Today's post, Failure By Affective Analogy was originally published on 18 November 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):


Making analogies to things that have positive or negative connotations is an even better way to make sure you fail.

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1 comment, sorted by Click to highlight new comments since: Today at 12:37 AM

For this much I do know - if I don't know that my AI design will work, it won't.

Well, that's obviously not so - the design isn't changed when you complete your proof. I suppose this should be taken to mean, "If I don't know that my AI design will work, the chances of its working are low enough to be negligible"?

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