I think one can read that line to be about moral epistemology under a truly realist conception. It seems to match my reading of Peter Railton. Of course one needs to then argue why our imperfect attempts at value negotiations can give us information about the moral facts.
This question becomes easier if one takes the moral facts to be constituted by some (potentially idealized) negotiation, which is the position of moral constructivisim. But constructivists wouldn't say that morality is "discovered" by the process of negotiation. 

How does this compare to the process that actually produces claims about truth?
It seems to me that the process that produces claims about truth biases significantly towards memeticity, along with many other biases. But i still think the correct referent for the word "truth" is what actually mind-independently is the case (that is realism). 

I think this analogy fails to engage with how philosophically different consequentialist morality and non consequentialist morality.
Here is how i would describe moral frameworks in programming terms, from an admittedly consequentialist perspective. Here a single line of machine code will correspond to some simple moral claim (eg "John prefers outcome A over outcome B").
The programming languages are different consequentialist moralities. Each of which will have some terminology which compiles down to the machine code. Examples of such terms could be "the common good", "action A is better than action B in situation S", "outcome A is good", "person P is good", which each language can include or exclude, also notably two languages might implement the same thing in ways that compile fundamentally differently (compare how the basic list type in some languages is an array and in some languages is a linked list).  

Then non consequentialist positions is like having programming languages that cant compile to machine code. The non consequentialist claims that the machine language is impoverished. This would be similar to criticizing a programming language as not Turing complete. And maybe thats a correct criticism, but it is a fundamentally deeper disagreement.

Maybe its worthwhile to compare with the question of reductionist vs non reductionist ontology.
Here the machine code is some simple empirical claim (eg "there is an electron at (x,y,z,w)").
The programming languages are languages that contain words that compile down to machine code (possibly in layers biology -> chemistry -> particle physics).
Then non reductionism claims that there are real objects (eg souls or numbers) which cannot be compiled like that, the machine code forms an impoverished ontology, that cant explain/compile everything that exists.

To me many of the arguments in this article have analog arguments against some of the above positions. And i wondered whether you 
1: disagree the arguments are analogous 
2: think there are positive arguments for these positions that overcome the analogous arguments, where there isnt a analogous positive argument
3: you also reject the above positions

Here is an example of the kind of analogy i am thinking of, this is similar to the second paragraph under Causality.
> This raises the issue that there are multiple theories with different unobservable structures expressing the same observations. For ontological minimality, we could say these are all valid theories (so there is no "further fact" of what is the real unobserved structure, in cases of persistent empirical ambiguity), though of course some have analytically nicer mathematical properties (simplicity) than others.

Regarding option 2, where there is some further argument such as being indispensable to our best scientific theories. Then it seems plausible that mathematics is indispensable. Which could be an example of an analogous positive argument.

I think it would be valuable to also state some things you include in this minimal position. Eg is it antirealist about composite objects? Does it accept further facts about the outside world over and above the facts about sensations? Does it accept any skeptical hypothesis?
 

Minor note. Your choice of utilities makes a 50/50 mixture of Cooperate:Defect and Defect:Cooperate better than the Cooperate:Cooperate outcome. So Cooperate:Cooperate isnt on the pareto frontier.  

Here are some relevant quotes by Eliezer from a discord discussion on dath ilan currency:
Note that i have skipped parts of the conversation between each paragraph
 

dath ilan does have an artificial currency used as a medium-of-exchange, meant to track the value of unskilled labor hours (note unskilled qualifier) as they're regularly auctioned in Taskrabbit-like markets about that, and this currency also serves as the notional definition of a medium of account because it fluctuates less than unskilled labor prices.

Nobody is supposed to be holding currency; it's strictly a medium of exchange to instantiate a unit of account, not at all a store of value.  Value is held in investment accounts.

the unit of the account affects quite a lot because people do negotiate contracts about future delivery of milk, priced that way, and many small businesses prefer not to adjust all the prices on their Web Page on a daily basis.

there's also a coordination problem when you have a complicated supply chain; everyone wants to be first in line to raise prices, but everyone wants to be last in line to lower prices

yep.  dath ilan's system is not meant to be superior to an NGDPLT-indexed inflationary unit of account, holding fixed the part about stores of value being held mainly in equities and the land taxes and so on. they're just legit not at the optimum there and got to their current position via NGDPLT having not been invented by the time of the historical screen, and earlier generations being not quite that smart and being much more bullheaded about "downward nominal wage rigidity is a BIAS and we will TRAIN PEOPLE OUT OF IT and COORDINATE AROUND LOWERING PRICES SUCCESSFULLY so we can RETAIN OUR IDEALISTIC COMMITMENT to the unit of account being something that EVERYONE COULD PERSONALLY SELL"

To the extent that purchases stay the same and we pay the cost domestically, that is indeed a tax paid by producers or consumers. Yes, it lowers their remaining capital, but is probably one of the least distortionary available taxes. In the terms described above, if you used the money to cut income tax rates, you’d probably be ahead.

Taxing something where the supply or demand is fixed is extremely efficient, and the extent to which purchases stay the same is exactly the extent to which supply or demand is inflexible. The economic inefficiency of a tax comes from the changes in behavior induced by the tax. The difference between a tariff and a sales tax, is that it induces you to buy native products.

Sorry I see now that i lost half a sentence in the middle. I agree that the notions of early/mid/late game doesn't map well to real life, and I don't think there is a good way to do so. I then (meant to) propose the stages of a 4X game as perhaps mapping more cleanly onto one-shot games

I think the most natural definitions are that early game is the part you have memorized, end game is where you can compute to the end (still doing pruning), and mid game is the rest.
So eg in Scrabble the end game is where there are no tiles or few enough tiles in the bag that you can think through all (relevant) combinations of bags.

I think perhaps the phases of a 4X game.

Explore: gain information that is relevant for what plan to execute 

Expand: Investment phase, you take actions that maximise your growth

Exploit: You slowly start depriotizing growth as the time remaining grows shorter.

Exterminate: You go for your win condition