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Rejected for the following reason(s):
I'm 16 and recently spent time thinking about the hard problem of consciousness. I arrived at a hypothesis and I'd like get an opinion by people who actually know what they're talking about (or at least just understand this stuff better, because from now on I only have pure speculation).
So:
I distinguish between "self" (the unique pattern of memories/experiences) and "consciousness" (subjective experience/awareness). A philosophical zombie could theoretically have a complex "self" but lack subjective experience.
But then a question: if a zombie can process information, learn, and even model itself functionally, what evolutionary advantage does subjective experience provide?
I assumed:
Consciousness isn't an epiphenomenon but an adaptation for what I'm calling "second-order cognitive flexibility".
- First-order flexibility (zombies could have): learning, adaptation, impulse control
- Second-order flexibility (requires subjectivity?): meta-processing, recognizing and modifying one's own thinking patterns, existential reframing, creative insight beyond algorithmic search
Basically when instincts became insufficient in complex/changing environments, subjective awareness emerged as the mechanism enabling radical self-modification.
1. Does this already exist in the literature? If so, under what name? I really need this.
2. What are the strongest counterarguments? (I assume there are a lot of them)
3. Am I just restating functionalism in different words?