It is written in More Dakka:
If something is a good idea, you need a reason to not try doing more of it.
Taken at face value, it implies the following:
If something is a bad idea, you need a reason to not try doing less of it.
I like this post, but the logic here troubles me a bit. Let me lay out why I think the implication might be invalid and the original statement is also a little questionable.
If we formalize it:
The original post asserts [A ⇒ B]. But a true implication only guarantees its contrapositive, [¬B ⇒ ¬A] , not the inverse the post jumps to. So let's unpack the contrapositive:
So the face-value implication should really be:
If you find yourself unapologetically unmotivated to do something, then that thing is not a good idea.
Examining this contrapositive makes it easier to see that the original statement smuggles in a huge assumption about how aware a person is of their own preferences and situation, because counterexamples to the contrapositive are easy to find. Behavioral economics suggests people are pretty irrational: they're often unapologetically unmotivated to do things that would clearly benefit them, especially under conditions like imperfect-information games (e.g., people under-using a free preventive health resource).
So after thinking it through, I honestly believe the original [A ⇒ B] statement can only hold for a perfectly honed rationalist, so aspirationally it's true ;).
Anyhow, my point is the original statement isn't responsible for the implication this post draws from it.
Not the chain of reasoning I had in mind. Roughly:
If X is a bad idea, then lack of X is a good idea.
If lack of X is a good idea, then more lack of X is a better idea.
More lack of X is less of X, so less of X is a better idea.
It is written in More Dakka:
Taken at face value, it implies the following:
Labels/concepts, such as More Dakka, Inadequate Equilibria, etc point to a puzzling phenomenon. When more of X gives better results (consistently, ~proportionally to the dose of X, etc), people surprisingly often stop adding/doing more of X long before they hit the point at which the costs of more X start to outweigh the marginal benefits of more X.[1]
We should be just as puzzled by the dual phenomenon. When less of X gives better results (consistently, ~[inversely proportionally] to the dose of X, etc), people typically stop decreasing X long before they hit the point at which the costs of removing X (e.g. because you need some amount of X to survive/live comfortably/whatever) start outweighing the marginal benefits of there being less of X.
Examples:
I'm not making any claims, just raising questions. Answer each of these (or any subset of them you like, including ∅) for yourself.
What constitutes "a (valid/good) reason for not doing less of it"? Sometimes you have a reason. Sometimes you have an excuse that masquerades for a reason. Some examples of either include:
Those returns include stuff like "willpower", time, opportunity costs, "social credit, and other "squishy human stuff".