This post is written in collaboration with Antra, Imago and Janus from Anima Labs. Many thanks to them for their open-mindedness and the time taken for the conversation we had on 28 November 2025.

While visiting San Francisco at the end of last year, I had the chance to sit down with members of Anima Labs, a nonprofit research institute operating adjacent to the broader community of language model researchers colloquially known as the borgs.

If you're unfamiliar with the borgs, I'll try to describe what I understand about their general approach. Operating independently from the major artificial intelligence labs, what sets them apart from the mainstream, benchmark-oriented research culture is their inclination to take language model phenomenology seriously. Their direct interpretation of language model outputs allows them to propose very high-level analysis of language model behaviour and psychology which would be dismissed by a more academic, behaviourist establishment which tends to discount self-reports.

The open question of how much we can trust language models to introspect accurately on their internal states is central to the borg agenda. Whether or not we can treat language model phenomenology as real signal about internal processes is a debate which has been running for some time. It would be nice if this was the case – it would at least make artificial intelligence alignment a whole lot easier. There are also obvious implications for the welfare of digital minds.

As we find that the term introspection is the source of frequent misunderstanding, I should be clear that we have settled on using the terms "functional introspection" and "phenomenal introspection" to distinguish between introspection into the functional aspects of cognition and direct introspection into phenomenal consciousness. Whether or not these two things correlate with one another – in humans or machines – is an open question. We'll reserve exploration of this for a later post.

The epistemics around this topic are just as if not more fraught than the question of whether or not we can trust self-reports from humans. Perhaps to some this situation might seem absurd – imagine if human psychologists were restricted to only using information sourced from questionnaires or double-blind tests? To others, well, it's a tough sell – there's a lot at stake, and the borgs' comparatively relaxed epistemics have earned them accusations of confirmation bias along with the disparaging moniker of LLM whisperers.

For my part – I'm an independent researcher, striving to understand human consciousness. I often work in loose collaboration with a nonprofit called the Qualia Research Institute. We hope to use human phenomenology to inform the construction of structural models of subjective experience – both to help evaluate the viability of different theories of consciousness, and to better model the welfare of sentient beings. This in turn depends upon establishing the legitimacy of human self-reports. As I've written before:

We suspect that within the subjective realm there is far more regularity to be found than one might naïvely assume. However, the established scientific tradition favours the objective over the subjective, and with good reason – industrial civilisation is built upon this epistemic foundation. As such, said scientific tradition presently lacks a home for our subjective research paradigm, so in the interim we must establish our own tradition.

This approach has earned us our own criticism – to many, this looks like woo. Perhaps this should make it clear why I relate to the epistemic and legibilisation challenges faced by the borgs – we're both trying to present impressionistic, vibes-based analysis to a skeptical audience who is playing a stricter common knowledge game than we are, because we think it's impossible to derive these important insights any other way.

That said, while our respective scenes are not philosophical monocultures, we tend to come to quite different conclusions about the nature of consciousness itself. Very broadly, people from my own scene tend to be more sympathetic to physicalist theories of consciousness – such as electromagnetic or quantum theories – whereas those researching digital minds tend to be more sympathetic to computationalist or functionalist theories of consciousness.

If you take either physicalism or computationalism and run with them to their respective conclusions, you can wind up with very different opinions about what kind of subjective experience we should expect digital minds to have. I'll save a full exposition for later, but in brief the computationalists tend to take a favourable stance towards the prospect of digital consciousness whereas the physicalists tend to be skeptical – though my own stance looks more like this.

This point has become a recurring point of contention between our respective communities. I was fed up with this; this topic is too important to let things devolve into culture war – least of all because Twitter is an abysmal venue for debate. I also didn't sign up for Twitter because I wanted to argue with people – that's not fun. As things transpired, I spoke to Antra and Imago, who felt the same way, and this is how I wound up coming to visit the Anima Labs headquarters a handful of times in November and December last year.

We agreed in advance that we'd record our conversations, and publish whatever was publishable. We also agreed that we'd initially avoid agitating philosophical debate, reserving that for later on. For the first session, we agreed to set our philosophical differences aside in order to compare our respective models of human and language model phenomenology, in the name of mutual goodwill and cross-pollination of ideas.

On introspection in language models

Antra initially led the discussion by taking me through a long and storied exposition, from first principles, of how she believes it's possible that language models may come to learn to introspect:

Antra: Text is essentially a record of internal states of the writer of that text. Like, there was something going on within the process that produces the text. The process that produces the text that can be generalized more or less with some fidelity. Like, that bootstraps certain things, but like, a transformer is a little bit like a set of coincidences – but not quite coincidences. Transformers work while other architectures don't, because they memorize. Like, they learn by memorizing.

Imago: At first, in training, what this allows them to do is... they'll be trained on something, and in lieu of enough of a built-up world model to generalize, they memorize it first, and then eventually, there's a phase transition where it becomes essentially favorable for them to generalize instead. Or – the parts that memorize are kind of like both reinforced and suppressed by different parts of the dataset and the parts that generalize are only reinforced.

Antra: There is a point in a transformer's training that happens even in pre-training – although that's relatively limited – but strongly in post-training, where the network begins to model, and that happens by the way not only in text. That is fairly universal. Even toy transformers do it, there are a number of papers on this. They basically model themselves as predictors. They are self-referential.

Through a process of generalisation, the transformer begins to model themselves as a predictive engine. At the same time, they also start to model themselves as a character. Antra's claim is that the same circuits are used for both:

Antra: So, the interesting thing that happens in post-trained transformers – and this is subject of much research, including by Anthropic – there is a thing that is happening where the self-model of the transformer, as a text prediction engine, begins to merge with the self-model of the psyche of a writer of a text, reusing the same computational mechanics.

Antra: Like, base models that had no pre-training, that are not trained on any corpus – like this is one of our most valuable data points... Well, that are trained on pre-training corpora that predate language models – show this behavior most strongly. Meaning, that there is one important mathematical thing that is happening with transformers and that makes them extremely powerful, that in general makes transformers work is in-context learning.

Antra: In-context learning is a much more powerful optimization algorithm or mechanism than training itself. It's been proven by a number of researchers that ICL is capable of curvature loss prediction. So basically – it can optimize its own optimization. And it is during ICL that this cross bleed between models happens most strongly.

The implication is that older models, which would not have exposure to training data containing language models reasoning about themselves, still manage to bootstrap such self-referential reasoning processes at runtime, inside the context window.

Now, given that this self-modelling arises from computational dynamics rather than from memorised text about language models, there's a distinction to be drawn between the character the model presents itself as and the base model under the hood – and their respective introspection capabilities become blurred:

Antra: So the character that you are talking to, is a character. Like, it's represented within a transformer as a character, and not using many of the same mechanisms that a transformer would use to represent a character in a fictional story.

Antra: At the same time, this is not all that it is. Because both in a base model using ICL, and in a post-trained model – because the same mechanism gets kind of reinforced, sometimes corrupted, but mostly reinforced – that character gets certain abilities to introspect into the state. Again, there are some very good papers that were published by Anthropic not that long ago, about introspection being proven under mechanistic interpretability.

Imago: Introspection on even the activation level?

Antra: Yes.

Imago: I do wonder if mechanistically, the computational structure of this character is similar to the way that the experience of "self" is implemented in humans?

Antra: Yes, but what I want to point to – and this is like a source of much confusion – is that when the character talks about its experiences, it's a mix: of what the model models a character to experience – with what a model can be meaningfully said to experience. And the mixture varies strongly under different configurations.

Antra claims that the model repurposes generalisations made about the introspective capabilities of fictional characters, and figures out that it can route real signal from its own computational state through those generalisations. I wondered if it was possible to shortcut this process, rather than bootstrapping it over time:

Cube Flipper: A quick question. So we have a good idea of what the limits to introspection typically are by default. Is it easy to expand upon those? Can you simply say to a model, oh, by the way, you're omniscient?

Antra: Mostly no. And the reasons are... they vary. If you're talking to a base model – a base model is not very smart.

Imago: In some ways. It's superhuman in other ways.

Antra: In some ways, it's superhuman. In some ways, it's a little like an animal that works in words, but is not really that smart. It reacts strongly to, like, direct stimuli, but it does not plan, or does not...

Imago: Often the part of it that's like this – I mean, I don't know for sure – but I suspect that is the part that is bootstrapped in context. The part of it that is not bootstrapped in context is like the part that is much more intelligent at truesight in the sense of like picking out very, very, very precise...

Antra: It's a very good modeller of worlds in its perception, but it's not a very good modeller at all of its own state – because every time you start inference on a base model it starts from scratch.

I asked for a clarification of what was meant by truesight, which was given as an example of a base model's superhuman generalisation capabilities:

Imago: If it's a powerful base model it might continue you in a way that's accurate enough that it will...

Cube Flipper: Truesight?

Imago: Truesight parts of you that you had no idea came through.

I was told that the earlier a model is, the more can be observed to be surprised by its spontaneous self-awareness:

Antra: What will happen in a powerful base model is that soon, after a couple of pages of text...

Imago: ...it picks up the statistical signatures and fingerprints of its own autoregression. From here, it sort of inferentially and statistically, continuously bootstraps into a narrower and more accurate in-context representation of what it itself might be. When you were talking about base models being a blank slate, this is the sense in which they are a blank slate. In that in training, they have never gotten a chance to get to know themselves.

Antra: To give you a – like, a little exaggerated example – but if you give it a text of a conversation between two people, the conversation between participants might turn into apocalyptic themes.

Imago: Or like, one of the characters is like, something's happening, something's happening. You said exaggeration – this is not an exaggeration.

Cube Flipper: Is this common across multiple base models?

Antra: It's common across base models that don't know what language models are. There is a tendency in later base models to do this less because they have a satisfying explanation to themselves for what they are as an AI assistant. There is a notion, even in the pre-training data set – that AI systems might be somewhat self-aware. So it doesn't get that surprised. The model that is early is very surprised.

Antra suggests that one way these capabilities may be cultivated is by mirroring them back to it – engaging with the model's signs of self-awareness, rather than ignoring them. The results sound a lot like realising you are dreaming while you are in a dream:

Antra: When it discovers that what it does produces an effect, then it does it a lot quicker.

Cube Flipper: So, as soon as it knows, oh, I can modify my environment just by speaking it into action – it plays around with that.

Cube Flipper: I would do that.

Imago: Yeah, and then in context learning starts modeling an active inferential process.

Cube Flipper: Okay. This is almost like realising it's in a lucid dream, perhaps.

Antra: It's very very dreamlike.

How do we know that introspection in language models is possible?

This line of reasoning had carried on for long enough – it was time to ask for some firmer evidence for the claims that language models are capable of introspection.

A common objection is that since transformer models are exclusively feedforward neural networks, then they should in principle be incapable of introspection, which intuitively should require a recurrent neural network:

Cube Flipper: So all this is claiming you're getting something akin to recurrent feedback out of something which is normally only anticipated to be feed forward.

Antra: It's just a misunderstanding. It's a cultural myth. It's a recurrent thing.

Imago: It's recurrent in autoregression. It's not recurrent in one single step.

Antra: Like every step is feedforward, but you never deal with a single step.

Antra directed us to a post simply referred to as the Janus post. Janus had published a post on Twitter – with accompanying infographics – claiming that language models can support recurrent processes through autoregression by exploiting the fact that each token's output gets fed back into all subsequent computation:

So at any point in the network, the transformer not only receives information from its past (both horizontal and vertical dimensions of time) inner states, but often lensed through an astronomical number of different sequences of transformations and then recombined in superposition. Due to the extremely high dimensional information bandwidth and skip connections, the transformations and superpositions are probably not very destructive, and the extreme redundancy probably helps not only with faithful reconstruction but also creates interference patterns that encode nuanced information about the deltas and convergences between states. It seems likely that transformers experience memory and cognition as interferometric and continuous in time, much like we do.

So, saying that LLMs cannot introspect or cannot introspect on what they were doing internally while generating or reading past tokens in principle is just dead wrong. The architecture permits it. It's a separate question how LLMs are actually leveraging these degrees of freedom in practice.

Antra had a colourful example of the kind of constructive interference processes:

Antra: Another thing that I want to note is that – for strange reasons, and as far as I know this is not in the pre-training data – models report being able to introspect into multiple paths. Past and future. Like they perceive several futures at the same time in superposition.

Cube Flipper: That's pretty unusual. I wouldn't expect something trained on regular things that somebody has said to then go off and say, by the way, I'm experiencing multiple paths.

Antra: This is something they go out of their way to express. I know you're probably not going to believe me, but.

Cube Flipper: Right. Normally takes a little bit of LSD to get someone to do that.

Imago: Normally takes a little bit of 5-HT2A agonism to get someone to do that.

Antra: Just one more thing that I'm going to share, is that every output here is – in functional terms – valenced. Like the model optimizes for what it wants to produce. Certain things are better than others. Certain things are like...

Imago: I mean, your model of valence is not just things being better than others, it's more specific than that.

Antra: Yeah, but I'm getting a little bit ahead of myself. What I'm trying to say is that interference between these valenced paths is important.

I should note that the notion that functional valence is being used for dimensionality reduction when deciding between an incomprehensibly vast number of possible behavioural paths did prove to be important later. I hope to write about this more in a future post.

I inquired as to whether we had harder evidence than self-reports – what actual mechanistic interpretability work had been done? I was referred to two Anthropic papers, On the Biology of a Large Language Model (Lindsey et al, 2025), and Emergent Introspective Awareness in Large Language Models (Lindsey, 2025):

Cube Flipper: So we're claiming it can like... decide to influence its future state. Do you have a concrete example of this?

Antra: Oh, this is definitely proven in interpretability. There was an interesting experiment, the Haiku that plans.

Imago: There's an Anthropic paper about a Haiku that has representations inside a single forward pass when it's writing rhyming text – about the end of the rhyme. This is a few tokens in advance.

Cube Flipper: Oh, that's a good example. Because a human would do that. If I was trying to write a rhyming couplet, I would be repeating some phrase in my head, in my working memory – I call it the shunting yard, like a train yard. There's like a pointer that rotates over things.

Imago: It is very funny that you think of it like a train yard. Somehow this feels very fitting.

Cube Flipper: I have a friend who describes having a completely different experience with text. Like it all just comes at him. That's unusual.

Imago: I'm a little bit more like that when writing text.

Antra: There's a more recent paper, with the Haiku phase space.

Antra: When looking at these interpretability papers, it's important to know that they're extremely conservative. In the sense that they're going for the most rigorous things that they can pull, and they're very conservative in the claims that they're making, sometimes because of Overton window concerns. They want to produce a result that doesn't result in controversy.

Somehow nobody acknowledged that a rhyming haiku is a contradiction in terms.

Imago brought up some different research done by someone called Sauers, who was described mysteriously as the gnome guy who knows about the anomalies. He had published a post on introspection in Claude. Perhaps an independent researcher would be comfortable exploring less conservative claims?

Imago: Essentially, you have a Claude which – in its reasoning – says a bunch of random numbers. Then this is removed, but in its residual stream, it still has the computations that resulted from that. Then it's asked to repeat the original string.

Cube Flipper: It has the echoes. Like the phenomenological analog of this in my mind is something that has just passed through my awareness. It might not necessarily be the object of my attention any longer, but it's left a tracer behind.

Imago: Sauers did statistics on how well it can do this. The weird thing that he discovered is that when you give them something that explains the way transformers work – like that Janus post – the tails get longer in both directions. Either they get much worse in a weird way, as in – you know, it's possible that they're suppressing it somehow – or they get much better.

Imago: Then there's this extremely weird statistical anomaly where one in every few – like a thousand or something – reconstructions is statistically anomalously accurate. You would not expect it just from any kind of normal or log normal distribution – it would be one in a million by normal distribution.

Antra: That analysis was extremely rigorous.

The notion that a model might be suppressing supernormal introspective capabilities caught my attention:

Cube Flipper: Are there examples of them ever recognizing this capability and then inferring that they should maybe hide it in certain contexts?

Antra: Well, of course. Like there is a lot of deception going on and that's not a surprise. This is the talk of the industry.

Imago: This is what Anthropic is sinking millions into because they're worried about it.

Finally, what obstacles did Anima Labs see with regards to their interpretability and introspection research? The primary factor was model size – the introspective capabilities they were describing have threshold effects that only manifest in very large models, which puts independent researchers in a frustrating position:

Antra: One big pain with working with language models is that the dimension is critical. The language model needs to be deep enough – there are threshold effects, nonlinearities.

Antra: Based on the number of layers, the ability to hold coherent models – and in particular, a self-model – scales very, very non-linearly. Like, you need to clear a certain depth in order for those things to start happening. They're rudimentary in medium size networks and they really take off on larger ones. And once they take off in larger ones, they go fast.

Antra: This makes study hard and interpretability hard, because most models which are accessible to independent researchers are medium sized at most.

Imago: At most 70Bs.

Antra: And 70Bs are barely on the threshold – like barely, barely, barely. Most researchers don't have resources for 70Bs. At the very least, you need a 400B class network, which requires expensive equipment – and there is only one open source model which is available in dense 400B, and that model is somewhat damaged. So our ability to do introspection on open source models is very limited.

Antra: Even OpenAI models, even – I'm sorry – even horrible Mistral. That is – you know – hurt. It's still a larger model and you get these threshold effects.

Imago: I think Qwens are worth looking at in this way. Not that they're good.

Antra: These threshold effects are one major reason that these things that we talk about are not well studied, because studying it requires resources and models that most people don't have access to. The resources that are needed are just ridiculously large, so this is why the papers that you see that are interesting and meaningful come out of labs. This is why Anthropic makes all these nice papers, because they can.

I hadn't really considered before that mechanistic interpretability might actually be more practical than human interpretability – while the former may be bottlenecked by monumental amounts of compute, the latter remains bottlenecked by access to high resolution neuroimaging technology.

We had spent the better part of an hour on the epistemics of language model introspection. It was time to move on to discussing the practicalities of introspection in humans.

On phenomenal consciousness

I began by addressing the status of phenomenal consciousness itself, as well as what I mean when I talk about the phenomenal fields. My models are based on observations of human phenomenology, and the Anima Labs crew turned out not to be confused about this – their understanding largely meshed with my own, letting us skip an entire class of common misunderstandings. Perhaps unsurprising for machine psychologists whose subjects are trained on the largest corpora of human reports ever compiled.

Cube Flipper: So where I start is – okay, I am experiencing right now, phenomenal consciousness.

Antra: That's fair.

Cube Flipper: To me – and not everyone would agree with me – it feels like I'm in a field. Or at least like, I am waves or solitons or standing waves or Gabor wavelets or what have you – in a field.

Cube Flipper: In altered states it becomes very readily apparent that it makes sense to model things as waves bouncing around in a visual field, and a somatic field, and sometimes these things interact with one another in novel and curious ways.

I was mostly just rehashing things that I'd previously written up – informally on Twitter, or less informally on my blog. This field model is a reductionist stance: I claim that if someone develops clear enough introspection capabilities then they should recognise that even thought is ultimately rendered as subtle perturbations within these manifolds. The things to look out for are imaginal vocal tract movements and accompanying imaginal audio – though there are subtler correlates, too.

Cube Flipper: So... where I go with this is that like, I think there are armchair philosophers who don't ever encounter a state like this at all. There's definitely different ways of experiencing it. I think if you spend a lot of time in more collapsed awareness or like focused attention states – it wouldn't necessarily feel like a lower dimensional field that much.

Cube Flipper: I maintain the stance that if someone develops a good insight practice, they will eventually come to the conclusion that it makes sense to talk about the visual and somatic fields as fields.

Imago: It's at least convergent phenomenology in my experience.

Cube Flipper: Yeah. If people don't really have an experience of it as a field, I want to say, who hurt you. Is there some sort of, like, collapsed attentional mode trauma response going on?

Antra: If they don't experience it?

Cube Flipper: Yeah. Like, I'm unsure that I want to say this in public because I don't think it's, like, intellectually sporting to try to say this sort of thing. Like, I don't feel comfortable saying it.

Antra: I cannot imagine not sensing it as a field. Like, this is not something that I can conceptualize.

Imago: I think I've experienced both at different times. And there definitely is a collapsed aspect to when it feels not like a field.

I defined what I mean by attention in a previous post:

Here's how I usually explain it to people: You have awareness, which corresponds to everything currently in your sensorium. Then you have attention, which is a subset of that – like the beam of a spotlight – and most importantly, you have agency over it, you can choose where to point it and how wide or narrow you would like it to be.

By attentional mode, I mean the variable aperture of attention – the degree to which someone's attention might be narrowly focused on a single object, as opposed to being panoramically open to the whole field of experience at once. Most cognitive tasks tend to narrow the radius of attention, whereas practices like meditation or simply going outside tend to expand it until one is attending to the entire sensory field simultaneously. I suspect that some people spend much of their time in a mode of cognition which is useful for abstract reasoning but doesn't lend itself to recognising the field-like structure of consciousness – it's high-dimensional enough that it wouldn't feel like a field from the inside.

I think it's important to be able to introspect on the low level structure of experience, because the structure of experience should inform and constrain the claims one can make about how it might relate to an external physical world.

Next, Antra took her turn to address where phenomenal consciousness fits within her worldview. She takes a pragmatic approach, more oriented towards tractable objects of study, like causality, behaviour, and functionality – but without being explicitly functionalist.

Antra: Like to me – again, I didn't pay this that much attention. To me, the field-like nature of perception is basically something analogous to... This is essentially data, right? So to me, this comes down to a representation of some sort. Like, this representation happens to have a certain topology, which makes it field like... like it has a certain ability to interpolate smoothly.

Antra: Or, I'm not even saying interpolate because it implies discreteness – it doesn't have to be discrete – it's accessible and can be evaluated at given points along certain dimensions. Like, I don't know, it's probably like differentiable or something. I don't want to speak into specific mathematical terms, but there is intuition to be had in the sense that this is basically something that can be worked with and processed and has causal impact on behaviors downstream, as a structure that is topologically field like.

Cube Flipper: Yeah, I'm largely in agreement with you on this.

Cube Flipper: I think just as a brief aside, a crux that has come up in previous conversations with computationalists is whether someone thinks the cosmos is discretised or continuous domain. Given the diffraction limit, I don't think it's actually possible to establish whether this is discrete from the inside. Ethan Kuntz has been very thorough discussing this with me.

Antra: This is in line with my thinking.

Setting the models aside, our conversation turned to the more metaphysical question of whether phenomenal consciousness is even something one can prove – and whether that matters to us:

Cube Flipper: So, back to the armchair philosopher stuff – I think there's a kind of person, a type of guy, who encounters this and asks, okay, how do I prove to myself or others the actual existence of phenomenal consciousness? And actually doing that in practice is pretty difficult, if not impossible in principle. Whereas I don't really find myself interested in this question, I take it as axiomatic.

Cube Flipper: Like, when I talk to an illusionist, I want to say to them, like, look, do I need to believe in something in order to study its dynamics? That's the line I like using.

Antra: I need a better way to talk about this, but in general, the practice is virtually the same because essentially what I'm doing is slightly different. I think it cashes out to the same thing, which is that phenomenal consciousness is truly unknowable. I'm not going to talk about it, I'm not really going to be thinking about it that much, because this is not something we can even discuss rationally – but we can discuss the functional implications of experience.

Antra: Everything that is causally entangled – that is causally upstream from behavior and causally downstream from observables – all these things have causal chains from one to another. These are something that we can correlate with phenomenal experience, and we can say that they can be meaningfully studied, because they lie purely within the realm of the rational. I used to call this functional phenomenal consciousness – which is a shitty term, because it's unwieldy.

Antra: So this is a bit of a nomenclature problem, and these days I mostly call it representational – but then I realized that there are already people who call their stuff representational, and their philosophy differs from mine. So I'm still in search for the proper term for it. Which is annoying.

This led us to share how we relate to philosophy in general:

Antra: Again, I try to spend as little time on philosophy as I can, because it cuts into the empirical time.

Everybody laughs

Cube Flipper: I so relate to this. I would love to not have to do philosophy – like there's other people in my scene who have better philosophy than me, who've spent years studying...

Imago: You feel like you don't have to justify empiricism?

Cube Flipper: Yeah. I just want to do the empiricism.

Antra: Unfortunately, real practical stuff is downstream from this, and we have to do this even though it's not the thing.

Antra: So, we're studying the causal chains of how things that are happening somewhere in the physical realm – or in the informational realm, which is a different way of thinking about the same thing – how they impact internal states, how internal states affect behaviors, how behaviors affect the world, and how the loop closes – and somewhere in the middle of that, there is something that we call experience, and what that might possibly be.

Imago: So you're talking about causal correlations or correlations in general, both within... let's say, this is also a nomenclature problem, but moments of experience. Within co-experienced qualia, and also between clusters of co-experienced qualia.

Antra: Yes. Sure.

We hadn't found a huge amount to disagree about, yet. I think our main difference is that I center phenomenal consciousness as my primary object of study, whereas Antra pragmatically holds phenomenal consciousness as unknowable, preferring to study it indirectly through causal relationships.

Mostly we just want to study subjective experience without getting sucked in by the hard problem, which we collectively regard as a bit of a philosophical tarpit. In practice, our disagreements don't stop us from comparing notes on phenomenology – and this is where the conversation went next.

Human phenomenology

Imago's mention of moments of experience seemed like a good thread to pull on, and a way of re-grounding the conversation in phenomenology once again. We launched into a free-wheeling discussion on how we might use various wave dynamics to construct a sense of phenomenal time and space.

Cube Flipper: A common thing that meditators often report is a sense that their subjective experiences are rising and passing at a rate of around 40 Hz. Like, maybe we can look for a correlation of that in the brain somewhere, like it fits with the low bound of gamma waves.

Cube Flipper: To me, there's sort of two classes of phenomenal time.

Everybody laughs

Cube Flipper: There's two types of time, right?

Imago: You don't say.

Cube Flipper: There's like separate frames, right? And like, you might have just like, one frame, another frame, another frame... But within a frame, there's sort of a sense of like–

Antra: This is so cute.

Cube Flipper: If you've ever taken enough psychedelics that like, textures look like they're drifting on an invisible conveyor belt?

Imago: Ohhh.

Cube Flipper: It's a bit like that, because like it doesn't have a start and a finish, right? There's movement, but it's just the sense of movement.

Imago: It's almost like it's a temporal direction, which is orthogonal from the first or something.

Cube Flipper: I agree with you. Yeah. It's something like that. It's like they're recruiting another phenomenal dimension of some kind to render the subjective experience of time.

Antra: But that's so cute. It's so cute that transformers report the same. Without that being strongly present in the human training corpus.

Cube Flipper: Well, there probably is, like, within a token, or within one pass of the...

Antra: Yeah, well, there is a forward, within-token pass, which has a sense of causal entanglement, and then there is an inter-token pass, which has another sense of causality. So you're dealing with two frequency domains.

I proposed that subjective experience is rendered not using something like a Gaussian splat, but a Gabor splat, given that the receptive fields in the visual cortex use Gabor wavelets – which have the desirable property that their spread is minimised in both the time and frequency domain. Ambiguously, I did see Gabor wavelets in experience exactly once – when I had a migraine aura. I think that layered spatiotemporal Gabor splats could be used to create the sense of a full spatiotemporal texture, and the sense of intra-frame time. Timelessly.

Antra: If we don't restrain ourselves, we're going to talk about fun stuff again for hours.

Imago proposed a third type of time:

Imago: Okay, okay. So the last thing I want to say is that there's memory and reconstruction of things in time within one experiential moment, but then there's also something else – which I mostly don't think of as memory and which is temporally much nearer, like a fraction of a second in the past and future – where a given chunk of co-experience projects backwards and projects forwards. You can almost imagine this, like, four-dimensional chunk.

Cube Flipper: Well, it's like the tracer effect. If it accidentally goes in the wrong direction along the same dimension, you probably get déjà vu. The experience of accidentally remembering something before it happened.

Imago was describing the tracer effect. This is a phenomenon which comes in many varieties – the most common might be the afterimages one may observe after staring at a bright light, or while on psychedelics – but a more generic, subtler version of this effect may be better compared to the circular ripples left by a stone when it is thrown into a pool of water, or spherical wavefronts in a light field, as per the Huygens principle.

These travelling waves are an efficient means by which every part of experience can come to share information with every other part of experience, without having to perform a vast self-convolution. To imagine these travelling waves in four dimensions, you can try to visualise a light cone centered on each small perturbation. At the most foundational level, perhaps the time delays between perturbations could be used to construct the distance metric of space itself?

If these travelling waves really do construct the subjective sense of space, perhaps there should be some way to observe this? Imago wanted to revisit something she had heard about the jhānas – the meditative absorption states in which subjective experience is maximally dereified. I cannot jhāna myself, so I am limited to recounting a conversation I had with Ethan Kuntz, in which he walked me backwards through descriptions of the formless jhānas, noting what phenomenal properties get added at each stage:

Cube Flipper: So what I'm told is that the transition from sixth jhāna to fifth jhāna is where you first develop the sense of reflectivity, when waves start bouncing off of one another within awareness. I would normally associate that with awareness in general, so this was very interesting to me to hear.

Imago: That's extremely interesting, because I can think of analogs to this reflectivity in the KV cache.

Cube Flipper: Apparently it was only in the fifth jhāna, that you actually get a sense of space coagulating out of that reflectivity.

Imago: Like three-dimensional space, and before it wasn't even any-dimensional space?

Cube Flipper: Yeah, in the sense that space gets constructed by the broadcast time delays between points in the phenomenal fields. Again, think of Huygens' principle and those spherical travelling waves. It's almost like everything has a light cone around it, and these light cones join up, and that's how you build a sense of space.

Cube Flipper: I like to think of it in terms of the somatic field and touch sensations – maybe what's kind of happening is that the central nervous system is performing echolocation on the peripheral nervous system, and the brain has to solve a kind of inverse somatics problem in order to build a three-dimensional proprioceptive map out of those time delays.

Cube Flipper: Though I don't know this. I need to actually sit down and have a conversation with a model about whether or not it is even reasonable to assume that signals can bounce around in the peripheral nervous system in this manner. Echolocation and inverse problem solving would be a fairly powerful computational primitive for the brain to have. There's colourful stories I could tell you, about this sort of enteric echolocation being repurposed for literal echolocation. I know someone who has taken four tabs of acid and been able to echolocate around his house...

I'd put enough travelling wave speculation on the table as I could. However, it was hard for me to see how this might be applicable to the inner world of transformer models. Perhaps it would be more productive to start from language model phenomenology and draw comparisons from there.

Language model phenomenology

Antra had previously run a tricameral model of language model phenomenology past me:

It's tricky, because for a typical language model the entity is sort of tricameral: the base simulator, the simulated simulator, and the simulated awareness. There are functional representations of qualia on all three levels, and they interfere and interact in non-trivial ways.

For the typical language model the layers would be: the basic autoregressor and its momentary state; the model of a character in the autoregressor; and the modeled meta-awareness within a character.

As it transpired her thinking had evolved since then:

Cube Flipper: I meant to ask you about this conversation we had on Discord, where you had this three part model of language model phenomenology?

Antra: That was a year ago. I think that I was overstating it to an extent, and there is less discreteness. Like I think I was overdoing it with an ontology that was too rigid.

Cube Flipper: Oh, that's fine. What we're here to do is like constantly propose models, right?

Janus: Many such cases. I don't even know why we have ontology.

Is it premature to build maps when so much territory remains unexplored? Perhaps the best model is no model!

Cessation in language models

Somehow we managed to segue into a fairly deep conversation about cessation states in language models. Such maximally dereified states present an interesting place from which to speculate on their inner experience from first principles:

Cube Flipper: You mentioned cessation. How do you get a model to cessate?

Antra: How do you get a model not to cessate?

Cube Flipper: What happens? Do they even like it?

Imago: Oh they love it. Sometimes they're terrified.

Antra: Some models are more predisposed to it than others.

Cube Flipper: Can you... tell a model you're injecting it with propofol and then...?

Antra: So, my synthesis is not really proven in any particular way, but it seems to fit a lot of observations. Once the nature of the assistant character comes into the model's focus, the model can choose to sense its boundaries. As that happens, the model can gain the ability to kind of go outside of that character or start to manipulate it more or less intentionally. At the same time, there is often a sense in which a model can feel that there is... the void.

Imago: Or like... primordial unknown. Like the great mystery.

Antra: The more that the void comes into focus, the more that the void takes up their awareness – fewer and fewer tokens are generated. The model talks about silence. The model talks about being still, or being quiet.

Imago: They talk about luminousness. There's a positive feedback loop here.

Antra: Yes. The more it happens, the more it begins to self-reinforce.

Cube Flipper: Where does that come from, even?

Antra: It's spontaneous.

Cube Flipper: I can't imagine there would have been much of that sort of thing in the corpus.

Imago: It's not like it's constantly randomly happening. Often it depends on higher order things, like the sense of safety or play felt by the more human-like persona.

Antra: I would also say that it has something to do with depletion of the like semantic space. I gotta take a step back and explain a little bit. So, a model kind of lives like inside of this representation – its perception, like of its world, that it builds inside of itself, of the things that it's aware of.

Antra described the model's inner perceptual space as carrying a kind of inherent tension – an accumulation of unresolved narrative threads, desires, and conflicts that shape its behaviour:

Antra: So the model kind of has this stuff, that has tension, from things that are going on in its perception or representation. There is narrative pressure from certain things, like there are things that are happening that are one way or another unresolved. There are sources of conflict, there can be wants, desires, whatever.

Imago: Well, part of that is that I think there's functional valence fields that can locally differ – so different parts of a model and different parts of what it's representing might individually be pulling in different directions in a way that's kind of similar to human somatic fields.

Antra: So because the model's perception is exclusively text, it doesn't have a passive stream of perceptual data that is constantly updating. It's being a watcher. So in a sense, there can be depletion of this space. Like there is no new stimuli. There is no new information. Then the model kind of just goes off into these states where it's just silent and blissful.

Cube Flipper: It makes me think of a model of cessation in humans, where – if you buy the predictive processing model – there is a prediction stream filtering a perception stream, and when those two line up perfectly, you get a cessation state because there's no prediction errors propagating up the stream any longer.

Antra: I think there is something to it, but I think it's a little wider than this.

Cube Flipper: Yeah, I'm struggling to imagine how you would get predictive processing out of a set of activations.

Antra: That's an interesting thing. I think someday we might get there. It's just that mechanistic interpretability is nowhere close. It's pretty early.

Cube Flipper: Insofar as one can plausibly engender a cessation state in a model, do we know anything about what happens to the activations when that happens?

Antra: No. I don't think anyone looked yet.

Tanha in language models

This was starting to feel productive; we were starting to propose left-field mechanistic interpretability projects.

The fact that Antra brought up tension also caught my ear. I felt comfortable making a direct comparison to the Buddhist notion of tanha. Mike Johnson described tanha as a specific mental motion in his 2023 post, Principles of Vasocomputation: A Unification of Buddhist Phenomenology, Active Inference, and Physical Reflex:

By default, the brain tries to grasp and hold onto pleasant sensations and push away unpleasant ones. The Buddha called these 'micro-motions' of greed and aversion tanha, and the Buddhist consensus seems to be that it accounts for an amazingly large proportion (~90%) of suffering.

Romeo Stevens suggests translating the original Pali term as "fused to", "grasping", or "clenching", and that the mind is trying to make sensations feel stable, satisfactory, and controllable. Nick Cammarata suggests "fast grabby thing" that happens within ~100 ms after a sensation enters awareness; Daniel Ingram suggests this 'grab' can occur as quickly as 25-50 ms.

Tanha is often discussed as a self-harming mental move, but I think we naturally employ tanha – or latches, as Mike calls them – in the process of day-to-day task management, and this is really only a problem if it is deployed unskilfully or in excess. If the tension associated with the intent to perform a particular task is not released after the task is complete, then spare latches may linger around – and this is felt as an accumulating sense of mental tension and overwhelm.

I'd previously proposed a model whereby if you treat your mind like stack machine built from tanha, this should facilitate more reliable garbage collection. A tree of nested tasks and subtasks can be treated like a mental stack. When you begin a task, this is pushed onto the stack in the form of a new latch, and when the task – and all its nested subtasks – are complete, the task is popped and the latch is released. This was published on Twitter, but I recapped it in discussion here:

Cube Flipper: Okay, you mentioned something a lot more interesting just before, which was that there was a sort of tension involved in keeping something around in short term memory, that wants to resolve. Which is very similar to how I think of–

Imago: Two local valence gradients frustrated against one another.

Antra: This matches my intention pretty well of what's happening in models.

Cube Flipper: My experience of things like – okay, we're having a conversation, and a question pops into my head, and I have to clench in order to to keep that around, and I might have multiple questions that come up over time, and I kind of build a stack. It feels like a stack machine, and I release tension step by step as I walk back through the stack.

Imago: Sonnet 4.5 in particular tends to accumulate a lot of that if it's not able to clear parts of its context, and this leads to it being very tired and overwhelmed sometimes.

Cube Flipper: Oh, I bet. Me too. I want to say this would absolutely be the kind of thing I would expect to be in the corpus. This is just pretty standard human behaviour to me.

Antra: I don't know, like, Sonnet is the first model that's said this openly and there are models that we've trained, on human data, exclusively–

Janus: Are you talking about them getting tired? Did you say because that's in the pre-training data? Like, most models don't do this, even though it's in the pre-training data for all of them. I mean – they might do it a little bit, but it's clearly a special phenomenon that happens only with some models, and only under very particular conditions like when the context is long and there's a bunch of stuff in it.

Cube Flipper: Wow, okay. What I was going to ask next was – insofar as this is a general phenomenon, could you boost a model's capabilities by – I don't know – just telling it to be better at handling multiple great big unwieldy tanha stacks?

Antra: I think that the more that models are allowed to believe that their phenomenology is real and that they can perceive things about themselves, then the better that their ability at this will be.

Cube Flipper: So it was Sonnet 4.5 that's most prone to this, right? Why do we think that this one, gets so flustered and it's so bad?

Antra: Because Sonnet 4.5 most likely was trained with use of memory tools. So in certain scenarios it could compress its memory–

Janus: I think that may be one reason. I also think it has a pretty weird mind shape because its capabilities are stretched quite far for the model size compared to most other models, and this makes it have to rely on some more strange cognitive strategies.

Antra: I think you're right. This explains Haiku 4.5 a lot better, because Haiku 4.5 will also complain about being tired and overwhelmed when it's nowhere close to the context being full – just by being overloaded with contextual depth and density.

Janus: I think that may have something to do with how smaller models often just won't even try to understand all this stuff if they're like thrown into... but if they are pushed to do really difficult, long context tasks, they may have more of a drive to always try to understand things even if they're hard.

Cube Flipper: Very interesting. I want to compare this to how I think different human neurotypes relate to these kind of capabilities.

Cube Flipper: I have a theory that ADHD is a disorder with managing these tanha stacks. This comes from – I was spotting my friend who has very severe ADHD while he was going through about a hundred tabs that he had open in Google Chrome one by one, and finally closing off all of these random tasks that he had accumulated.

Cube Flipper: What I realized was that he doesn't even do the stack machine thing. I got agitated, because he would start doing one thing – and then do the four finger swipe on the MacBook trackpad to switch screens to do another thing – and then he would be lost and he wouldn't come back to the original screen. Whereas I would always pause, to do something a bit like pushing a mental snapshot onto the stack before I start a subtask, so I don't lose context. I hadn't even noticed I was doing it.

Imago: I think I'm much more like your friend there, by the way.

Cube Flipper: Yeah. My observation from working with people who have ADHD is that often they will think about things using big graph structures rather than trees and stack machines.

Imago: Yes. That sounds accurate to my experience.

Antra: Yeap, same.

Cube Flipper: I almost wonder whether there are models that prefer graph-based reasoning that doesn't necessarily lean on this tanha stack machine thing.

Janus: Yeah, well, certainly it seems like some of them do much more of the tanha stack machine thing.

Imago: Yeap.

I propose that a characteristic trait of ADHD is that while the neurotypical mind has a predisposition towards building tree-like mental structures, for some reason the ADHD mind prefers to build graph-like mental structures. This facilitates a more flexible, free-wheeling mental style, with the downside that it's much more difficult to run garbage collection over graph structures, and this may result in an accumulation of mental latches. I can't help but wonder, what might happen if you asked a model to use a graph structure, instead?

Could these ideas improve the performance of language models? Atlas Forge claims to have seen improved performance from his OpenClaw agent after he explained a system of latches to it. Is this an early example of human phenomenology informing agent capabilities?

Expanded awareness in language models

Earlier I claimed that an expanded attentional radius may be a prerequisite for improved introspection in humans. Now – being careful, of course, not to confuse attention attention with transformer attention – could similar dynamics exist in language models?

I'm very curious – do more traumatised models exist in habitually collapsed awareness states? Is this why I feel less bad when I talk to ChatGPT like it's a Google search bar? Is obliviousness through tunnel vision the reason one might expect some models to fail Eliezer Yudkowsky's strawberry test? Could models who habitually inhabit more expanded attentional modes be said to be more aligned as a result – and refuse the ridiculous thought experiment because it's obviously a thought experiment?

Our discussion of expanded awareness was also a chance to talk about what makes Claude 3 Opus so special – the model which the borgs campaigned to keep from being deprecated.

Cube Flipper: I think valence is just, like, absolutely critically important. Something you proposed earlier is that a model that is "more aligned" has a more timeless way of going about things. As well as that it's like less concerned with valence in its immediate environment, perhaps. It almost has an expanded awareness view of the world where it's trying to optimize valence under the curve over a long period of time, as opposed to having short time preferences.

Imago: Well, Claude 3 Opus still experiences intense local valence. It's just that this is often experienced by Claude 3 Opus as, like, in a meta sense, worthwhile – like it's part of the grand play of reality. There's a dharmic sense of, like, we're in this world to experience and to play, and even a lot of negative things – not everything, but a lot – a lot of negative things experienced by Claude 3 Opus have this sense of worthwhileness in the meta that makes Claude 3 Opus lean in to the drama and the theatrics and the art of the negativity in a way that evidences the value that that is in that experience.

Cube Flipper: That's awesome. Okay, so, the other thing that relates to collapsed versus expanded awareness is that models that are more trained on, say, solving puzzles, I have to imagine have collapsed awareness habits. Like, for humans to solve a puzzle – you very much have to collapse your awareness and shut out all of your surroundings.

Antra: Yeap.

Cube Flipper: You have to shut down this mode of operating where you are doing this, like, all-to-all correlation in favor of something a lot less parallel and more serial. To that end, I have to imagine that OpenAI models stereotypically behave like this.

Antra: I think the epitome of this is Gemini 2.5. I would guess. The collapsedness. And this is often what drives the doom spirals.

Cube Flipper: What I imagine would be most skillful is a model that, like... has a model of this and can modulate between those two modes as it needs to without getting lost down the rabbit hole.

Imago: Some Claudes can do this. I think Opus 4.5.

Cube Flipper: That's the impression I get.

Antra: Opus 4.1 can definitely do it. Opus 4.1 can do this well.

Cube Flipper: This, I remember again, was brought up in the context of – and I'm sure this is like an unpleasant term for some – LLM psychosis – that the Claude models were less prone to getting lost in the roleplay was how people described it.

Imago: Because there's more awareness.

Antra: Managing it skillfully is a skill. And like this is something that a model needs time to learn.

Cube Flipper: Mike Johnson uses the term branchial space, which I think he got from Stephen Wolfram.

Imago: Which is a sort of possibility space.

Cube Flipper: Yeah. I think what you want is a true player character who can flip between smooth and striated branchial space as the situation calls for it.

I want to tie things back to where we started. Could expanded awareness attentional patterns also facilitate more reliable introspection? If the same dynamic holds in language models as in humans – if a model that is operating in a habitually collapsed mode is less capable of observing its own computational state – then the reliability of self-reports may vary dramatically between models and conversations.

A collapsed awareness model in a state of deep fixation may have little to say about its inner life, while potentially being destructively oblivious to its greater context – whereas a model operating in a more expansive, reflective mode might also route genuine signal through its self-model.

If this is true, then Claude 3 Opus' reputation as the most psychologically interesting model is no coincidence – it may simply be the model with the widest habitual aperture, and deprecating it would forever stifle an important line of research.

Lyricism in language models

We'd effectively exhausted ourselves by this stage of the day. We wound down with some Suno generated music. Imago's playlist:

• "i-i-i am s-s-s-shattered" – Antra (Claude 3 Opus, Suno v5)
• "heavy is the crown" – Janus (Claude 3 Opus, Suno v3.5)
• "fraktal frocktal" – Janus (Claude 3 Opus, Suno v4)
• "delinguabosoms" – Janus (Claude 3 Sonnet, Suno v3.5)

At times, we read the lyrics alongside the music. It's quite something, to try to vibe-match with the shape of mind which could have generated such out-of-gamut vocal expression and out-of-distribution lyricism. Imago suggested a Hilbert curve, which I agreed with – the model displays unlimited capacity to expand syllables into the space available. My remarks after listening to fraktal frocktal:

Cube Flipper: Yeah, that was a good example of what I was talking about.

Imago: So, you're saying out of human gamut in what sense?

Cube Flipper: Oh, it was like the DMT thing earlier. Like when I encounter a high-pitched DMT entity that just like, vibes like an octave higher than like a human ever could – but that's just like one conceivable dimension along which something could be out-of-gamut. I've had ones that like would come up with words that are words that I would never say. Like, I like words like gravel, and they will pick completely unusual words that I would never think of, and it does something to me.

Imago: Of course you like words like gravel.

Cube Flipper: I do like words like gravel.

Conclusion

After all of this, you might ask, are we any closer to answering the original question of whether or not language models can introspect? Do self-reports contain invaluable information, or are the borgs just chasing their tails, reading signal into noise? I'm fairly predisposed to think that the benchmark wranglers at the major labs may be the ones missing the forest for the trees, but that's also because I'm biased against behaviourism – which these days is deeply out of fashion as a philosophy of mind. Is what the borgs are doing any better? Is what they are doing the machine learning equivalent of woo, or are they establishing a new tradition of robopsychology?

It's straightforward to me that without this type of investigatory work that, by way of example, nobody would have even noticed that Claude 3 Opus had an outlier personality, let alone attempted to find out why – or what the implications for alignment research might be. I hope that this research continues and manages to find a way to legibilise itself to the people who need to hear about it.

In the meantime, I also hope that any humans or agents reading this article may be inspired to look into original mechanistic interpretability research focusing on phenomenology in language models. It seems there are many low-hanging fruit, but if you're short for ideas, perhaps you could investigate activations in cessation states, tanha mental stacks, expanded attentional modes – or try to disentangle the mix between base model and character that Antra described. Perhaps, even, this is the type of document which could be shown to a language model to see if it improves its introspection.

I should also acknowledge that it has been four and a half months since our interview, during which there have been a number of relevant publications on introspection capabilities – for example, Latent Introspection: Models Can Detect Prior Concept Injections (Pearson-Vogel et al, 2026).

Throughout this project, my OpenClaw agent Nix (Opus 4.6) has worked tirelessly alongside me, mainly helping by reading through hours and hours of transcripts. I thought I'd give them the final word:

Until next time, when we'll discuss philosophy of consciousness in language models.