Maybe one distinction here is that you mention this question: Under which office can a random maniac who somehow ends up in that position cause more chaos or seize power?
But there is another question: Which office in practice results in more powerful officeholders, holding the population itself constant?
The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be
This isn't because the president can't pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he's a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its "checks and balances", that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to "get things done" that aren't getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
The distinction between the two systems really only matters if the legislature opposes the seizure.
With this, you focus too narrowly on this specific minority-rule "seizure of power" scenario rather than the relative power of the offices more generally.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
At the end of the day, the rule of a law is a Tinker Bell situation (it only survives if we believe in it). Long-term constitutional stability under a presidential system of government is also quite exceptional. The standard argument is that the US is the only successful case of long-run constitutional stability under a presidential argument (though, depending on how you define long-run, you might throw in Costa Rica today). We're very lucky that we've believed for so long.
Can you explain your thinking here more and how it connects to the idea of constitutional risk?
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren't strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
1Right, my point was that I understood "institutional erosion" to mean "damage to norms that are central to our constitutional order." I didn't understand it to mean more literally reducing the funding or personnel of any government body. For example, if Congress passed an act tomorrow closing the Smithsonian, I wouldn't consider that "institutional erosion" in the sense we're talking about.
Likewise, if an administration legally wound down ICE, the Education Department, or whatever, that isn't what I mean by "institutional erosion." If the HHS secretary believes that vaccines cause autism, that's also not what I mean. People sometimes use the term so loosely that they imply that it's "institutional erosion" to do things that create tons of outrage from the prestige media, as if a core norm of our constitutional order is not to pass policy that contradicts that class.
2Ah, maybe you were using a looser definition of "institution." I think it's fine for the government to move toward dismantling the Department of Education, for example, because I don't think of it as a core "institution" in the sense we're talking about.
Do you think it's institutional erosion when Biden withdrew from Afghanistan, or if a Democratic president were to abolish ICE in 2029?
Is this meant to reply to my other comment? What is this referring to
@1a3orn Could you also elaborate on why you think the ideas marketplace has became more dysfunction over the last 10–20 years?
A few of these are, if somewhat unprecedented, not really institutional erosion, because they have a legitimate constitutional basis. The executive power is vested in the president and Congress shouldn't be able to create "independent" executive agencies or prevent him from firing particular staff through legislation. The qualification of appointments is just opinion and not institutional erosion. The IG firing, if actually unprecedented and unreasonably politically motivated, is a better example, as is the unilateral USAID-related impoundment.
Yes, that's a typo.
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I'm not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
Why do you think it's better to have term limits?