The assumptions made here are not time reversible as the macrostate at time t+1 being deterministic given the macrostate at time t, does not imply that the macrostate at time t is deterministic given the macrostate at time t+1.

So in this article the direction of time is given through the asymmetry of the evolution of macrostates. 

I think "book of X" can be usefully "translated" as beliefs about X.
The book of truth is not truth, just like the book of night is not night.

I think "book of names" can be read as human categoristion of animals (giving them name). Although other readings do seem plausible. 

You might be interested in John Harsanyi on the topic.
He argues that the conclusion achieved in the original position is (average) utilitarianism.

I agree that behind the veil one shouldn't know the time (and thus can't care differently about current vs future humans). This actually causes further problems for Rawls conception when you project back in time, what if the worst life that will ever be lived has already been lived? Then the maximin principle gives no guidance at all, and in positions of uncertainty it recommends putting all effort in preventing a new minimum from being set.

Then you violate the accurate beliefs condition. (If the world is infact a random mixture in proportion which their beliefs track correctly, then fdt will do better when averaging over the mixture)

I don't think the quoted problem has that structure.

And suppose that the existence of S tends to cause both (i) one-boxing tendencies and (ii) whether there’s money in the opaque box or not when decision-makers face Newcomb problems.

But now suppose that the pathway by which S causes there to be money in the opaque box or not is that another agent looks at S

So S causes one boxing tendencies, and the person putting money in the box looks only at S.

So it seems to be changing the problem to say that the predictor observes your brain/your decision procedure. When all they observe is S which, while causing "one boxing tendencies", is not causally downstream of your decision theory.

Further if S where downstream of your decision procedure, then fdt one boxes whether or not the path from the decision procedure to the contents of the boxes routes through an agent. Undermining the criticism that fst has implausible discontinuities.

Cant you make the same argument you make in Schwarz procreation by using Parfits hitchhiker after you have reached the city? In which case i think its better to use that example, as it avoids the Heighns criticism.

In the case of implausible discontinuities i agree with Heighn that there is no subjunctive dependence.
 

Here is a quick diagram of the causation in the thought experiment as i understand it.
We have an outcome which is completely determined by your decision to one box/two box and the predictor decision of whether to but money in the one box.
The Predictor decides based on the presence of a lesion (or some other physical fact)
Your decision how many boxes to take is determined by your decision theory.
And your decision theory is partly determined by the Lesion and partly by other stuff.

Now (my understanding of) the claim is that there is no downstream path from your decision theory to the predictor. This means that applying the do operator on the decision theory node doesn't change the distribution of the choices of the predictor.

Denmark culled all mink due to worries about a covid strain in mink. It has only recently (January 1 2023) become legal to farm mink in Denmark again.

logical inductors are actually defined by the logical induction criterion. The market bit is there to prove that it is possible to fulfill the criterion.