Abstract.
The Qualia Narrative Theory (QNT) reframes the hard problem of consciousness as a
narrative feedback problem, proposing that the vividness of subjective experience—what we call qualia—emerges from an evolved social modeling loop that prepares internal perceptual content for potential communication. QNT integrates insights from philosophy (e.g., Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 1995; Baars, 1997), psychology and neuroscience (Frith & Frith, 2006; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), anthropology and culture (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Tomasello, 2008), and artificial intelligence (Shumailov et al., 2024) to offer a functionalist, testable account. The five-stage model predicts that
qualia intensity is modulated by social context, cultural norms, and narrative exchange. Evidence includes developmental and cross-cultural studies, isolation effects (Suedfeld, 2018), and AI degradation under recursive training ("MAD").
1. Introduction.
The “hard problem” asks why information processing feels like anything from the inside (Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 1995). Functional frameworks such as Global Workspace Theory describe access and control structures (Baars, 1997), but not the felt quality itself. QNT proposes that qualia are not intrinsic properties of perception; rather, they are emergent artifacts of a socially oriented communication pipeline that prepares internal states for potential sharing. This loop is recursive and predictive, leveraging mentalizing circuits implicated in reasoning about other minds (Frith & Frith, 2006) and is compatible with higher-order awareness accounts (Lau & Rosenthal,2011).
In humans, prolonged social isolation degrades experiential richness, producing dissociation and even hallucinations in a substantial subset (Suedfeld, 2018). In AI, training or prompting systems primarily on their own outputs leads to repetition and loss of coherence—a failure mode termed Model Autoregressive Degradation (MAD; Shumailov et al., 2024). QNT treats these as parallel manifestations of loop collapse without external anchoring.
2. Core Proposition.
Qualia emerge from a five-stage social modeling process:
1) Perception – Sensory data are processed into stable representations.
2) Internal Modeling – Representations are embedded within a personal worldview.
3) Social Simulation – Internal states are simulated as if for communication to others (theory-of-mind mechanisms; Frith & Frith, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014).
4) Narrative Encoding – Perceptual content is structured into shareable form (story-comprehension networks; Mar, 2011).
5) Feedback Integration – Actual or imagined feedback modifies future processing, maintaining the loop. Isolation or monotonic environments weaken stages 3–5, reducing qualia vividness.
3. Human Evidence
3.1 Developmental. Joint attention and gaze cueing scaffold early social simulation (Frischen,Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Infants use social referencing to interpret ambiguity (Campos & Stenberg,1981), foreshadowing the communication-first framing of qualia.
3.2 Cultural Modulation. Cultural frameworks bias what is encoded for sharing—holistic vs. analytic perception alters the qualitative profile of what “stands out” (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). Language,pedagogy, and coordinated action practices provide a natural pathway for such biases to shape the loop (Tomasello, 2008).
3.3 Social Modulation of Intensity. Anticipated support or exclusion changes reported intensity of experience; e.g., social contact buffers threat responses (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006) and exclusion recruits pain circuitry (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), consistent with QNT’s prediction that the loop tunes vividness.
3.4 Isolation and Deprivation. Reviews of solitary confinement and extreme environments report dissociation, derealization, and perceptual anomalies; hallucinations occur in a notable minority, while broader distress is widespread (Suedfeld, 2018). QNT explains these as consequences of a weakened social-model loop.
4. AI Analogy and MAD. Under recursive self-training or self-prompting, LLMs drift toward repetition, mode collapse, and loss of tail behavior (Shumailov et al., 2024). The structural homology to human isolation is the missing external anchor: without diverse interaction, the narrative/semantic loop loses calibration.
5. Comparative Parallels
In humans, prolonged social or sensory deprivation can produce hallucinations, derealization, and a flattening of perceptual vividness (Suedfeld, 2018). Under the Qualia Narrative Theory (QNT), these effects occur because the social-model loop erodes, weakening the narrative anchor that sustains vivid experience. Mitigation examples include re-engaging in narrative exchange and structured, varied interaction.
In AI systems, recursive-only prompting produces repetition, self-reference, and mode collapse (Shumailov et al., 2024). QNT interprets this as a collapse of the narrative/semantic loop without fresh grounding. Mitigation strategies include human-in-the-loop interventions and periodic diversification of training inputs.
For both humans and AI, a lack of external anchoring causes a progressive loss of richness and constructive feedback. This results in a convergence toward collapse unless external feedback is reintroduced to stabilize the system. Mitigation involves structured interaction with diverse, grounded inputs.
6. Predictions and Hypotheses.
Cultural Variability: VR studies priming holistic vs. analytic framing will show corresponding differences in reported vividness (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005).
Isolation Effects: Controlled deprivation will flatten reported qualia; structured reintroduction of narrative exchange will restore it (Suedfeld, 2018).
AI Retention Rates: LLMs with periodic human-curated input retain substantially more coherence under recursion than self-only controls (Shumailov et al., 2024).
7. Implications and Limitations.
QNT is compatible with integrated-information views (Tononi,
2008) while adding a social elaboration: the interface we experience as 'what it’s like' is built for communication. Limitations include non-social species and contemplative practices; QNT allows that internalized models may substitute for live interaction. Comparative work can test whether rudimentary proto-qualia emerge without social history.
8. Broader Applications.
For AI, maintain interaction diversity to avoid MAD; design training
curricula that require modeling other agents’ interpretations. For mental health, therapies can explicitly reactivate narrative exchange to restore experiential vividness.
9. Conclusion.
QNT treats qualia as an emergent consequence of preparing perception for social
exchange. Across humans and machines, richness and coherence depend on sustained interaction with diverse others. This reframing turns the hard problem into a program of experiments and designs rather than a metaphysical impasse.
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