Given that we basically got AGI (without the creativity of best humans) that is a Karnofsky's Tool AI very unexpectedly, as you admit, can you look back and see what assumptions were wrong in expecting the tools agentizing on their own and pretty quickly? Or is everything in that Eliezer's post still correct or at least reasonable, and we are simply not at the level where "foom" happens yet?
Come to think of it, I wonder if that post had been revisited somewhere at some point, by Eliezer or others, in light of the current SOTA. Feels like it could be instructive.
That is indeed a bit of a defense. Though I suspect human minds have enough similarities that there are at least a few universal hacks.
Any of those. Could be some kind of intentionality ascribed to AI, could be accidental, could be something else.
So when I think through the pre-mortem of "AI caused human extinction, how did it happen?" one of the more likely scenarios that comes to mind is not nano-this and bio-that, or even "one day we just all fall dead instantly and without a warning". Or a scissor statement that causes all-out wars. Or anything else noticeable.
Human mind is infinitely hackable through the visual, textual, auditory and other sensory inputs. Most of us do not appreciate how easily because being hacked does not feel like it. Instead it feels like your own volition, like you changed your mind based on logic and valid feelings. Reading a good book, listening to a good sermon, a speech, watching a show or a movie, talking to your friends and family is how mind-hacking usually happens. Abrahamic religions are a classic example. The Sequences and HPMoR are a local example. It does not work on everyone, but when it does, the subject feels enlightened rather than hacked. If you tell them their mind has been hacked, they will argue with you to the end, because clearly they just used logic to understand and embrace the new ideas.
So, my most likely extinction scenario is more like "humans realized that living is not worth it, and just kind of stopped" than anything violent. Could be spread out over the years and decades, like, for example, voluntarily deciding not to have children anymore. None of it would look like it was precipitated by an AI taking over. It does not even have to be a conspiracy by an unaligned SAI. It could just be that the space of new ideas, thanks to the LLMs getting better and better, expands a lot and in the new enough directions to include a few lethal memetic viruses like that.
What are the issues that are "difficult" in philosophy, in your opinion? What makes them difficult?
I remember you and others talking about the need to "solve philosophy", but I was never sure what it meant by that.
My expectation, which I may have talked about before here, is that the LLMs will eat all of the software stack between the human and the hardware. Moreover, they are already nearly good enough to do that, the issue is that people have not yet adapted to the AI being able to do that. I expect there to be no OS, no standard UI/UX interfaces, no formal programming languages. All interfaces will be more ad hoc, created by the underlying AI to match the needs of the moment. It can be star trek like "computer plot a course to..." or a set of buttons popping up on your touchscreen, or maybe physical buttons and keys being labeled as needed in real-time, or something else. But not the ubiquitous rigid interfaces of the last millennium. For the clues of what is already possible but not being implemented yet one should look to the scifi movies and shows, unconstrained by the current limits. Almost everything useful there is already doable or will be in a short while. I hope someone is working on this.
It seems like we are not even close to converging on any kind of shared view. I don't find the concept of "brute facts" even remotely useful, so I cannot comment on it.
But this faces the same problem as the idea that the visible universe arose as a Boltzmann fluctuation, or that you yourself are a Boltzmann brain: the amount of order is far greater than such a hypothesis implies.
I think Sean Carroll answered this one a few times: the concept of a Boltzmann brain is not cognitively stable (you can't trust your own thoughts, including that you are a Boltzmann brain). And if you try to make it stable, you have to reconstruct the whole physical universe. You might be saying the same thing? I am not claiming anything different here.
The simplest explanation is that some kind of Platonism is real, or more precisely (in philosophical jargon) that "universals" of some kind do exist.
Like I said in the other reply, I think that those two words are not useful as binaries real/not real, exist/not exist. If you feel that this is non-negotiable to make sense of philosophy of physics or something, I don't know what to say.
I was struck by something I read in Bertrand Russell, that some of the peculiarities of Leibniz's worldview arose because he did not believe in relations, he thought substance and property are the only forms of being. As a result, he didn't think interaction between substances is possible (since that would be a relation), and instead came up with his odd theory about a universe of monadic substances which are all preprogrammed by God to behave as if they are interacting.
Yeah, I think denying relations is going way too far. A relation is definitely a useful idea. It can stay in epistemology rather than in ontology.
I am not 100% against these radical attempts to do without something basic in ontology, because who knows what creative ideas may arise as a result? But personally I prefer to posit as rich an ontology as possible, so that I will not unnecessarily rule out an explanation that may be right in front of me.
Fair, it is foolish to reduce potential avenues of exploration. Maybe, again, we differ where they live, in the world as basic entities or in the mind as our model of making sense of the world.
That is definitely my observation, as well: "general world understanding but not agency", and yes, limited usefulness, but also... much more useful than gwern or Eliezer expected, no? I could not find a link.
I guess whether it counts as AGI depends on what one means by "general intelligence". To me it was having a fairly general world model and being able to reason about it. What is your definition? Does "general world understanding" count? Or do you include the agency part in the definition of AGI? Or maybe something else?
Hmm, maybe this is a General Tool, as opposed a General Intelligence?