “You have no experience with worlds where other kinds of logic apply. So your intuition in favor of the law of noncontradiction is unreliable.” Or, “There are no relevant feedback loops shaping your intuitions about the goodness of abstract populations, so why trust your intuition against the repugnant conclusion?” (We might still reject these intuitions, but if so, this shouldn’t be because of their “unreliability”.)
Ambiguous cases
Sometimes, though, it’s unclear whether someone is reporting an intuition as a predictor or an expression of a normative attitude. So we need to pin down which of the two is meant, and then ask about the intuition’s “reliability” insofar as the intuition is supposed to be a predictor. Examples (meant only to illustrate the distinction, not to argue for my views):
The bottom line is that we should be clear about when we’re appealing to (or critiquing) intuitions as predictors, vs. as normative expressions.
Thanks to Niels Warncke for a discussion that inspired this post, and Jesse Clifton for suggestions.
H/t Claude for most of these.
For normative realists, “expressing how normatively compelling we find something” is supposed to be equivalent to appealing to the intuition as a predictor of the normative truth. This is why I say “(empirical)” in the claim “not all intuitions are “predictors” in this (empirical) sense”.