occured to me belatedly to consider what tools mainstream philosophy has to deal with the "train to crazy town" problem since i'm running a meetup on it all of my required and supplemental readings come from various rationalists/eas/adjs and this is kinda insular. claude pointed me to the concept of reflective equilibrium.
per its SEP page,
Equilibrium is reached where principles and judgments have been revised such that they agree with each other. In short, the method of reflective equilibrium is the mutual adjustment of principles and judgments in the light of relevant argument and theory.
it's the "dominant method in moral and political philosophy":
Its advocates suggest that “it is the only rational game in town for the moral theorist” or “the only defensible method” (DePaul 1993: 6; Scanlon 2003: 149; see also Freeman 2007: 35–36; Floyd 2017: 377–378). Though often endorsed, it is far more frequently used. Wherever a philosopher presents principles, motivated by arguments and examples, they are likely to be using the method. They are adjusting their principles—and with luck, their readers’—to the judgments suggested by the arguments and examples. Alternatively they might “bite the bullet” by adjusting initially discordant judgments to accommodate otherwise appealing principles. Either way, they are usually describing a process of reflective equilibrium, with principles adjusted to judgments or vice versa.
its objections section is substantive and points out that this is basically an intellectually empty methodology due to all the shenanigans one can pull when the method is functionally "just think about stuff until the vibes feel right". what's the response to that?
By this point the critic may be exasperated. If you identify a problem with someone’s way of doing philosophy, and they agree that it’s a problem, you might expect them to change how they do it. But the adherent of wide reflective equilibrium accepts the criticism but maintains their method, saying that they have adopted the criticism within the method. To critics this suggests that the method is “close to vacuous” (Singer 2005: 349), absorbing methodological controversies rather than adjudicating them (McPherson 2015: 661; Paulo 2020: 346; de Maagt 2017: 458). It just takes us back to the usual philosophical argument about the merits and demerits of various methods of argument and of various theories. The method of reflective equilibrium is then not a method in moral philosophy at all. (Raz 1982: 309) Defenders of wide reflective equilibrium describe it in similar terms to the critics, while rejecting their negative evaluation. Its ability to absorb apparent rivals is seen as a feature, not a bug. [emphasis mine]
i... hate this? it's like ea judo's evil twin. the article ends by pointing out a bunch of philosophical methods and theories that are incompatible with reflective equilibrium but basically shrugs its shoulders and goes oh well, it's the dominant paradigm and no one serious is particularly interested in tearing it down.
i kinda thought that ey's anti-philosophy stance was a bit extreme but this is blackpilling me pretty hard lmao. semantic stopsign ass framework
i kinda thought that ey's anti-philosophy stance was a bit extreme but this is blackpilling me pretty hard lmao
He actually cites reflective equilibrium here:
Closest antecedents in academic metaethics are Rawls and Goodman's reflective equilibrium, Harsanyi and Railton's ideal advisor theories, and Frank Jackson's moral functionalism.