What specifically do you think is obviously wrong about the village idiot <-> Einstein gap?  This post from 2008 which uses the original chart makes some valid points that hold up well today, and rebuts some real misconceptions that were common at the time.

The original chart doesn't have any kind of labels or axes, but here are two ways you could plausibly view it as "wrong" in light of recent developments with LLMs:

• Duration: the chart could be read as a claim that the gap between the development of village idiot and Einstein-level AI in wall-clock time would be more like hours or days rather than months or years.
• Size and dimensionality of mind-space below the superintelligence level. The chart could be read as a claim that the size of mindspace between village idiot and Einstein is relatively small, so it's surprising to Eliezer-200x that there are lots of current AIs landing in between them, and staying there for a while.

I think it's debatable how much Eliezer was actually making the stronger versions of the claims above circa 2008, and also remains to be seen how wrong they actually are, when applied to actual superintelligence instead of whatever you want to call the AI models of today.

OTOH, here are a couple of ways that the village idiot <-> Einstein post looks prescient:

• Qualitative differences between the current best AI models and second-to-third tier models are small. Most AI models today are all roughly similar to each other in terms of overall architecture and training regime, but there are various tweaks and special sauce that e.g. Opus and GPT-5 have that Llama 4 doesn't. So you have something like: Llama 4: GPT-5 :: Village idiot : Einstein, which is predicted by:

Maybe Einstein has some minor genetic differences from the village idiot, engine tweaks.  But the brain-design-distance between Einstein and the village idiot is nothing remotely like the brain-design-distance between the village idiot and a chimpanzee.  A chimp couldn't tell the difference between Einstein and the village idiot, and our descendants may not see much of a difference either.

(and something like a 4B parameter open-weights model is analogous to the chimpanzee)

Whereas I expect that e.g. Robin Hanson in 2008 would have been quite surprised by the similarity and non-specialization among different models of today.

• Implications for scaling. Here's a claim on which I think the Eliezer-200x Einstein chart makes a prediction that is likely to outperform other mental models of 2008, as well as various contemporary predictions based on scaling "laws" or things like METR task time horizon graphs:
  
  "The rough number of resources, in terms of GPUs, energy, wall clock time, lines of Python code, etc. needed to train and run best models today (e.g. o4, GPT-5), are sufficient (or more than sufficient) to train and run a superintelligence (without superhuman / AI-driven levels of optimization / engineering / insight)."
  
  My read of task-time-horizon and scaling law-based models of AI progress is that they more strongly predict that further AI progress will basically require more GPUs. It might be that the first Einstein+ level AGI is in fact developed mostly through scaling, but these models of progress are also more surprised than Eliezer-2008 when it turns out that (ordinary, human-developed) algorithmic improvements and optimizations allow for the training of e.g. a GPT-4-level model with many fewer resources than it took to train the original GPT-4 just a few years ago.

Thanks for the report, should be fixed now.

The issue was that the LW GraphQL API has changed slightly, apparently. The user query suggested here no longer works, but something like:

{
      GetUserBySlug(slug: "max-h") {
          _id
          slug
          displayName
          pageUrl
          postCount
          commentCount
          createdAt
      }
}

works fine.

I prefer (classical / bedrock) liberalism as a frame for confronting societal issues with AGI, and am concerned by the degree to which recent right-wing populism has moved away from those tenets.

Liberalism isn't perfect, but it's the only framework I know of that even has a chance of resulting in a stable consensus. Other frames, left or right, have elements of coercion and / or majoritarianism that inevitably lead to legitimacy crises and instability as stakes get higher and disagreements wider.

My understanding is that a common take on both the left and right these days is that, well, liberalism actually hasn't worked out so great for the masses recently, so everyone is looking for something else. But to me every "something else" on both the left and right just seems worse - Scott Alexander wrote a bunch of essays like 10y ago on various aspects of liberalism and why they're good, and I'm not aware of any comprehensive rebuttal that includes an actually workable alternative.

Liberalism doesn't imply that everyone needs to live under liberalism (especially my own preferred version / implementation of it), but it does provide a kind of framework for disagreement and settling differences in a way that is more peaceful and stable than any other proposal I've seen.

So for example on protectionism, I think most forms of protectionism (especially economic protectionism) are bad and counterproductive economic policy. But even well-implemented protectionism requires a justification beyond just "it actually is in the national interest to do this", because it infringes on standard individual rights and freedoms. These freedoms aren't necessarily absolute, but they're important enough that it requires strong and ongoing justification for why a government is even allowed to do that kind of thing. AGI might be a pretty strong justification!

But at the least, I think anyone proposing a framework or policy position which deviates from a standard liberal position should acknowledge liberalism as a kind of starting point / default, and be able to say why the tradeoff of any individual freedom or right is worth making, each and every time it is made. (And I do not think right-wing frameworks and their standard bearers are even trying to do this, and that is very bad.)

I think it was fine for Nate to delete your comment and block you, and fine for you to repost it as a short form.

But my anecdote is a valid report of the historical consequences of talking with Nate – just as valid as the e/acc co-founder's tweet.

"just as valid" [where validity here = topical] seems like an overclaim here. And at the time of your comment, Nate had already commented in other threads, which are now linked in a footnote in the OP:

By "cowardice" here I mean the content, not the tone or demeanor. I acknowledge that perceived arrogance and overconfidence can annoy people in communication, and can cause backlash. For more on what I mean by courageous vs cowardly content, see this comment. I also spell out the argument more explicitly in this thread.

So it's a bit of a stretch to say that any AI safety-related discussion or interpersonal interaction that Nate has ever had in any context is automatically topical.

I also think your description of Nate's decision to delete your comment as "not ... allowing people to read negative truths about his own behavior" is somewhat overwrought. Both of the comment threads you linked were widely read and discussed at the time, and this shortform will probably also get lots of eyeballs and attention. 

At the very least, there is an alternate interpretation, which is that the comment really was off-topic in Nate's view, and given the history between the two of you, he chose to block + delete instead of re-litigating or engaging in a back-and-forth that both of you would probably find unpleasant and unproductive. Maybe it would have been more noble or more wise of him to simply let your comment stand without direct engagement, but that can also feel unpleasant (for Nate or others).

I gave YIMBYism as an example of a policy agenda that would benefit from more widespread support for liberalism, not as something I personally support in all cases.

A liberal argument for NIMBYism could be: people are free to choose the level of density and development that they want within their own communities. But they should generally do so deliberately and through the rule of law, rather than through opposition to individual developments (via a heckler's veto, discretionary review processes that effectively require developers to lobby local politicians and woo random interest groups, etc.). Existing strict zoning laws are fine in places where they already exist, but new laws and restrictions should be wary of treading on the rights of existing property owners, and of creating more processes that increase discretionary power of local lawmakers and busybodies.

Hmm, I'm not so pessimistic. I don't think the core concepts of liberalism are so complex or unintuitive that the median civically engaged citizen can't follow along given an amenable background culture.

And lots of policy, political philosophy, culture, big ideas, etc. are driven by elites of some form, not just liberalism. Ideas and culture among elites can change and spread very quickly. I don't think a liberal renaissance requires "wrestling control" of any particular institutions so much as a cultural shift that is already happening to some degree (it just needs slightly better steering IMO).

I don't personally feel screwed over, and I suspect many of the people in the coalitions I mentioned feel similarly. I am sympathetic to people who do feel that way, but I am not really asking them to unilaterally honor anything. The only thing in my post that's a real concrete ask is for people who do already broadly support liberalism, or who have preferred policy agendas that would benefit from liberalism, be more outspoken about their support.

(To clarify, I have been using "liberalism" as a shorthand for "bedrock liberalism", referring specifically to the principles I listed in the first paragraph - I don't think everything that everyone usually calls "liberalism" is broadly popular with all the coalitions I listed, but most would at least pay lip service to the specific principles in the OP.)

I don't really agree with the characterization of recent history as people realizing that "liberalism isn't working", and to the degree that I would advocate for any specific policy change, I support a "radical incrementalist" approach. e.g. maybe the endpoint of the ideal concept of property rights is pretty far from wherever we are right now, but to get there we should start with small, incremental changes that respect existing rights and norms as much as possible.

So for example, I think Georgism is a good idea in general, but not a panacea, and a radical and sudden implementation would be illiberal for some of the reasons articulated by @Matthew Barnett  here.

I think a more realistic way to phase in Georgism that respects liberal principles would mainly take the form of more efficient property tax regimes - instead of complex rules and constant fights over property tax assessment valuations, there would be hopefully slightly less complex fights over land valuations, with phase-ins that keep the overall tax burden roughly the same. Some property owners with relatively low-value property on higher value land (e.g. an old / low density building in Manhattan) would eventually pay more on the margin, while others with relatively high-value property on lower value land (e.g. a newer / high density building in the exurbs) would pay a bit less. Lots of people in the middle of the property-vs-land value spectrum would pay about the same. But this doesn't really get at the core philosophical objections you or others might have with current norms around the concept of property ownership in general.

I kind of doubt that leaders at big labs would self-identify as being motivated by anything like Eliezer's notion of heroic responsibility. If any do self-identify that way though, they're either doing it wrong or misunderstanding. Eliezer has written tons of stuff about the need to respect deontology and also think about all of the actual consequences of your actions, even (especially when) the stakes are high:

The critical question here is: what happens if the plot successfully places the two of them in an epistemic Cooperation-Defection Dilemma, where rather than the two of them just having different goals, Carissa believes that he is mistaken about what happens...

In this case, Carissa could end up believing that to play 'Defect' against him would be to serve even his own goals, better than her Cooperating would serve them.  Betraying him might seem like a friendly act, an act of aid.

(https://glowfic.com/replies/1874768#reply-1874768)

If he commits to a drastic action he will estimate that actual victory lies at the end of it, and his desperation and sacrifice will not have figured into that estimation process as positive factors.  His deontology is not for sale at the price point of failure.

(https://glowfic.com/replies/1940939#reply-1940939)

Starting an AI lab in order to join a doomed race to superintelligence, and then engaging in a bunch of mundane squabbles for corporate control, seems like exactly the opposite of the sentiment here:

For Albus Dumbledore, as for her, the rule in extremis was to decide what was the right thing to do, and do it no matter the cost to yourself. Even if it meant breaking your bounds, or changing your role, or letting go of your picture of yourself. That was the last resort of Gryffindor.

(https://hpmor.com/chapter/93)

Also, re this example:

It also seemingly justifies or obligates Sam Altman to fight back when the OpenAI board tried to fire him, if he believed the board was interfering with his mission.

In general, it seems perfectly fine and normal for a founder-CEO to fight back against a board ouster - no need to bring heroic responsibility into it. Of course, all parties including the CEO and the board should stick to legal / above-board / ethical means of "fighting back", but if there's a genuine disagreement between the board and the CEO on how to best serve shareholder interests (or humanity's interests, for a non-profit), why wouldn't both sides vigorously defend their own positions and power? 

Perhaps the intended reading of your example is that heroic responsibility would obligate or justify underhanded tactics to win control, when the dispute has existential consequences. But I think that's a misunderstanding of the actual concept. Ordinary self-confidence and agency obligate you to defend your own interests / beliefs / power, and heroic responsibility says that you're obligated to win without stepping outside the bounds of deontology or slipping into invalid / motivated reasoning.

Maybe the recent tariff blowup is actually just a misunderstanding due to bad terminology, and all we need to do is popularize some better terms or definitions. We're pretty good at that around here, right?

Here's my proposal: flip the definitions of "trade surplus" and "trade deficit." This might cause a bit of confusion at first, and a lot of existing textbooks will need updating, but I believe these new definitions capture economic reality more accurately, and will promote clearer thinking and maybe even better policy from certain influential decision-makers, once widely adopted.

New definitions:

• Trade surplus: Country A has a bilateral "trade surplus" with Country B if Country A imports more tangible goods (cars, steel, electronics, etc.) from Country B than it exports back. In other words, Country A ends up with more real, physical items. Country B, meanwhile, ends up with more than it started with of something much less important: fiat currency (flimsy paper money) or 1s and 0s in a digital ledger (probably not even on a blockchain!).

  If you extrapolate this indefinitely in a vacuum, Country A eventually accumulates all of Country B's tangible goods, while Country B is left with a big pile of paper. Sounds like a pretty sweet deal for Country A if you ask me.

  It's OK if not everyone follows this explanation or believes it - they can tell it's the good one because it has "surplus" in the name. Surely everyone wants a surplus.

• Trade deficit: Conversely, Country A has a "trade deficit" if it exports more tangible resources than it imports, and thus ends up with less goods on net. In return, it only receives worthless fiat currency from some country trying to hoard actual stuff for their own people. Terrible deal!

  Again, if you don't totally follow, that's OK, just pay attention to the word "deficit". Everyone knows that deficits are bad and should be avoided.

Under the new definitions, it becomes clear that merely returning to the previous status quo of a few days ago, where the US only "wins" the trade war by several hundred billion dollars, is insufficient for the truly ambitious statesman. Instead, the US government should aggressively mint more fiat currency in order to purchase foreign goods, magnifying our trade surplus and ensuring that in the long run the United States becomes the owner of all tangible global wealth.

Addressing second order concerns: if we're worried about a collapse in our ability to manufacture key strategic goods at home during a crisis, we can set aside part of the resulting increased surplus to subsidize domestic production in those areas. Some of the extra goods we're suddenly importing will probably be pretty useful in getting some new factories of our own off the ground. (But of course we shouldn't turn around and export any of that domestic production to other countries! That would only deplete our trade surplus.)