I honestly haven't thought especially in depth or meaningfully about the LTBT and this is zero percent a claim about the LTBT, but as someone who has written a decent number of powerpoint decks that went to boards and used to be a management consultant and corporate strategy team member, I would generally be dissatisfied with the claim that a board's most relevant metric is how many seats it currently has filled (so long as it has enough filled to meet quorum).  

As just one example, it is genuinely way easier than you think for a board to have a giant binder full of "people we can emergency appoint to the board, if we really gotta" and be choosing not to exercise that binder because, conditional on no-emergency, they genuinely and correctly prefer waiting for someone being appointed to the board who has an annoying conflict that they're in the process of resolving (e.g., selling off shares in a competitor or waiting out a post-government-employment "quiet period" or similar).
 

I'm about to embark on the classic exercise of "think a bunch about AI policy."

Does anyone actually have an up to date collection of "here are all the existing AI safety policy proposals out there"?

(Yes, I know, your existing proposal is already great and we should just implement it as-is.  Think of the goal of this exercise being to convince someone else who needs to see a spreadsheet of "here are all the ideas, here is why idea number three is the best one")

I think this is somewhat true, but also think in Washington it's also about becoming known as "someone to go talk to about this" whether or not they're your ally.  Being helpful and genial and hosting good happy hours is surprisingly influential.

I agree with all of this -- but also do think that there's a real aspect here about some of the ideas lying around embedded existing policy constraints that were true both before and after the policy window changed.  For example, Saudi Arabia was objectively a far better target for a 9/11-triggered casus belli than Iraq (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, as was bin Laden himself!), but no one had a proposal to invade Saudi Arabia on the shelf because in a pre-fracking United States, invading Saudi Arabia would essentially mean "shatter the US economy into a third Arab Oil Embargo."

I’m kind of confused by why these consequences didn’t hit home earlier.

I'm, I hate to say it, an old man among these parts in many senses; I voted in 2004, and a nontrivial percentage of the Lesswrong crowd wasn't even alive then, and many more certainly not old enough to remember what it was like.  The past is a different country, and 2004 especially so.  

First: For whatever reason, it felt really really impossible for Democrats in 2004 to say that they were against the war, or that the administration had lied about WMDs.  At the time, the standard reason why was that you'd get blamed for "not supporting the troops."  But with the light of hindsight, I think what was really going on was that we had gone collectively somewhat insane after 9/11 -- we saw mass civilian death on our TV screens happen in real time; the towers collapsing was just a gut punch.  We thought for several hours on that day that several tens of thousands of people had died in the Twin Towers, before we learned just how many lives had been saved in the evacuation thanks to the sacrifice of so many emergency responders and ordinary people to get most people out. 

And we wanted revenge.  We just did.  We lied to ourselves about WMDs and theories of regime change and democracy promotion, but the honest answer was that we'd missed getting bin Laden in Afghanistan (and the early days of that were actually looking quite good!), we already hated Saddam Hussein (who, to be clear, was a monstrous dictator), and we couldn't invade the Saudis without collapsing our own economy.  As Thomas Friedman put it, the message to the Arab world was "Suck on this." And then we invaded Iraq, and collapsed their army so quickly and toppled their country in a month.  And things didn't start getting bad for months after, and things didn't get truly awful until Bush's second term.  Heck, the Second Battle for Fallujah only started in November 2004.

And so, in late summer 2004, telling the American people that you didn't support the people who were fighting the war we'd chosen to fight, the war that was supposed to get us vengeance and make us feel safe again -- it was just not possible.  You weren't able to point to that much evidence that the war itself was a fundamentally bad idea, other than that some Europeans were mad at us, and we were fucking tired of listening to Europe.  (Yes, I know this makes no sense, they were fighting and dying alongside us in Afghanistan.  We were insane.)  

Second: Kerry very nearly won -- indeed, early on in election night 2004, it looked like he was going to!  That's part of why him losing was such a body blow to the Dems and, frankly, part of what opened up a lane for Obama in 2008.  Perhaps part of why he ran it so close was that he avoided taking a stronger stance, honestly.

I mean, two points:
1.  We all work too many hours, working 70 hours a week persistently is definitely too many to maximize output.  You get dumb fast after hour 40 and dive into negative productivity.  There's a robust organizational psych literature on this, I'm given to understand, that we all choose to ignore, because the first ~12 weeks or so, you can push beyond and get more done, but then it backfires.

2.  You're literally saying statements that I used to say before burning out, and that the average consultant or banker says as part of their path to burnout. And we cannot afford to lose either of you to burnout, especially not right now.

If you're taking a full 4 weeks, great.  2 weeks a year is definitely not enough at a 70 hours a week pace, based on the observed long term health patterns of everyone I've known who works that pace for a long time.  I'm willing to assert that you working 48/50ths of the hours a year you'd work otherwise is worth it, assuming fairly trivial speedups in productivity of literally just over 4% from being more refreshed, getting new perspectives from downing tools, etc.

I'd like to strongly assert that you'd want your design spec to be multiplayer from the start so that you can have virtually any arbitrary mix of LLMs and people.  You'll probably want this later and there are likely to be some design decisions that you'll make wrong if you assume there's never more than one person

I would strongly, strongly argue that essentially "take all your vacation" is a strategy that would lead to more impact for you on your goals, almost regardless of what they are.

Humans need rest, and humans like the folks on LW tend not to take enough.

"We don't want it to be the case that models can be convinced to blackmail people just by putting them in a situation that the predictor thinks is fictional!"  

This is interesting!  I guess that in, some sense, means that you see certain ways in which even a future Claude N+1 won't be a truly general intelligence?