ike's Comments

What fraction of your lifetime (0-80 years old) egoist budget would you (want to) spend on a pill that made you live for as long as you wanted (perfect invincibility), as healthily as you wanted if you knew it would become available to you once you're 80 years old (and that you would otherwise irreversibly die)?
Answer by ikeMay 08, 20202

100%, assuming I have enough to eat and other basic needs at all times. I was originally going to say 95% and hold some back for internet/devices/etc but then realized I could use libraries. If libraries cease to exist in a useable form over this timeframe then modify this down to the minimum required to get a basic level of connection.

Review of "Lifecycle Investing"

Your DCA recommendation in 3 is found by several studies to be riskier and lower return than lump sum investing. Do you believe those are similarly flawed?

Vaccine... Help? Deprogramming? Something?

I'd recommend, for each argument, finding someone who makes that argument online, and posting it to skeptics stack exchange. I used to do that years ago and found people were very helpful in doing research and finding good sources on a wide variety of topics.

What's going on with "provability"?

There's a non-trivial proof of "P or not P" for a specific P.

What's going on with "provability"?

All provable statements follow from the axioms, including "P or not P" for any particular P. It's the same sense as any other statement can be provable.

What's going on with "provability"?
Answer by ikeOct 13, 20192

Note that you can prove "P or not P".

ike's Shortform

How does it imply that?

I have intuitions on both sides. The intuition against is that predicting the outcome of a process can be done without having anything isomorphic to individual steps in that process - it seems plausible (or at the very least, possible and coherent) for humans to be predictable, even perfectly, without having something isomorphic to a human. But a perfect predictor would count as an arbitrarily accurate simulation.

ike's Shortform

The argument that qualia can't be epiphenomenal.

ike's Shortform

Causality is different, for one. You in reality has a causal structure where future actions are caused by the state of you in the present + some inputs. You in the simulation has a causal structure where actions are caused by the simulator, to some extent.

I'm not really assuming that. My question is if there's a coherent position where humans are conscious, p-zombie humans are impossible, but simulations can be high fidelity yet not conscious.

I'm not asking if it's true, just whether the standard argument against p-zombies rules this out as well.

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