This thread is for the discussion of Less Wrong topics that have not appeared in recent posts. If a discussion gets unwieldy, celebrate by turning it into a top-level post.
Accepting God as a probable hypothesis has a lot of epistemic implications. This is not just one thing, everything is connected, one thing being true implies other things being true, other things being false. You won't be seeing the world as you currently believe it to be, after accepting such change, you will be seeing a strange magical version of it, a version you are certain doesn't correspond to reality. Mutilating your mind like this has enormous destructive consequences on your ability to understand the real world, and hence on ability to make the ri... (read more)
(Edit - it's probably a good idea to avoid reading this comment until you try RobinZ's suggestion.)
I looked at the parent of the comment of yours, and I think I can see why you disagreed with MatthewB and JGWeissman about Pascal's Wager: the three of you may be thinking of PW differently to each other.
It sounds to me that MatthewB was evaluating PW in terms of how well it gets you to the truth, whereas you were evaluating PW in terms of whether it helps you win the +∞ reward for belief. PW is misguided for the first purpose, but could work for the second, depending on the situation.
And JGWeissman, I think, was considering PW-as-applied-to-theism whereas you were thinking of PW-in-general - but you identified that difference yourself.
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This thread is for the discussion of Less Wrong topics that have not appeared in recent posts. If a discussion gets unwieldy, celebrate by turning it into a top-level post.