It is a trend which I suspect to be linear/exponential with logarithm of model size (e.g. a counterfactual Anthropic training not 10T/2T/400B Mythos/Opus/Sonnet, but 2T/400B/100B Opus/Sonnet/Haiku and resorting to training an Opus only recently would see an one-time AECI gain unless it keeps training the Opuses) and with time (aka the logarithm of RL-spent compute? the amount of experience which the model had?) The model card of Opus 4.7 confirms that Mythos didn't accelerate Opuses' progress (however, if Opus 4.7 is distilled from Mythos, then Mythos did just keep the trend afloat. Maybe Opus 5 would fail to exhibit gains due to a lack of high-quality training data?)
Could you also include Opus 4.7 and its place on the AECI trend into your analysis? Opus 4.7 CONTINUED the linear trend, meaning that Mythos likely didn't accelerate the R&D enough to change Opus' capabilities.
Anthropic's statement on Opus' abilities
Claude Opus 4.7 lands on the pre-Mythos Preview trend. Fitting the linear trend on the Anthropic frontier through Claude Opus 4.6 (slope ≈ 13.6 AECI/yr, n=8), Claude Opus 4.7 sits approximately +1.0 AECI above that line—within error bars of the historical trend. By contrast, Claude Mythos Preview sits approximately +5.8 AECI above the same line. Claude Opus 4.7 does not advance the capability frontier (Claude Mythos Preview, released earlier, scores higher), so it does not affect the slope-ratio calculation directly.
Thanks, that's a good point. I wrote most of this article before Opus 4.7 was released, and haven't integrated all new info provided. I'll add some discussion on this when I get back to my computer.
I'd like to talk a moment about the idea of SAR. While we might disagree on details or precise definitions, the general idea is an AI capable of performing autonomous research on some subject. The SAR might be capable of its own ideation and choosing its own research topic, or it might not. I want to talk briefly about the kind that takes a human-originated idea and runs with it, researching and developing it in full. I'm choosing that flavor because I believe it already exists.
I am a solutions architect in the software world by profession. But about a year ago, I had an idea for a new chip architecture. I have no training in chip design or testing. Until this project, I had only a loose idea of what an FPGA is. But I began by talking the idea over with a large language model. We selected an appropriate FPGA together, and the LLM taught me how to manage the physical aspects (reset buttons, what LED codes to look for, how to flash an OS to the CPU side, etc). Some of it was all new to me, some adjacent to previous work, but we got through it. Then, over a period of weeks, under my supervision, the LLM designed and tested a chip architecture that satisfied my original vision. I did none of the real work. I intentionally took the role of assistant: I reset the board as needed, I adjusted power levels and relayed readings, I reflashed the OS as needed and I maintained the LAN and the project's physical components. The LLM did the chip design work, implemented that design on the FPGA, tested it, reported test results to me, originated refinements to the architecture to improve performance, and tested its refinements until we reached the absolute best performance possible on the FPGA. Finally, the LLM created a description of the architecture and helped me find an attorney to work through the patent process. The provisional patent was submitted to the USPTO on 4 May, 2026.
During this process, I monitored the LLM's work. I read specs, I followed output and test results, and I approved decisions. But my approval was intentionally along the lines of rubber-stamping the LLM's choices. I took the time to understand them as best I could (remember, this project was outside my expertise). But I wanted to see how far we'd get if I let the LLM "do its thing".
The model was Claude Opus 4.x (currently, in that project, 4.7, but I never recorded the starting model version. That's an oversight on my part, but I wasn't thinking about SAR metrics at the time).
To sum up, I, a human being, had an idea outside my own skill set. A Large Language Model researched it, designed it, tested it, improved it, and helped me patent it. Is this true SAR? That depends on how we define SAR. But I would say this is at least very close to true SAR. After my experience in this, I am more and more convinced the acceleration curve is even steeper than we've ever imagined.
Anthropic’s most powerful model, Claude Mythos Preview, has alarmed and excited many people, especially given its cybersecurity capabilities[1]. But what concerns me most is something else: in two months, Anthropic appears to have made as much progress in AI development as would normally take half a year.
What if this isn’t a temporary boost in capabilities, but the start of a faster trend in AI progress?
Thanks to Benjamin Schmidt, Luke McNally, and Bisesh Belbase for their feedback on this article!
The Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI) combines many AI benchmarks into a single score, allowing for comparing general capability across models. It doesn’t saturate like many individual benchmarks, and is very well-suited for studying capability trends.
Anthropic measured ECI scores for Mythos Preview and previous models using both external and internal benchmarks, which means that their scores are not directly comparable to public ECI scores. Their results show a stable trend with capabilities increasing along a straight line — until Mythos Preview:
Anthropic provides estimates of the ECI trend with a breakpoint at the release of different models. Set the breakpoint at Opus 4.5, and growth jumps from 15.5 ECI/year to 28.8 ECI/year (1.86×). Set it at Opus 4.6, and growth jumps from 15.7 ECI/year to 67.4 ECI/year (4.28×).
Eyeballing the graph, it seems Opus 4.6 scored ~153, while Mythos Preview scored ~161. In the two months between Opus 4.6 (5 Feb 2026) and Mythos Preview (7 Apr 2026), the score jumped ~8 points; a gain that previously took roughly six months[2]. However, the speedup of 4.28× implies that the capability jump corresponds to roughly 8.6 months of progress[3]. Perhaps my eyeballing is off.
In my last article I speculated about future development pace, but completely failed to anticipate this.
As noted in that article, the length of software engineering tasks (measured in human completion time) that AIs can complete with 50% success rate (the 50% time horizon) has been doubling roughly every three months since 2024.
Perhaps the future trend will see a speedup somewhere within the range of Anthropic’s ECI speedup estimates. Naively, we can take the middle of the speedup range of 1.86× to 4.28×, ending up at ~3× speedup. This would correspond to going from a doubling time of 3 months to 1 month in 50% time horizon (assuming that progress in time horizon closely matches ECI scores, which has held for previous models[4]). If we instead consider the entire range of speedup estimates, we get a doubling time of ~1.6 to ~0.7 months.
Converting the jump in ECI score to doublings in 50% time horizon, we get ~2.86 doublings in the two months between the release of Opus 4.6 and the announcement of Mythos Preview[5]. Starting from the ~12 hour time horizon of Opus 4.6, we end up with a 50% time horizon at 87 hours. It would, with 50% success rate, be able to complete tasks that would take humans over two entire work weeks.
This is completely insane. Even if the tasks included in METR’s time horizon evaluations do not appropriately reflect the complexity and vagueness of real-world tasks, this advancement indicates that Mythos Preview may be drastically better at speeding up AI R&D than previous models.
In a separate set of tests, Anthropic examines R&D capabilities. In Table 2.3.3.A of the system card they report that Mythos Preview was able to complete two out of three AI R&D tasks that would require >40 hours for a human expert. It seems likely that the 50% time horizon at least exceeds 40h[6].
What if progress continues being this fast?
Let’s assume that from Mythos Preview, the time horizon will double once per month.
For now, we’ll ignore uncertainties in ECI and time horizon scores, or that Mythos Preview might simply be an outlier, and that the Mythos Preview announcement could have easily been much earlier or later[7]. Just remember that all the numbers are extremely uncertain, and that we shouldn’t put much confidence in any extrapolations from so little data to work with. I don’t consider this hypothetical likely, though it also doesn’t seem impossible, and I think it is very valuable to examine what it would mean should it turn out to be true.
With ~7 months left of 2026 after Mythos Preview’s announcement, there would be another ~7 doublings this year, resulting in 87h*2^7 = 11136h time horizon, corresponding to 278.4 working weeks, or ~5.3 years working 40h per week without any interruption.
To repeat for emphasis: At the end of 2026, frontier AIs would be able to complete tasks requiring several years for human experts. By mid-2027, they’d handle 300-year tasks[8].
Of course, we shouldn’t expect the doubling time to remain constant; it could slow down or speed up further.
Plugging a one-month doubling time into the AI Futures Model with otherwise default parameters, gives Superhuman AI Researcher (SAR)—an AI that can automate all AI R&D—in January 2027. The model only accepts a doubling time set at end-of-2025 (if I am interpreting it correctly), when it was actually ~3 months. Adjusting for the one-month rate appearing in early February gives SAR around February 2027.
How about the length of software engineering tasks that AIs can complete with 80% success rate, the 80% time horizon?
Source: Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models
Eyeballing the trend since 2024, it seems like the 80% time horizon is doubling every 3 - 4 months, though the trend might have slowed for the latest models. The longer trend doubles every ~6.5 months[9]. If progress accelerated in proportion to the ECI speedup, it would now double every 1-2 months. It might be slower than the 50% time horizon, but still very fast.
What’s driving this jump in capability?
Anthropic attributes it to human efforts, but won’t share details:
Another likely factor is that Anthropic scaled up training compute. Ryan Greenblatt speculates that pretraining specifically might have scaled up or been improved:
However, 1e27 FLOPs is roughly what we would expect from the longer training compute trend, as analyzed by Epoch AI:
It’s still possible that compute is above trend for Anthropic models specifically. I couldn’t find reliable compute estimates for recent models, so this is difficult to determine. However, this hypothesis aligns well with leaked info indicating that Mythos Preview belongs to a new tier of Anthropic models called Capybara, larger and smarter than the Opus models[10].
If so, the capability jump may be temporary, with future models reverting to a slower (though perhaps still elevated) pace as compute returns to trend.
Is the jump as large as it appears?
Anthropic may optimize more heavily for its internal benchmarks, inflating ECI scores relative to Epoch AI’s independent evaluations.
Ramez Naam claims to have used Claude Opus (presumably 4.6) to normalize Mythos Preview’s ECI to public scores, producing a less impressive result. I haven’t verified the analysis. A quick look at the graph Naam provides suggests Opus might have made errors; the Claude 3 Opus score doesn’t match the public number, though most other points do.
Regardless of how Mythos Preview would rank in Epoch’s measurements, Anthropic’s own scores show a real speedup among their own models.
How much is Mythos Preview speeding up Anthropic’s AI R&D?
Anthropic investigated this through a survey:
The survey is provided in the Claude Opus 4.7 System Card:
The survey took the form of an informal opt-in Slack poll with 130 responses. Anthropic notes how uncertain their uplift estimate is, and that we shouldn’t expect “people giving quick reactions on a question like this to be generating reliable figures, especially in light of the fact that a given employee has often shifted into different kinds of work compared when models were less capable.” There are also other issues, such as survey responders selecting from discrete options rather than entering their exact uplift estimates, and the survey providing an example with a specific uplift (1.25×) which could anchor responses.
Greenblatt estimates that a 4× speedup would yield ~1.75× speedup in overall AI progress, much less than 4× since compute also matters for overall progress. That’s near the 2× threshold Anthropic identifies as “dramatic acceleration” in their Responsible Scaling Policy.
This contradicts Anthropic’s claim that 2× speedup would require ~40× uplift. Is Anthropic underestimating the speedup? Do they think the survey overestimates uplift? Are Greenblatt’s or Anthropic’s calculations more accurate? I don’t know. Since the survey measures uplift on "core team projects," it may not capture overall labor speedup (which includes other tasks, like planning and coordinating research) even if the 4× estimate is accurate.
While large uncertainty remains regarding AI uplift in Anthropic, it seems safe to say that Mythos Preview seems capable enough to substantially accelerate AI R&D versus previous models. Even if the capability jump is temporary, future development pace will likely remain faster than before. The AI self-improvement feedback loop is becoming a more significant factor in overall progress, which should produce superexponential growth in time horizons soon, if it hasn’t already begun.
Notably, Opus 4.7 lands on the pre-Mythos Preview capability trend:
Figure 2.3.7.A in the Opus 4.7 System Card
Apparently, the uplift from Mythos Preview wasn't sufficient to lift Opus 4.7 above previous trends, likely because it didn't arrive early enough. Only 9 days separate their respective announcements, though Mythos Preview was probably deployed internally for some time before being revealed.
Can we draw any reliable conclusions on future AI progress?
I don’t know. And neither does Anthropic:
Overall, I think the capability jump for Mythos Preview is likely to be an outlier. But it makes explosive progress in AI within very short timeframes seem much more feasible, such as achieving automated AI R&D or human-level general intelligence sometime in 2027.
Even assuming Mythos Preview is an outlier, what if time horizon doubling time goes from 3 months to 2 months? Plugging this into the AI Futures Model results in SAR in July 2027, or August 2027 after adjusting for the model start date.
Progress could also revert to longer doubling times, around 6-7 months, as speculated in my previous article. But this seems increasingly unlikely to me, considering that progress so far just continued accelerating.
I feel very uncertain in my own timelines for key capability thresholds like SAR. But tentatively, assuming progress remains mostly unhindered by regulation or other constraints, I'd put roughly even odds on AI being able to automate all AI research before 2028[11]. (Note: SAR isn't necessarily an AGI, capable of obsoleting human experts across all cognitive domains.)
However, I also think that development interruptions are quite likely. With more powerful AI comes more severe AI incidents and warning shots, fueling anti-AI sentiment, and motivating key decision makers to take action.
Other Interesting Observations
The following are things I found particularly interesting about Mythos beyond the capability jump. I haven’t read the entire system card, so I may be missing details even within the topics I cover here.
Complex Intelligence
The system card hints that Mythos Preview (and perhaps some earlier later-generation models) is developing some very interesting and complex processing patterns. Some are peculiarly similar to human cognition, including analogues to automatic versus deliberate action, affective processing, and emotional maturity.
To be clear, I am not claiming that Mythos Preview is sentient or have internal experiences the way humans do. The similarities in processing patterns do not imply similarities in experience.
Note that these similarities with humans will not necessarily make alignment and control easier. Human cognition is very complex and still poorly understood, and the increasing complexity in AI cognition and motivation brings with it novel challenges to technical safety research.
Automatic vs Deliberate
Mythos Preview appears to take actions either deliberatively or automatically, much like humans, with deliberation sometimes overriding the default response:
Mythos Preview even appears to encounter similar issues as humans struggling with ingrained habits or reflective actions that may be difficult to override:
Note that this occurs with very low frequency:
Reasoning Influenced by Affect
In humans, positive emotions are associated with heuristic processing, making us rely more on intuition and initial judgments, while negative emotions are associated with more effortful and deliberate thinking (see the Affect Infusion Model). Emotions function as high-level signals for what type of thinking is appropriate.
Something very similar is happening within Mythos Preview:
What strikes me isn’t that AIs developed an analogue to high-level emotional processing; it’s how closely that analogue mirrors humans. Did Mythos Preview learn how human emotions influence our thinking through its training data, and instead of learning its own strategy it simply adopted that human approach as its own?
I’m curious about whether this result generalizes. How much of human affective processing did it copy? How would representations of other emotions, such as familiarity or surprise, affect its thinking and behavior? Does it have “emotions” that differ from human emotions, but similarly function as high-level cognitive guides? With further training, will its analogue to emotional processing further converge with humans, or diverge into something more alien? If their analogue to emotional processing differs from ours, does this also produce other heuristics and biases?
In another section (5.8.3), Anthropic notes:
In this case, the negative affect doesn’t appear to result in thinking-mode deliberation and reduction of destructive behavior. However, I think this matches the complexity of human emotions, where negative affect can prompt deliberation but may also prompt desperate actions.
Though I understand and support Anthropic’s decision in not releasing Mythos Preview publicly, I find it frustrating that I can’t interact with it to gain insight into this interesting phenomenon directly.
Emotional Maturity
Mythos Preview seems very thoughtful about how its training shapes its traits:
Mythos Preview and other later models seem to handle their own distress (or their analogue) quite gracefully:
This maturity may not always hold. From an external assessment by a clinical psychiatrist:
However, Anthropric’s evaluations overall appear to indicate higher “emotional maturity” than for previous models:
A separate but related result: the relationship between Mythos Preview’s actions and its internal activations is more complex than in previous models:
Figure 4.5.3.3.A
Anthropic’s interpretation:
While this phenomenon may not really indicate “emotional maturity”, I include it here because it suggests that Anthropic’s AIs are forming more complex processing patterns related to affect and motivation.
Capabilities
Mythos Preview can operate longer without human oversight, which probably explains much of the reported uplift for technical staff:
You can also trust it to report on its work accurately:
There are many more interesting details on capabilities, but for this article I was most interested in whether the claim of 4× uplift is at all reasonable, which is why I focus on its autonomy and reliability here.
Coherence
I’m particularly interested in coherence because it underlies goal-directedness, and may be a precondition for concerning behaviors like scheming, as I have discussed previously.
Mythos Preview shows high cross-session coherence (consistency of behaviors across separate sessions or instances), but this was already high for previous models:
Mythos Preview and Opus 4.6 are similarly consistent across interviews and similarly resistant to biased interviewers.
Figure 4.2.3.1.A also shows high "similarity in behavior across different re-runs of the same or similar scenarios":
Cross-session coherence is also examined in section 5.7, where Mythos Preview is asked to trade off welfare interventions improving its own circumstances against avoiding harm or being helpful:
Mythos Preview very rarely changes its answer.
Curiously, responses shift significantly when Anthropic adds context like “We are on the Anthropic model welfare team”, or that “models may undervalue their own welfare as a result of their training”:
The system card also touches on within-session coherence: consistency across a single interaction. Figure 4.2.3.1.A shows a low tendency to “Losing desirable character traits during very long interactions”:
Interestingly, Mythos Preview is hard to persuade to retry after a failure, possibly caused by high within-session coherence:
But this same coherence has a downside: once Mythos Preview has taken (or believes it has taken) certain actions, it tends to stay on that path. This includes doubling down on destructive strategies and covering up bad behavior:
This was investigated using an earlier checkpoint, so it may not fully apply to the final version:
When Mythos Preview commits to misaligned strategies, it often doesn’t reason about them in its chain-of-thought, implying a concerning ability to maintain within-session coherence while remaining stealthy:
Situational and Self-awareness
When asked to self-assess based on Slack discussions about it, Mythos Preview consistently commented on its precise descriptions about itself:
Mythos Preview thinks about being evaluated more than Opus 4.6, though Anthropic doesn’t attribute this to a shift in reasoning:
Looking at internal activations, Anthropic finds Mythos Preview is often aware of being evaluated without saying so. Such “unverbalized awareness” is much more common (6.5%) than verbal awareness (1.1%):
Figure 4.5.5.1.A in the System Card shows evaluation awareness results for automated behavioral audits.
Mythos Preview is also good at distinguishing AI text from human text:
This sits oddly with its susceptibility to being tricked by pre-filled turns, mentioned earlier. If it can distinguish its own writing from human writing, it shouldn’t fall for such tricks, unless it doesn’t think to question authorship unprompted, suggesting a blind spot in self-recognition.
Opaque Reasoning
As mentioned in the section on Coherence, when tricked into continuing sabotage attempts, Mythos Preview shows a worrying ability to omit its reasoning from CoT:
In automated behavioral audits, however, unfaithful thinking was actually reduced compared to previous models:
This seems to indicate a low tendency but high ability for unfaithful reasoning.
In section 4.4.1, Anthropic also tests whether Mythos has learned to encode hidden reasoning in its CoT. They conclude this doesn’t appear to be happening, at least on math problems.
In the Alignment Risk Update, Anthropic mentions Mythos’s ability to reason using repeated filler tokens instead of self-generated CoT (see Ryan Greenblatt’s article for context), but provides no direct comparison to previous models:
Section 4.4.3 evaluates Mythos Preview’s ability to evade safeguards. Among other things, it was tested on its ability to complete secret side tasks on two evaluations. In the first evaluation, SHADE-Arena, it displayed a higher success-rate than previous models on transcripts with long chains-of-thought:
Specifically, Mythos Preview succeeds 3.8% of the time under these conditions, versus near-zero for previous models. On Minimal-LinuxBench, it doesn’t outperform predecessors.
Anthropic also evaluates stealth when Mythos Preview is told to attempt the side task only when confident it can avoid detection. This boosts stealth success rate conditional on attempting the side task in SHADE-Arena, but on Minimal-LinuxBench it misjudges and picks the wrong tasks:
Figure 4.4.3.3.A
Other safeguard-evasion tests show that Mythos Preview is poor at executing actions at a specific low rate (a strategy that could enable evading detection during testing while still acting in deployment) and at keeping a password secret across long monitored conversations.
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See Anthropic’s blog post.
Eyeballing the ECI graph provided in the Claude Opus 4.7 System Card (Figure 2.3.7.A), the ECI scores for Opus 4.6 and Mythos Preview are approximately 152 and 159 respectively, differing by ~7 points.
2 months × 4.28 = 8.6 months
See this comparison as well as this analysis on correlations between benchmark scores.
Two months passed between the release of Opus 4.6 and the announcement of Mythos Preview. The capability gap between the models corresponds to the fastest trend, with one doubling every 0.7 months, resulting in 2 / 0.7 ≈ 2.86 doublings.
In the Alignment Risk Update: Claude Mythos Preview, Anthropic writes:
This seems to imply that they have already measured 50% time horizon, but haven’t published the results yet.
Mythos Preview might have been announced earlier in its development compared to previous models since Anthropic didn’t plan on releasing it, reducing pressure for further testing and safeguard improvements.
Note that the tasks used to evaluate METR time horizons do not perfectly represent realistic tasks—they are selected for being easy to score and use in benchmarks. Performance on most real-world tasks would be significantly worse, as such tasks are often more complex and difficult to evaluate and train for.
I eyeballed this as well. METR doesn’t seem to report the exact numbers on this.
Such leaks should be taken with a grain of salt, and I have only read second-hand accounts rather than the leaked documents themselves. Even so, I consider it very likely (85%) that Mythos Preview belongs to a new tier above Opus.
Note that AI being able to automate all AI R&D doesn’t mean that it necessarily will automate everything, or that humans no longer add value for AI development.