Facts may or may not be beliefs; there are infinite facts that no one knows (in addition to those facts that most people disbelieve, which tend to be the sorts of facts that, if I were to mention them, would make some people angry, so I won't.)

Hmm: you say "Chalmers denies that he's an epiphenomenalist" and has a "core objection to interactionism", but Chalmers said he endorses "the thesis (Z) that zombies are logically possible", and Bentham's Bulldog says the zombie argument is an argument for non-physicalism, which he implies means "Consciousness is its own separate thing that is not explainable just in terms of the way matter behaves" and which is subdivided into dualism (epiphenomenalism and interactionism) and "niche views". Does Chalmers, then, endorse one of the "niche views" like "idealism and panpsychism"?

Not exactly, as Chalmers said:

substance dualism (in its epiphenomenalist and interactionist forms) and Russellian monism (in its panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms) are the two serious contenders in the metaphysics of consciousness, at least once one has given up on standard physicalism. (I divide my own credence fairly equally between them.) 

So I'm pretty confused about what Chalmers' opinion is. Maybe it changed over time? Even so, I think it's pretty bad that when Chalmers tried to correct EY's 2008 post 4 days after he posted it, EY not only didn't understand Chalmers' argument (rather, he argues that Chalmers was thinking incorrectly), he didn't even take notice that Chalmers said he doesn't believe what EY says he believes, so when he reposts nearly the same article 8 years later, he misrepresents Chalmers' beliefs in the same way again.

In the short term, yes. In the medium term, the entire economy would be transformed by AGI or quasi-AGI, likely increasing broad stock indices (I also expect there will be various other effects I can't predict, maybe including factors that mute stock prices, whether dystopian disaster or non-obvious human herd behavior).

I've seen a lot of finance videos talking about the stock market and macroeconomics/future trends that never once mention AI/AGI. And many who do talk about AI think it's just a bubble and/or that AI ≅ LLMs/DALL·E; prices seem high for such a person. And as Francois Chollet noted, "LLMs have sucked the oxygen out of the room" which I think could possibly slow down progress toward AGI enough that a traditional Gartner hype cycle plays out, leading to temporarily cooler investment/prices... hope so, fingers crossed.

I'm curious, what makes it more of an AI stock than... whatever you're comparing it to?

Well, yeah, it bothers me that the "bayesian" part of rationalism doesn't seem very bayesian―otherwise we'd be having a lot of discussions about where priors come from, how to best accomplish the necessary mental arithmetic, how to go about counting evidence and dealing with ambiguous counts (if my friends Alice and Bob both tell me X, it could be two pieces of evidence for X or just one depending on what generated the claims; how should I count evidence by default, and are there things I should be doing to find the underlying evidence?)

So―vulnerable in the current culture, but rationalists should strive to be the opposite of the "gishy" dark-epistemic people I have on my mind. Having many reasons to think X isn't necessarily a sin, but dark-epistemic people gather many reasons and have many sins, which are a good guide of what not to do.

TBH, a central object of interest to me is people using Dark Epistemics. People with a bad case of DE typically have "gishiness" as a central characteristic, and use all kinds of fallacies of which motte-and-bailey (hidden or not) is just one. I describe them together just because I haven't seen LW articles on them before. If I were specifically naming major DE syndromes, I might propose the "backstop of conspiracy" (a sense that whatever the evidence at hand doesn't explain is probably still explained by some kind of conspiracy) and projection (a tendency to loudly complain that one's political enemies have whatever negative characteristics you yourself, or your political heroes, are currently exhibiting). Such things seem very effective at protecting the person's beliefs from challenge. I think there's also a social element ("my friends all believe the same thing") but this is kept well-hidden. EDIT: other telltale signs include refusing to acknowledge that one got anything wrong or made any mistake, no matter how small; refusing to acknowledge that the 'opponent' is right about anything, no matter how minor; an allergy to detail (refusing to look at the details of any subtopic); and shifting the playfield repeatedly (changing the topic when one appears to be losing the argument).

The Hidden-Motte-And-Bailey fallacy: belief in a Bailey inspires someone to invent a Motte and write an article about it. The opinion piece describes the Motte exclusively with no mention of the Bailey. Others read it and nod along happily because it supports their cherished Bailey, and finally they share it with others in an effort to help promote the Bailey.

Example: Christian philosopher describes new argument for the existence of a higher-order-infinity God which bears no resemblance to any Abrahamic God, and which no one before the 20th century had ever conceived of.

Maybe the Motte is strong, maybe it isn't, but it feels very strong when combined with the Gish Fallacy: the feeling of safety some people (apparently) get by collecting large numbers of claims and arguments, whether or not they routinely toss them out as Gish Gallops at anyone who disagrees. The Gish Fallacy seems to be the opposite of the mathematician's mindset, for mathematicians know that a single flaw can destroy proofs of any length. While the mathematician is satisfied by a single a short and succinct proof or disproof, the Gish mindset wishes to read a thousand different descriptions of three dozen arguments, with another thousand pithy rejections of their counterarguments, so they're thoroughly prepared to dismiss the evil arguments of the enemies of truth―or, if the enemy made a good point, there are still 999 articles supporting their view, and more where that came from!

Example: my dad

I know this comment was 17 years ago, but nearly half of modern US politics in 2024 is strongly influenced by the idea "don't trust experts". I have listened to a lot of cranks (ex), and the popular ones are quite good at what they do, rhetorically, so most experts have little chance against them in a debate. Plus, if the topic is something important, the public was already primed to believe one side or the other by whatever media they happen to consume, and if the debate winner would otherwise seem close (to a layman) then such preconceptions will dominate perceptions about who won.

One thing these winning cranks take advantage is that the audience (like the cranks themselves!) tend to believe they are "knowledgeable enough to understand all the technical arguments" when they're not. Also, most experts have much worse teaching skills than these cranks (who are popular for a reason) so the expert tends to provide worse explanations, while also overlooking key counterarguments they could make against the crank's case.

So: in today's environment, I see a large fraction of the population as giving too little credence to authority in cases where they only partially evaluate the arguments. Related SSC. Like proofs, arguments can be completely wrong due to a single flaw. A partial evaluation will not necessarily uncover the flaw, but pop cranks are often good at pointing out things that appear as flaws to the uneducated (perhaps because they have a shorter inferential distance to the audience than the experts do, but also because they have more practice in public debate). And needless to say, people who are undecided don't know that they're listening to a crank, and would be offended if you claimed that the one who they thought won the debate was a crank.

I actually think Yudkowsky's biggest problem may be that he is not talking about his models. In his most prominent posts about AGI doom, such as this and the List of Lethalities, he needs to provide a complete model that clearly and convincingly leads to doom (hopefully without the extreme rhetoric) in order to justify the extreme rhetoric. Why does attempted, but imperfect, alignment lead universally to doom in all likely AGI designs*, when we lack familiarity with the relevant mind design space, or with how long it will take to escalate a given design from AGI to ASI?

* I know his claim isn't quite this expansive, but his rhetorical style encourages an expansive interpretation.

I'm baffled he gives so little effort to explaining his model. In List of Lethalities he spends a few paragraphs of preamble to cover some essential elements of concern (-3, -2, -1), then offers a few potentially-reasonable-but-minimally-supported assertions, before spending much of the rest of the article prattling off the various ways AGI can kill everyone. Personally I felt like he just skipped over a lot of the important topics, and so didn't bother to read it to the end.

I think there is probably some time after the first AGI or quasi-AGI arrives, but before the most genocide-prone AGI arrives, in which alignment work can still be done. Eliezer's rhetorical approach confusingly chooses to burn bridges with this world, as he and MIRI (and probably, by association, rationalists) will be regarded as a laughing stock when that world arrives. Various techbros including AI researchers will be saying "well, AGI came and we're all still alive, yet there's EY still reciting his doomer nonsense". EY will uselessly protest "I didn't say AGI would necessarily kill everyone right away" while the techbros retweet old EY quotes that kinda sound like that's what he's saying.

Edit: for whoever disagreed & downvoted: what for? You know there are e/accs on Twitter telling everyone that the idea of x-risk is based on Yudkowsky being "king of his tribe", and surely you know that this is not how LessWrong is supposed to work. The risk isn't supposed to be based on EY's say-so; a complete and convincing model is needed. If, on the other hand, you disagreed that his communication is incomplete and unconvincing, it should not offend you that not everyone agrees. Like, holy shit: you think humanity will cause apocalypse because it's not listening to EY, but how dare somebody suggest that EY needs better communication. I wrote this comment because I think it's very important; what are you here for?