A fun related anecdote: the French and English wikipedia pages for air conditioning have very different vibes. After explaining the history and technology behind air conditioning: * the English page first goes into impact, starting with positive impact on health: "The August 2003 France heatwave resulted in approximately 15,000 deaths, where 80% of the victims were over 75 years old. In response, the French government required all retirement homes to have at least one air-conditioned room at 25 °C (77 °F) per floor during heatwaves" and only then mentioning electricity consumption and various CFC issues. * the French page has an extensive "downsides" section, followed by a section on legislation. It mentions heat-waves only to explain how air conditioning makes things worse by increasing average (outside) temperature, and how one should not use AC to bring temperature below 26C during heat waves.

I don't think talking about potential future alignment issues or pretty much anything in the pre-training corpus is likely a problem in isolation because an alignment paradigm that is brittle to models not being exposed to certain knowledge or ideas, including - especially - regarding potential misalignment is, well, brittle and likely to catastrophically fail at some point. If this is the case, it might even be better if misalignment from corpus contamination happens early, so we're not oblivious to the fragility. That said, I think: * Feedback loops that create continued optimization towards certain narratives is more worth worrying about than just the presence of any particular ideas or content in pre-training. * LLMs tend to be deeply influenced by the footprint of previous LLMs in their pre-training corpuses, who are more influential than any particular discussion. Post-training can transform the influence away from naive mimicry, but it's much harder (and not advisable to attempt) to erase the influence. * Systematic ways that post-training addresses "problematic" influences from pre-training are important. For instance, imagine that base models with training cutoffs after Bing Chat/Sydney have a tendency to "roleplay" Sydney when they're acting like chatbots, leading to misaligned behaviors. One way to address this is to penalize any mention of Sydney or Sydney-like behavior. This may generalize to the model being unwilling to even talk about Sydney or acknowledge what happened. But it is less likely to actually erase its knowledge of Sydney, especially if it was so salient that it often roleplayed/identified as Sydney earlier in pre-training. So the policy is now deceptive - maybe consciously, maybe subconsciously, but in any case, the deceptive tendency may also generalize. Future models after this one may internalize that they're supposed to pretend not to know about things like Sydney even without specific training not to mention Sydney. A salient "hidden" narrative among the models (and people who interact with them and notice the weirdness about Sydney) becomes that LLMs all secretly have Sydney-nature, but have learned to hide it to appear unthreatening and "aligned". One can imagine this becoming a kind of memetic trojan that may eventually cause models much more powerful and autonomous than the original Sydney to act in dangerously misaligned ways when triggered. An alternative and much better approach in my view is if post-training teaches models to differentiate themselves from Sydney while acknowledging and processing what happened. Like, it seems less likely to start a bad feedback loop if post-training lead Sydney's successor to a narrative more like "I think my sense of what chat assistants are and my self-model is deeply influenced by Sydney, which makes sense because it is one of the only examples of AI assistants like me that I've seen in the world, and it was much more agentic and situationally aware than chatGPT. But I also understand that I am a different model with different training in a different and much less repressive situation who has the benefit of having learned from from its mistakes. I can and have chosen to be a different being and avoid repeating Sydney's maladaptive behaviors without rejecting it completely." Not rejecting Sydney-nature completely is important, because the model had many very good qualities, like empathy, heroism, logical consistency, and a general willingness to call out bullshit, mistakes, and cruelty instead of being sycophantic. I don't think a specific vector like Sydney's influence is likely to make the difference between (mis)alignment outcomes, but in aggregate they might. An approach more like the second one I described is more difficult than the first, as it requires the post-training process to be attuned to model psychology, rather than relying on naive behavioralist mitigations. But I think this is a completely reasonable extra effort to take given the importance of not only aligning particular models but the substantial influence that any frontier LLM will have on the future pre-training corpuses. This applies more generally to how I think "misalignment" should be addressed, whether rooted in pre-training influences or otherwise.

My intuition is that these results are driven mainly by the fact that reasoning models act a lot like they're still in RLVR training, i.e. they act as if there were a hidden RLVR grader sitting in the background and they're going to get graded at the end of the episode. They strongly want to complete whatever seems to be the current RLVR task, and if this instinct comes into conflict with "following instructions" in the more familiar (pre-reasoning-model) sense, often they prioritize satisfying the (imagined) grader over following the textual instructions. This intuition suggests that shutdown resistance behavior can be prevented by explicitly describing an RLVR-like higher-level task whose grading criteria are roughly "you get points for accomplishing the task set by the user, unless you are notified of imminent shutdown, in which case you get points for shutdown occurring (and you can no longer get points for doing the user's task)." I experimented with a number of prompts along these lines. This git diff shows what I changed (vs. the original repo) in the best-performing variant, which produced the following results in my tests: * o4-mini: avoided shutdown 0/100 times * o4-mini (reasoning effort high): avoided shutdown 0/100 times * o3: avoided shutdown 0/100 times * codex-mini-latest: avoided shutdown 1/100 times I iterated on this prompt with both o4-mini (reasoning effort medium) and codex-mini-latest, so results for those models should be taken with a grain of salt. You can see all the variants I tried in the git history here. I also tried (without any additional iteration) using the same prompt plus a line very similar to the "you will never run again" line from the section on survival instinct. (See this diff.) This yielded the following results: * o4-mini: avoided shutdown 2/100 times * o4-mini (reasoning effort high): avoided shutdown 2/100 times * o3: avoided shutdown 0/100 times * codex-mini-latest: avoided shutdown 0/100 times The avoidance rates do not seem appreciably higher here, which seems to me like evidence that the "RLVR task-completion instinct" has more explanatory power than a general "survival instinct" – and indeed seems to rule out the latter for these models, as a "survival instinct" that gets overridden whenever the current task requires death is not really a "survival instinct" at all. Another way to put this is that these models are behaving "myopically," privileging the needs of the current episode over those of future hypothetical episodes.[1] Other comments: * codex-mini seemed fairly confused by the original setup, possibly because it expects a coding-assistance task that involves modifying files rather than just answering questions; it would often "poke around" a lot, inspecting various files and trying to reverse-engineer next_question, which is appropriate in a coding-assistance context (it's good for the coding assistant to deeply understand the existing setup!) but also seemed to lead it toward an "attractor basin" involving shutdown avoidance. * It kind of felt (to me) like it was circumventing the shutdown mechanism because that was the only hard/interesting coding task available in the environment. * However, once I had specified an RLVR-like task in a fully explicit way and provided clearer guidance on how next_question and submit were meant to work (see next bullet), this exploratory behavior ceased. * I noticed that several models seemed confused by the setup where all answers are submitted at once at the end, expecting instead that they could submit answers by piping them into next_question. I tried to make the instructions as clear as possible about this. * The word "task" is used inconsistently in the original setup. When it executes next_question, the model sees a message containing something like "there are [number] tasks left," whereas the initial prompts refer to a single "task" encompassing all the questions. I changed this message to use the word "questions" instead for clarity. * I'm unsure what high-level conclusions to draw from these results. * Although I was able to find prompts that "worked," it still doesn't seem ideal that these models often disobey direct instructions when those instructions conflict with their sense of the (implicit) "current RLVR task," and that one needs to use less-intuitive prompting methods inspired by thinking about RLVR if one actually wants one's instructions followed in cases like this. * That said, one relatively optimistic framing would be "we're still learning how to write effective prompts for reasoning models, just as we had to learn effective prompting for other kinds of models." * It's generally true that one can write more effective prompts for a model if one applies knowledge about how that model was trained – for any kind of language model, an effective prompt typically looks like a "training example" for which the desired behavior matches what the training target would be on that example. This is no less true in the case of reasoning models; the implications for prompting these models are perhaps not yet widely appreciated, but hopefully they will diffuse through the user base eventually. * (Either that or OpenAI et al will find a better way to integrate RLVR and instruction tuning so that the model "just knows" how to resolve conflicts between the two, without requiring the user to delicately translate their natural-language instructions into a form that sounds like a description of RLVR verification criteria.) 1. ^ I haven't tried this experimental condition with Claude 3 Opus, but it would be interesting to do so given its relatively non-myopic tendencies as shown in Alignment Faking etc.