Given the picture I've suggested, the relevant questions are
- What are the returns to thinking longer for experiment design?
- What are the penalties for parallelised experiment design and/or for teamwork on experiment design?
- (I've written even less on this, but I think it's quite difficult because the key is pooling research taste, either from best-of-k or some team iterative thing, but research taste is mostly acquired through experimental experience)
- (Perhaps also as you note, are there cognitive diversity penalties or bonuses at play?)
In my somewhat analogous picture (which I've thought through on paper less than you), having AI workforce is more like
- having more people
- who can effectively think for longer between experiments
(The inverted slowcorp would have fewer people who are more distracted/have less time to think between experiments.)
To me that's the natural operationalisation of this analogy. I notice it doesn't obviously map directly to your analogy, where there are different quantities of compute, different serial research times, etc. Do you think your analogy is more natural, or does it in fact map more closely than I'm seeing?
I think unless they explicitly want to harm or threaten you, was the point - which incidentally is often a situation not accounted for in the foundational assumptions of many economic models (utility functions generally considered to be independent and monotonic in resources and so on).
Uhh, not sure. I think it was just a holistic consideration including the property.
See other thread where we discuss a variant without forced sale, but with forced re-evaluation.
I don't think anyone would advocate a naive universalist approach to this with square inches for sale. This does point at an interesting mereological dynamic here though where the boundaries of 'an item' might in principle be subject to some gerrymandering!
I do think that a large part of the point is to incentivise a high (somewhat Georgist) tax on 'counterproductive' uses of land (or similar), if I've read correctly.
I happen to know a former low-level land evaluation bureaucrat in the UK (for council tax) and he said it's a huge pain. For annoying bureaucratic activities, two standard questions are 'can we sensibly decentralise?' and 'can we sensibly automate?'... maybe so.
Seems right! 'studies' uplifts 'design' (either incremental or saltatory), I suppose. For sure, the main motivation here is to figure out what sorts of capabilities and interventions could make coordination go better, and one of my first thoughts under this heading is open librarian-curator assistive tech for historic and contemporary institution case studies. Another cool possibility could be simulation-based red-teaming and improvement of mechanisms.
If you have any resources or detailed models I'd love to see them!
What constitutes cooperation? (previously)
Because much in the complex system of human interaction and coordination is about negotiating norms, customs, institutions, constitutions to guide and constrain future interaction in mutually-preferable ways, I think:
- 'institution and constitution design'
deserves special attention.
This is despite it perhaps (for a given 'coordination moment') being in theory reducible to preference elicitation or aggregation, searching outcome space, negotiation, enforcement, ...
There are failure modes (unintended consequences, concentration of power, lost purposes, corruptability, poor adaptability, plain old inefficacy) and patterns for success (stabilising win-win equilibria, reducing inefficiencies, improving collective intelligence and adaptability) which are specific to this process of negotiating and developing institutions (there are patterns, because the complex system has emergent structure like trust, corruption, coalitions, information propagation, ...).
Said briefly: much (most?) coordination is about coordination because a) humans are that type of creature and b) we live in a highly iterated world.
1Ideally you would want to allow depreciation though, which is a definite phenomenon! (Especially if things are neglected.)
Yeah, there's some design questions. You're right, the upside to the corrective bidders is naively nothing if they get called on it: they're doing valuable corrective cybernetic labour for free.
Maybe a sensible refinement would be for them to be owed a small fee... or roughly equivalently some (temporary) direct share of the resulting increased Harberger tax.
A less crazed approach might be more like
- if someone bids at or above your assessed value, you have to sell or start paying commensurably more tax (possibly backdated some amount)
I'm interested to know how (if at all) you'd say the perspective you've just given deviates from something like this:
My current guess is you agree with some reasonable interpretation of all these points. And maybe also have some more nuance you think is important?