Yes, the crucial issue in this conversation is the concept of 'most' and 'probability'. What you can conclude from P1 is that a priori, a randomly selected predicate X probably does not satisfy X(m) for all m. If we had other reasons to believe that X(m) for all m, then we can update our beliefs. Similarly, we expect that a randomly selected prime number n is probably odd; but if we learn the further fact that n=2, then our belief changes.
So what do you make of this argument then? Suppose I were of the opinion that 2 is an even prime. You come to me with an argument to the effect that I should not believe 2 to be prime because a randomly selected prime number is very, very unlikely to be even. Should I be convinced by that? I may be convinced that in some sense, 2 is unlikely to be even, but I don't think I should accept that 2 is not even, or that the evenness of 2 is questionable.
Similarly, suppose someone believes an argument to be universally compelling. It seems to me that EY's argume... (read more)
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