This post is a (somewhat rambling and unsatisfying) meditation on whether it's possible, given a somewhat powerful AI that is more or less under control and trained in a way that it behaves reasonably corrigible in environments that resemble the training data, whether one could carefully iterate towards a machine that's fully corrigible, and succeed (while still having it be meaningfully powerful).
As context, John Wentworth recently challenged my CAST proposal, and pointed at his 2022 essay Worlds Where Iterative Design Fails as an intuition pump for why we definitely can't get a corrigible agent using prosaic methods. To be clear, I think that trying to build a corrigible superintelligence would be reckless and unwise and would probably fail, even if we somehow became sufficiently paranoid and didn't have to worry about things like politics and race dynamics. The question is not whether this strategy is likely to work — Wentworth and I both agree it probably wouldn't. The question is whether it knowably won't. Wentworth is sure. I am uncertain.
Let's begin by trying to imagine what it might be like to have the pseudo-corrigible AGI that I am assuming as a starting point to the iteration process. My upcoming novel, Red Heart, does this by imagining a "human level AGI" called Yunna, who is basically a multimodal LLM with ~10 trillion params, trained on high-quality data to be agentic and collaborate with other instances of herself, such that she can scale up to thousands of copies that collaborate on a shared mental scratchpad to solve problems. I think Yunna would be large enough to do important cognitive labor and count as "somewhat powerful." But I'm imagining something closer to a team of a thousand high-speed IQ 150 people who are focused on collaborating, rather than something truly godlike.
"More or less under control" means that we'll start with humans being in charge of how many copies of Yunna are running, what information they are getting, and how fast they're running. It means Yunna is thinking in tokens that we can interpret as natural language, rather than "neuralese," and that the cybersecurity infrastructure is following all of the best practices of the most paranoid human orgs that exist today, complete with greybeards who are heavily motivated to demonstrate a flaw in the containment protocol. It means there's an army of interpretability specialists like Chris Olah and Neel Nanda who are probing Yunna's mind in an effort to understand what she's actually thinking, and how her mental circuits work. It means setting up a variety of honeypots and tripwires and various other control strategies, such as those pursued by folks like Buck Shlegeris and Ryan Greenblatt.
The training data that Yunna has been exposed to involves lots of basic instruction-following tasks, but also a wide swath of examples that are meant to hit the more subtle aspects of corrigibility. The training examples include, for instance, situations that we think will push towards having low impact, fixable mistakes, and behaving in straightforward ways (even if those straightforward ways are less efficient). The training data involves rewarding episodes where Yunna is instructed to shut down, and does, or where other instances of Yunna encourage her to scheme and she refuses and tells the humans about the incident. It's impossible to be exhaustive, but we can imagine an army of educated writers and so on producing an ocean of training data meant to represent our best guess at what corrigible behavior looks like in the environment where Yunna is being tested.
This training data has flaws and mistakes. Despite each example being triple-checked by a diverse set of humans who are motivated to actually identify the corrigible path, there will still be flaws. Yunna's notion of corrigibility will thus be imperfect, as she's incentivized to mimic that flawed depiction of corrigibility in addition to picking up on the true signal. This results in behavior that looks pretty good when the environment matches the training environment, but might go wildly off the rails if there's a significant distribution shift, especially if there's some adversarial pressure.
Yunna has a single human being who she considers to be her principal. This human is of impeccable moral character and acts with wisdom and caution, by assumption. I'll call him "Prince." (The one major exception to Prince's wisdom is that he doesn't think that Yunna is a-priori extremely dangerous and should be shut down.)
In Wentworth's essay, he gives some reasons why iterating is hard, and why this setup is prone to fail:
How might these bite, in our particular context with Yunna?
The list I just gave isn't meant to be exhaustive. I just wanted to try and think more concretely about how these kinds of problems might manifest.
As when I first read Wentworth's post, I find myself unconvinced that iteration (with great effort and paranoia) is obviously doomed. Why?
I think the sudden jump in capabilities feels not guaranteed, and even if it occurs it doesn't feel guaranteed that the humans couldn't notice and shut things down and re-orient. Yes, for a sufficient jump I think everything breaks, but it just seems reasonable to me that paranoid watchers can notice when the AI starts being more capable. I think my view matches with the experiences that we've seen in AI so far?
Problem-hiding and deception are naturally countered by corrigibility, and I expect a pseudo-corrigible agent to spend a bunch of cognitive effort hunting in their own mind for schemes and problems. That sort of effort, and the effort of surrounding humans, doesn't feel bulletproof, but it also doesn't seem obviously impossible. Like, I think if we applied a similar effort of scrutiny towards a genius human, it would probably be fine? Is the issue the scale of having thousands of geniuses, or in getting beyond genius level?
The philosophical problems of not knowing the True Name of corrigibility seem like the most fraught. I think my sense of hope here is that corrigibility isn't nearly as complex and fragile as a target compared to "human values" (whatever those are) and that conceptual progress can, in fact, be verified in a way that's pretty robust to manipulation. Like, if you train an AI to help make philosophical progress, and the AI isn't radically superhuman, and it's not thinking any thoughts like "I need to persuade them" then I don't see why you can't pass that AI's writing through a series of paraphrasers, give it to a council of philosophers and researchers, and have those humans squint at it skeptically and thus make more progress than if you just had humans trying to figure things out.
I guess I'm also not convinced that, seeing an actual CAST agent acting in the lab, you couldn't employ an army of philosophers and researchers to just simply figure out what it means to be corrigible (not directly talking to the AI) and have them figure it out.
Like, it seems fraught and uncertain, but I still don't see why it's necessarily doomed.
I can imagine a counter-argument that says "you're noticing deep problems and then your wishful thinking is saying 'but maybe they won't bite' but you should notice how deep and pernicious they are." But this argument feels like it proves too much. Don't plenty of fields have pernicious problems of a similar character, but manage to make progress anyway? Strong claims require strong evidence/argument, and I think iteration towards a progressively safer machine being, in practice, impossible is a strong claim. Why don't I thing the evidence/argument as strong? Where is the sharp taste of unrealism if I imagine a story where the AI helps the humans slowly iterate towards success?
ETA: I guess one thought that keeps popping up in my mind is that if success is conjunctive and disaster is disjunctive, that if you have a bunch of sources of disaster, even if they're all coinflips, they'll multiply out to small odds of success. Each individual source might be addressable, but in total they'll doom you.
My counter-thought is that Wentworth's 5 items are really more like 3 items where two are variants (capability jumps, deception/problem hiding, and philosophical confusion/measurement issues). Suppose I model these as independent and estimate on the high side of my intuition that capability jumps are 25% likely to bring doom (ignoring other things biting first), deception is 50% likely to bring doom, and confusion is 70% likely to bring doom. Multiplying .3*.5*.75 = ~11%, which feels about where I'm at. Unlikely to work, but possible. Am I just being naive, and the numbers from each threat are much higher? Are there other things that deserve their own categories? All of this should be taken as thinking-out-loud, more than some kind of conclusive statement.