Moral realism is an explicit version of the ordinary view of morality. It has the following assumptions:
Good and evil are objectively real.
We have the ability to recognize good and evil.
We have an objective moral obligation to do good and not do evil. Likewise, we have an objective moral right to not have evil done to us.
Society depends on morality to exist. The social order is created by human goodness, and it is destroyed by evil.
There are many problems with moral realism, including:
Moral realism has no definition of good and evil. If good and evil are objectively real properties or substances, like temperature or oxygen, it should be possible to define them in scientific terms.
Why are we obliged to do good and not do evil? Moral realism does not explain why we have this obligation, nor how it is imposed on us.
Moral judgments vary between individuals, cultures and societies. If good and evil are objective, and humans have essentially the same ability to recognize good and evil, then we would expect moral judgments to be mostly the same. But they are not.
In most cases, moral disagreements cannot be resolved by rational persuasion. If good and evil are objective, and humans have the ability to recognize good and evil, then we should be able to resolve moral disagreements with evidence and arguments. But we can’t.
Morality is ad hoc. Moral judgments can’t be reduced to a small number of principles applied consistently. The ad hoc nature of morality is hard to explain if morality reflects objective good and evil.
If moral realism is true, then most people would be morally good. But evil is pervasive. Individuals and societies don’t behave in a morally good way, generally speaking. Morality is often linked to hypocrisy.
Let’s go through these problems in more detail, starting with the definition of good and evil.
What are good and evil?
If good and evil are objectively real, then we should be able to measure them, analogous to how we measure height or temperature. We could construct a device to measure things on this objective moral dimension, in a way that is free from personal biases. Then we could use the device to resolve moral conflicts, in the same way that we can use a ruler to resolve a disagreement about height. But of course, we can’t do any of those things for good and evil.
The whole field of meta-ethics is bogus and produces verbiage that isn't helpful. The last paragraph here hits the nail on the head, an interlocutor can grant basically anything about morality, as long as there isn't an enforcement mechanism it's simply irrelevant.
Any non supernatural enforcement mechanism just turns compliance/non-compliance into a game theoretic problem. Even if there was a supernatural enforcement mechanism - people would just cooperate out of calculation, in which case morality and altruism get divorced and morality loses it's emotional appeal and just reduces to individual selfishness, if you think long enough about it, which chokes the motivation to care about morality in the first place.
The PDF version can be read here.
Moral realism is an explicit version of the ordinary view of morality. It has the following assumptions:
There are many problems with moral realism, including:
Let’s go through these problems in more detail, starting with the definition of good and evil.
What are good and evil?
If good and evil are objectively real, then we should be able to measure them, analogous to how we measure height or temperature. We could construct a device to measure things on this objective moral dimension, in a way that is free from personal biases. Then we could use the device to resolve moral conflicts, in the same way that we can use a ruler to resolve a disagreement about height. But of course, we can’t do any of those things for good and evil.
(see the rest of the post in the link)