In a recent seminar, I had the chance to listen to a talk by Raghuram Rajan discussing his paper titled Liquidity Dependence and the Waxing and Waning of Central Bank Balance Sheets. The paper examines the new situation of central bank policies, where the cycle between QE and QT creates financial instabilities instead of mitigating them.
The paper puts forward the idea of "liquidity dependence," where the supply of reserves during quantitative easing (QE) leads to an increase in bank liquidity claims. In turn, an even larger central bank balance sheet is needed. This buildup of liquidity claims can make quantitative tightening (QT) difficult, while also dulling the impact of QE on the broader economy.
Some key findings from the paper include:
Simply put, during QE, time deposits are replaced by demandable ones:
Asset | Liability |
Reserves | ▲Demandable Deposits |
Securities | ▼Time Deposits |
And during QT, banks experience a shrink in asset value as a result of interest rate risk:
Asset | Liability |
Reserves | = Demandable Deposits |
▼Securities | = Time Deposits |
This can explain the SVB bank case, where its long-term securities lose value. On its liability side, there remains a lot of demandable, instead of time deposits, which increases its liquidity risk.
Here is a simple visual analysis, where dimmed regions represent QEs. A similar figure can be found in the paper. Note that the QT period starting in 2015 does not change either the time or demandable deposits.
During the question section, topics such as holding assets to maturity, deposit betas, duration risks, and CBDCs were discussed.
Finally, some excerpts from Keeping At It by Paul Volcker, his autobiography:
A lesson from my career is that such success can carry the seeds of its own destruction. I’ve watched country after country, faced with damaging inflation, fight to restore stability. Then, with victory in sight, the authorities relax and accept a “little inflation” in the hope of stimulating further growth, only to see the process resume all over again. The sad history of economic policy over much of Latin America offers too many examples.
...
The late Bill Martin, as I recalled earlier, is famous for his remark that the job of the central bank is to take away the punch bowl just when the party gets going. The hard fact of life is that few hosts want to end the party prematurely. They wait too long and when the risks are evident the real damage is done.