The article gives framing and advice that seem somewhat arbitrary, and doesn't explain most of the choices. It alludes to research, but the discussion actually present in the article is only tangentially related to most of the framing/advice content, and even that discussion is not very informative when considered in isolation, without further reading.
There is a lot of attention to packaging the content, with insufficient readily available justification for it, which seems like a terrible combination without an explicit reframing of what the article wants to be. With less packaging, it would at least not appear to be trying to counteract normal amount of caution in embracing content of (subjectively) mysterious origin.
The distinction is between understanding and faith/identity (which abhors justification from outside itself). Sometimes people build understanding that enables checking if things make sense. This also applies to justifying trust of the kind not based on faith. The alternative is for decisions/opinions/trust to follow identity, determined by luck.
Naming a group of people is a step towards reification of an ideology associated with it. It's a virtuous state of things that there is still no non-awkward name, but keeping the question of identity muddled and tending towards being nameless might be better.
Sleeping Beauty illustrates the consequences of following general epistemic principles. Merely finding an assignment of probabilities that's optimal for a given way of measuring outcomes is appeal to consequences, on its own it doesn't work as a general way of managing knowledge (though some general ways of managing knowledge might happen to assign probabilities so that the consequences are optimal, in a given example). In principle consequentialism makes superfluous any particular elements of agent design, including those pertaining to knowledge. But that observation doesn't help with designing specific ways of working with knowledge.
Labels are no substitute for arguments.
Labels are no substitute for arguments.
But that's the nature of identity: a claim that's part of identity won't suffer insinuations that it needs any arguments behind it, let alone the existence of arguments against. Within one's identity, labels are absolutely superior to arguments. So the disagreement is more about epistemic role of identity, not about object level claims or arguments.
See proving too much. In the thought experiment where you consider sapient wolves who hold violent consumption of sentient creatures as an important value, the policy of veganism is at least highly questionable. An argument for such a policy needs to distinguish humans from sapient wolves, so as to avoid arguing for veganism for sapient wolves with the same conviction as it does for humans.
Your argument mentions relevant features (taste, tradition) at the end and dismisses them as "lazy excuses". Yet their weakness in the case of humans is necessary for the argument's validity. Taste and tradition point to an ethical argument against veganism, that doesn't not exist as you claim at the start of the article. Instead the argument exists and might be weak.
This proves too much. Most of these arguments would profess to hold veganism as the superior policy for sapient wolves (who are sufficiently advanced to have developed cheap dietary supplementation), degrading the moral imperative of tearing living flesh from the bones.
This is a much clearer statement of the problem you are pointing at than the post.
(I don't see how it's apparent that the voting system deserves significant blame for the overall low-standard-in-your-estimation of LW posts. A more apparent effect is probably bad-in-your-estimation posts getting heavily upvoted or winning in annual reviews, but it's less clear where to go from that observation.)
The stress of negotiation/management of COVID precautions destroyed my intellectual productivity for a couple of months at the start of the pandemic. So I rented a place to live alone, which luckily happened to be possible for me, and the resulting situation is much closer to normal than it is to the pre-move situation during the pandemic. There is no stress, as worrying things are no longer constantly trying to escape my control without my knowledge, there's only the challenge of performing "trips to the surface" correctly that's restricted to the time of the trips and doesn't poison the rest of my time.
As I understand this, Clippy might be able to issue an authoritative moral command, "Stop!", to the humans, provided it's "caused" by human values, as conveyed through its correct understanding of them. The humans obey, provided they authenticate the command as channeling human values. It's not advice, as the point of intervention is different: it's not affecting a moral argument (decision making) within the humans, instead it's affecting their actions more directly, with the moral argument having been computed by Clippy.