Here is my attempt at preventing these problems from being overlooked. I am not a US citizen, so if you are, please do what I cannot.
Briefly, the Chip Security Act is about making sure chips aren't getting smuggled into places they're not supposed to be. A mix of ping-based location verification, inspections, and other things is proposed. It is currently being negotiated as part of the annual defence bill, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which basically always gets passed. The final text is expected to be released this December.
Issue number one is the inspections are listed as "periodic". Issue number two is the super long timeframes given for some requirements, some of them longer than my AI timelines.
Periodic inspections are mentioned here:
The term ‘‘chip security mechanism’’ means a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including— (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end-user’s approved destination for the covered integrated circuit product;
(Note that inspections are optional: they're one choice of ~4, and as long as one of them is done, that counts. Which one is done is decided by Commerce. Ping-based location verification is another example of an option.) The word periodic does not necessarily imply inspections with regular time intervals, but it's certainly not strict enough to imply random inspections. Inspections have to be random, or very short notice, otherwise the entities being inspected can move incriminating objects off-site before the auditors arrive. This is super basic and obvious and it's what you do for nuclear inspections![1]
The Chip Security Act has timeframes that are far too long. The May 2025 version had shorter timeframes; I assume industry pressure (mainly from the Semiconductor Industry Association) extended them. The lengths of time given are ceilings though, so once the bill passes (I think it's probably too late to get the timeframe adjusted but I'd love to be proven wrong), Commerce should be pressured to move way, way faster than the deadlines.
What long timeframes am I talking about?
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, shall require any covered integrated circuit product that is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to or within a foreign country to be secured by a chip security mechanism that enables reliable verification of whether the product has been illegally diverted to destinations of concern, to the maximum extent practicable, using techniques that are feasible and appropriate on such date of enactment.
The above paragraph can be crudely summarised as "chips must have security mechanisms one year after the Act is enacted". This used to be 180 days in the May 2025 version. I think this is the most important one. Implementing basic chip security mechanisms in December 2027? I don't know if we'd survive.
If any enhanced chip security mechanisms identified pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) are determined by the Secretary to be appropriate, the Secretary may, not later than two years after the date on which the Secretary completes the assessment required by paragraph (1), require any covered integrated circuit product to incorporate the enhanced chip security mechanisms, or for additional mechanisms to be otherwise implemented, at the time the product is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to or in a foreign country.
This basically says if there are some chip mechanisms that seem good to implement, the Secretary has two years to require chips to incorporate those security mechanisms after they complete the assessment. In the May 2025 version, the assessment itself was due one year after enactment; now it's due two years after it. (It also used to say "shall" (as in, must) instead of "may".) So in the worst case scenario, improved security mechanisms might not be required until about four years after the Act is passed.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in robust consultation with the public in a manner determined appropriate by the Secretary and in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall promulgate a final rule that includes a reporting requirement to inform the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce whenever chip security mechanisms fail to confirm that any covered integrated circuit product has not been illegally diverted to a destination of concern, taking into account reasonable time for persons to verify or repair the chip security mechanism, identified in the final rule, including instances in which there is evidence that a product has been subjected to tampering or an attempt at tampering, including efforts to disable, spoof, falsify, manipulate, mislead, or circumvent chip security mechanisms.
This reporting of diversion or tampering was originally meant to be set up in 180 days, not one year.
Those are the basic problems I noticed. If you’re a US citizen, please contact your representative and senators and ask them to press Commerce to implement the Chip Security Act well ahead of its legal deadlines. You can find your representatives at congress.gov/members.
One final note: Section 6(c) lets Commerce keep a record of the location and end-user of every exported advanced chip, but it's optional. This should not be optional, because those records could prove super useful for treaty verification later (and would be useful for current enforcement, as in the stuff the Chip Security Act is trying to accomplish).
Also, I am going to the PauseAI UK March Against AI Extinction in London this Saturday.[2] Consider going even if you don't live in the UK — there are currently 1,692 people signed up, so it's looking like it'll be the biggest anti-AI-extinction protest ever. Don't you want to be there? :)
The main thing I have in mind about this protest is getting Andy Burnham to put the UK's G20 presidency to good use and broker a pause treaty. I may do another speech, we'll see.
Epistemic status: I have no experience in law or anything, I just read this bill and noticed some issues. This is not deeply researched.
[Crossposted from my blog, BlueprintingHeaven.]
Here is my attempt at preventing these problems from being overlooked. I am not a US citizen, so if you are, please do what I cannot.
Briefly, the Chip Security Act is about making sure chips aren't getting smuggled into places they're not supposed to be. A mix of ping-based location verification, inspections, and other things is proposed. It is currently being negotiated as part of the annual defence bill, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which basically always gets passed. The final text is expected to be released this December.
I am looking at the version passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2026.
Issue number one is the inspections are listed as "periodic". Issue number two is the super long timeframes given for some requirements, some of them longer than my AI timelines.
Periodic inspections are mentioned here:
(Note that inspections are optional: they're one choice of ~4, and as long as one of them is done, that counts. Which one is done is decided by Commerce. Ping-based location verification is another example of an option.) The word periodic does not necessarily imply inspections with regular time intervals, but it's certainly not strict enough to imply random inspections. Inspections have to be random, or very short notice, otherwise the entities being inspected can move incriminating objects off-site before the auditors arrive. This is super basic and obvious and it's what you do for nuclear inspections![1]
The Chip Security Act has timeframes that are far too long. The May 2025 version had shorter timeframes; I assume industry pressure (mainly from the Semiconductor Industry Association) extended them. The lengths of time given are ceilings though, so once the bill passes (I think it's probably too late to get the timeframe adjusted but I'd love to be proven wrong), Commerce should be pressured to move way, way faster than the deadlines.
What long timeframes am I talking about?
The above paragraph can be crudely summarised as "chips must have security mechanisms one year after the Act is enacted". This used to be 180 days in the May 2025 version. I think this is the most important one. Implementing basic chip security mechanisms in December 2027? I don't know if we'd survive.
This basically says if there are some chip mechanisms that seem good to implement, the Secretary has two years to require chips to incorporate those security mechanisms after they complete the assessment. In the May 2025 version, the assessment itself was due one year after enactment; now it's due two years after it. (It also used to say "shall" (as in, must) instead of "may".) So in the worst case scenario, improved security mechanisms might not be required until about four years after the Act is passed.
This reporting of diversion or tampering was originally meant to be set up in 180 days, not one year.
Those are the basic problems I noticed. If you’re a US citizen, please contact your representative and senators and ask them to press Commerce to implement the Chip Security Act well ahead of its legal deadlines. You can find your representatives at congress.gov/members.
One final note: Section 6(c) lets Commerce keep a record of the location and end-user of every exported advanced chip, but it's optional. This should not be optional, because those records could prove super useful for treaty verification later (and would be useful for current enforcement, as in the stuff the Chip Security Act is trying to accomplish).
Also, I am going to the PauseAI UK March Against AI Extinction in London this Saturday.[2] Consider going even if you don't live in the UK — there are currently 1,692 people signed up, so it's looking like it'll be the biggest anti-AI-extinction protest ever. Don't you want to be there? :)
Alongside scheduled ones.
The main thing I have in mind about this protest is getting Andy Burnham to put the UK's G20 presidency to good use and broker a pause treaty. I may do another speech, we'll see.