Just as almost any "is it?" headline can be answered with "no", almost any "could it" headline can be answered with "yeah probably under some circumstances".
Mental health is especially complicated in that pathologies are defined by their impairment of "normal" function and performance, for a relatively nebulous and subjective definition of "normal". Specific behaviors that might be unusual to the point of adding up to hypomania for one individual might be entirely normal for another.
IMO, you are likely to get farther by quantifying the exact symptoms you want and inquiring what induces those symptoms than by trying to redefine a relatively well-known pathology as "like that but better".
LW sometimes puts old news in my recommended posts, like "LessWrong has enabled agree/disagree voting on all new posts!".
I think that this is helpful, and I really like this feature of the site. It's a reminder that ideas shaped like big scary changes will shrink into old-news over time, which is easy to forget.
I would appreciate it if you try to answer what I am trying to ask.
What I'm hearing here is that you want me to make up a version of your initial question that's coherent, and offer an answer that you find satisfying. However, I have already proposed a refinement of your question that seems answerable, and you've rejected that refinement as missing the point.
If you want to converse with someone capable of reading your mind and discerning not only what answer you want but also what question you want the answer to, I'm sorry to inform you that I am unable to use those powers on you at this time.
My inability to provide an answer which satisfies you stems directly from my inability to understand what question you want answered, so I don't think this is a constructive conversation to continue. Thank you for your time and discourse in challenging me to articulate why your seemingly intended question seems unanswerable, even though I don't think I've articulated that in a way that's made sense to you.
I will try to explain what I mean by “the same”. Lets call the person before they died “Bob 1” and the resurrected version ”Bob 2”. Bob 1 and Bob 2 are completely selfish and only care about themselves. In the version of resurrection I am talking about, Bob 1 cares as much about Bob 2’s experience as Bob 1 would care about Bob 1’s future experience, had Bob 1 not died.
This supposes that Bob 1 knows about Bob 2's experiences. That seems impossible if Bob 1 died before Bob 2 came into being, which is what's typically understood by the term "resurrect" used in the context of death ("restore (a dead person) to life."). If Bob 1 and Bob 2 exist at the same time, whatever's happening is probably not resurrection.
Let's stick with standard resurrection though: Bob 1 dies and then Bob 2 comes into existence. We're measuring their sameness, at your request, by the expected sentiment of each toward the other.
If I was unethical researcher in the present day, I could name a child Bob 2 and raise it to be absolutely certain that it was the reincarnation of Bob 1. It would be nice if the child happened to share some genes with Bob 1, but not absolutely essential. The child would not have an easy life, as it would be accused of various mental disorders and probably identity theft, but it would technically meet the "sameness is individual belief" criterion that you require. As an unethical researcher, I would of course select the individual Bob 1 to be someone who believes that reincarnation is possible, and thus cares about the wellbeing of their expected reincarnated self (whom they probably define as 'the person who believes they're my reincarnation', because most people don't think adversarially about such things) as much as they care about their own.
There you go, a hypothetical pair of individuals who meet your criteria, created using no technology more advanced than good ol' cult brainwashing. So for this definition, I'd say the percentage chance that it's possible matches the percentage chance that someone would be willing to set their qualms aside and ruin Bob 2's life prospects for the sake of the experiment.
(yes, this is an unsatisfying answer, but I hope it might illustrate something useful if you see how its nature follows directly from the nature of your question)
I believe we'll build eventually systems that we call resurrection, and which some people believe qualify as it. You haven't provided enough information for me to guess whether we'll build systems that you believe qualify as it, though.
If I brought you someone and said "this is your great-grandparent resurrected", how would you decide whether you believed that resurrection was real?
If I brought you someone and said "this is your ancestor from 100 generations ago resurrected", how would you decide whether you believed that resurrection was real?
If I brought you someone and said "this is Abraham Lincoln resurrected", how would you decide whether you believed that resurrection was real?
If I brought you someone and said "this is a member of the species Homo Erectus resurrected", how would you decide whether you believed that resurrection was real?
You must explain what you mean by "the same" before anyone can give you a useful answer about how likely it is that such a criterion will ever be met.
Research into how to do vegan (and probably vegetarian) diets safely and sustainably will come in extremely handy if/when some prion disease finds a way to cause worse issues than they already do.
The relative irrelevance of prion diseases to most people right now seems to echo the relative irrelevance of coronaviruses pre-covid. On the one hand they're sufficiently rare to be dismissed; on the other hand they were sufficiently mild and familiar to be dismissed; neither state of the world offers any guarantee it won't change.
If/when the thing that goes wrong with animal proteins and is transmitted by eating them becomes a worse problem, I expect that we'll see an extreme influx of interest in how to do plant-based diets safely, healthily, and cheaply. Research like the community is currently doing on the impact of vegan diets in EA folks will come in very handy in those possible futures.
I like this much better for 2 reasons:
The add-react-button and reacts-added should be together. It's counterintuitive to push a button in one place and have the result appear somewhere that might be off-screen on a long enough comment.
I think it makes sense for all the metadata about a post to stay together. Who wrote it, when they posted it, whether others upvoted it, and what reacts it got are all metadata. I think any argument for putting the reacts at the bottom could be applied to also putting vote scores at the bottom as well.
Serious question that I'm surprised I'd never asked before: why are the vote and agree/disagree scores at the top of the post, instead of elsewhere?
I agree that many behaviors are heritable, but I model that inheritance as emerging from the intersection of genetic and environmental factors. I hadn't previously considered generalizing from genetic behavioral proclivities to what values people hold.
genetics plays a major role in determining what kinds of values we adopt.
Could you point me toward the data from which you've drawn this conclusion? I imagine that there are enough adoptee studies in the world to point at a link pretty conclusively if one exists, but I'd also like to skip straight to the most applicable ones if you could recommend them.
You shouldn’t ever feel safe, because something bad could happen at any time. To think otherwise is an error of rationality.
I'm curious, do you hear this as often from those with the emotional literacy to usefully differentiate "think" or "assume" from "feel"?
Usually there's little harm done from failing to clearly differentiate assumptions from feelings, but this is an interesting edge case where the framing "you should never assume you're totally safe" seems obviously useful and correct, but it's easy to conflate with the obviously unhelpful and incorrect "you should never feel safe".
The point I'm attempting to make is that psychiatric diagnoses, such as "hypomania", are framed through a lens of pathology. A change in behavior or experience which causes no problems for the affected person and those around them would not be defined and studied in the same way that changes associated with problems are. Working from general research focused on pathologized changes of experience (ie clinical hypomania) is likely to yield resources that include negative states you'd rather not learn from while disregarding positive states that you'd prefer to emulate.
Toward the goal of tailoring subjective experience, I think you're on the right track for breaking down the desired change into component parts and contemplating the parts separately at first.
Whatever you end up doing, try to avoid discounting hedonic treadmill effects when assessing the sustainable effectiveness of various interventions, and try to include ambient factors such as location, sleep quality, valence of recent news exposure, etc.