I think it would be good if you made clear in the abstract what your contributions to the literature are, and how your results relate to those of e.g. Kierland and Monton (2005).

Yes, of course we can still quibble with the assumptions (like the OP does in some cases), which is why I say "moderate evidence" rather than "completely watertight proof", but given how natural the assumptions are, the evidence is good.

Completeness is arguably not natural (see e.g. Aumann, 1962; Bradley, 2017, §11.5). In particular, I think it is clearly not a requirement of rationality.

Edit: Actually, I think my deeper objection is that most of the critiques here (made by Sammy) are just wrong. For example, of course Dutch books/money pumps frequently get invoked to justify VNM axioms. See for example this.

Sami never mentioned money pumps. And "the Dutch books arguments" are arguments for probabilism and other credal norms^[1], not the vNM axioms.

1. ^{^}

   Again, see Pettigrew (2020) (here is a PDF from Richard's webpage).

You are conflating the Dutch book arguments for probabilism (Pettigrew, 2020) with the money-pump arguments for the vNM axioms (Gustafsson, 2022). 

The normal VNM approach is to start with an agent whose behavior satisfies some common sense conditions: can't be money pumped and so on.

Nitpicks: (1) the vNM theorem is arguably about preference, not choice and behavior; and (2) "can't be money pumped" is not one of the conditions in the theorem.

and Silvia's work

Typo: it's Sylvia.

I wrote "I'm really not sure at this point whether UDT is even on the right track" in UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever which I think you've read? Did you perhaps miss that part?

Yes, missed or forgot about that sentence, sorry.

(BTW this issue/doubt about whether UDT / paying CM is normative for humans is item 1 in the above linked post. Thought I'd point that out since it may not be obvious at first glance.)

Thanks.

Do you have more examples where making such distinctions would be helpful?

I was mostly thinking about discussions surrounding what the "correct" decision theory, is whether you should pay in CM, and so on.

Here's a related idea that is maybe clearer: Suppose an agent has the ability to self-modify to use any decision theory, would they decide to stick with their current decision theory? (I'm actually not sure what term has been explicitly defined to mean this, so I'll just call it "self-endorsement" for now.)

This sounds similar to what's called "self-recommendation"—see e.g. Skyrms (1982, pp. 707-709), Meacham (2010, §3.3) and Pettigrew (2023). In the abstract Pettigrew writes: "A decision theory is self-recommending if, when you ask it which decision theory you should use, it considers itself to be among the permissible options.". 

I have actually been thinking about ways of extending Pettigrew's work to theories of dynamic choice. That is: is sophistication/resoluteness self-recommending? I don't think it is immediately clear what the answers are, and it might depend on the interpretations of sophistication and resoluteness one adopts, but yeah, I do agree that it seems like sophistication might be self-undermining.

Thanks for the clarification!

I do understand from the SEP, like Wei, that sophisticated means "backwards planning", and resolute means "being able to commit to a policy" (correct me if I'm wrong).

That seems roughly correct, but note that there are different interpretations of resolute choice floating around^[1], and I think McClennen's (1990) presentation is somewhat unclear at times. Sometimes resoluteness seems to be about the ability to make internal commitments, and other times it seems to be about being sensitive to the dynamic context in a particular way, and I think these can come apart. You might be interested in these notes I took while reading McClennen's book. 

My usage of "dynamic instability" (which might be contrary to academic usage) was indeed what Wei mentions: "not needing commitments". Or equivalently, I say a decision theory is dynamically stable if itself and its resolute version always act the same.

Then that sounds a bit question-begging. Do you think dynamic instability is a problem (normatively speaking)? 

1. ^{^}

   See e.g. Gauthier (1997) and Buchak (2013, §6).

I think Sami's comment is entirely fair given the language and framing of the original post. It is of course fine to forget about references, but e.g. "I find it curious that none of my ideas have a following in academia or have been reinvented/rediscovered by academia" and "Clearly academia has some blind spots, but how big?" reads like you don't consider it a possilbity that you might have re-invented something yourself, and that academics are at fault for not taking up your ideas.