AnnaSalamon

Sequences

Decision Theory: Newcomb's Problem

Comments

Open & Welcome Thread - June 2020

I'm glad you're trying, and am sorry to hear it is so hard; that sounds really hard. You might try the book "How to have Impossible Conversations." I don't endorse every bit of it, but there's some good stuff in there IMO, or at least I got mileage from it.

Hanson vs Mowshowitz LiveStream Debate: "Should we expose the youth to coronavirus?" (Mar 29th)

Yes; thanks; I now agree that this is plausible, which I did not at the time of making my above comment.

Hanson vs Mowshowitz LiveStream Debate: "Should we expose the youth to coronavirus?" (Mar 29th)

​I think we are unlikely to hit herd immunity levels of infection in the US in the next 2 years. I want to see Robin and Zvi discuss whether they think that also or not, since this bears on the value of Robin's proposal (and lots of other things).

Mazes Sequence Roundup: Final Thoughts and Paths Forward

For anyone just tuning in and wanting to follow what I mean by “dominating and submitting,” I have in mind the kinds of interactions that Keith Johnstone describes in the “status” chapter of “Impro” (text here; excerpt and previous overcoming bias discussion here.)

This is the book that indirectly caused us to use the word “status” so often around here, but I feel the term “status” is a euphemism that brings model-distortions, versus discussing “dominating and submitting.” FWIW, Johnstone in the original passage says it is a euphemism, writing: “I should really talk about dominance and submission, but I’d create a resistance. Students who will agree readily to raising or lowering their status may object if asked to ‘dominate’ or ‘submit’.” (Hattip: Divia.)

Mazes Sequence Roundup: Final Thoughts and Paths Forward

The Snafu Principle, whereby communication is only fully possible between equals, leading to Situation Normal All F***ed Up.

This seems true to me in one sense of “equals” and false in another. It seems true to me that dominating and submitting prohibit real communication. It does not seem true to me that structures of authority (“This is my coffee shop; and so if you want to work here you’ll have to sign a contract with me, and then I’ll be able to stop hiring you later if I don’t want to hire you later”) necessarily prohibit communication, though. I can imagine contexts where free agents voluntarily decide to enter into an authority relationship (e.g., because I freely choose to work at Bob’s coffee shop until such time as it ceases to aid my and/or Bob’s goals), without dominating or submitting, and thereby with the possibility of communication.

Relatedly, folks who are peers can easily enough end up dominating/submitting-to each other, or getting stuck reinforcing lies to each other about how good each others’ poetry is or whatever, instead of communicating.

Do you agree that this is the true bit of the “communication is only possible between equals” claim, or do you have something else in mind?

Player vs. Character: A Two-Level Model of Ethics

I'm a bit torn here, because the ideas in the post seem really important/useful to me (e.g., I use these phrases as a mental pointer sometimes), such that I'd want anyone trying to make sense of the human situation to have access to them (via this post or a number of other attempts at articulating much the same, e.g. "Elephant and the Brain"). And at the same time I think there's some crucial misunderstanding in it that is dangerous and that I can't articulate. Voting for it anyhow though.

Reality-Revealing and Reality-Masking Puzzles

Responding partly to Orthonormal and partly to Raemon:

Part of the trouble is that group dynamic problems are harder to understand, harder to iterate on, and take longer to appear and to be obvious. (And are then harder to iterate toward fixing.)

Re: individuals having manic or psychotic episodes, I agree with what Raemon says. About six months into a year into CFAR’s workshop-running experience, a participant had a manic episode a couple weeks after a workshop in a way that seemed plausibly triggered partly by the workshop. (Interestingly, if I’m not mixing people up, the same individual later told me that they’d also been somewhat destabilized by reading the sequences, earlier on.) We then learned a lot about warning signs of psychotic or manic episodes and took a bunch of steps to mostly-successfully reduce the odds of having the workshop trigger these. (In terms of causal mechanisms: It turns out that workshops of all sorts, and stuff that messes with one’s head of all sorts, seem to trigger manic or psychotic episodes occasionally. E.g. Landmark workshops; meditation retreats; philosophy courses; going away to college; many different types of recreational drugs; and different small self-help workshops run by a couple people I tried randomly asking about this from outside the rationality community. So my guess is that it isn’t the “taking ideas seriously” aspect of CFAR as such, although I dunno.)

Re: other kinds of “less sane”:

(1) IMO, there has been a build-up over time of mentally iffy psychological habits/techniques/outlook-bits in the Berkeley “formerly known as rationality” community, including iffy thingies that affect the rate at which other iffy things get created (e.g., by messing with the taste of those receiving/evaluating/passing on new “mess with your head” techniques; and by helping people be more generative of “mess with your head” methods via them having had a chance to see several already which makes it easier to build more). My guess is that CFAR workshops have accidentally been functioning as a “gateway drug” toward many things of iffy sanity-impact, basically by: (a) providing a healthy-looking context in which people get over their concerns about introspection/self-hacking because they look around and see other happy healthy-looking people; and (b) providing some entry-level practice with introspection, and with “dialoging with one’s tastes and implicit models and so on”, which makes it easier for people to mess with their heads in other, less-vetted ways later.

My guess is that the CFAR workshop has good effects on folks who come from a sane-isn or at least stable-is outside context, attend a workshop, and then return to that outside context. My guess is that its effects are iffier for people who are living in the bay area, do not have a day job/family/other anchor, and are on a search for “meaning.”

My guess is that those effects have been getting gradually worse over the last five or more years, as a background level of this sort of thing accumulates.

I ought probably to write about this in a top-level post, and may actually manage to do so. I’m also not at all confident of my parsing/ontology here, and would quite appreciate help with it.

(2) Separately, AI risk seems pretty hard for people, including ones unrelated to this community.

(3) Separately, “taking ideas seriously” indeed seems to pose risks. And I had conversations with e.g. Michael Vassar back in ~2008 where he pointed out that this poses risks; it wasn’t missing from the list. (Even apart from tail risks, some forms of “taking ideas seriously” seem maybe-stupid in cases where the “ideas” are not grounded also in one’s inner simulator, tastes, viscera — much sense is there that isn’t in ideology-mode alone). I don’t know whether CFAR workshops increase or decrease peoples’ tendency to take ideas seriously in the problematic sense, exactly. They have mostly tried to connect peoples’ ideas and peoples’ viscera in both directions.

“How to take ideas seriously without [the taking ideas seriously bit] causing them to go insane” as such actually still isn’t that high on my priorities list; I’d welcome arguments that it should be, though.

I’d also welcome arguments that I’m just distinguishing 50 types of snow and that these should all be called the same thing from a distance. But for the moment for me the group-level gradual health/wholesomeness shifts and the individual-level stuff show up as pretty different.

Reality-Revealing and Reality-Masking Puzzles

There are some edge cases I am confused about, many of which are quite relevant to the “epistemic immune system vs Sequences/rationality” stuff discussed above:

Let us suppose a person has two faculties that are both pretty core parts of their “I” -- for example, deepset “yuck/this freaks me out” reactions (“A”), and explicit reasoning (“B”). Now let us suppose that the deepset “yuck/this freaks me out” reactor (A) is being used to selectively turn off the person’s contact with explicit reasoning in cases where it predicts that B “reasoning” will be mistaken / ungrounded / not conducive to the goals of the organism. (Example: a person’s explicit models start saying really weird things about anthropics, and then they have a less-explicit sense that they just shouldn’t take arguments seriously in this case.)

What does it mean to try to “help” a person in such as case, where two core faculties are already at loggerheads, or where one core faculty is already masking things from another?

If a person tinkers in such a case toward disabling A’s ability to disable B’s access to the world… the exact same process, in its exact same aspect, seems “reality-revealing” (relative to faculty B) and “reality-masking” (relative to faculty A).

Reality-Revealing and Reality-Masking Puzzles

To try yet again:

The core distinction between tinkering that is “reality-revealing” and tinkering that is “reality-masking,” is which process is learning to predict/understand/manipulate which other process.

When a process that is part of your core “I” is learning to predict/manipulate an outside process (as with the child who is whittling, and is learning to predict/manipulate the wood and pocket knife), what is happening is reality-revealing.

When a process that is not part of your core “I” is learning to predict/manipulate/screen-off parts of your core “I”s access to data, what is happening is often reality-masking.

(Multiple such processes can be occurring simultaneously, as multiple processes learn to predict/manipulate various other processes all at once.)

The "learning" in a given reality-masking process can be all in a single person's head (where a person learns to deceive themselves just by thinking self-deceptive thoughts), but it often occurs via learning to impact outside systems that then learn to impact the person themselves (like in the example of me as a beginning math tutor learning to manipulate my tutees into manipulating me into thinking I'd explained things clearly)).

The "reality-revealing" vs "reality-masking" distinction is in attempt to generalize the "reasoning" vs "rationalizing" distinction to processes that don't all happen in a single head.

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