This is a special post for quick takes by Richard_Ngo. Only they can create top-level comments. Comments here also appear on the Quick Takes page and All Posts page.
Defensiveness obviously isn't immoral, but it's not "inaction". A "hackles raised"/"defensive" energy is something one is actively "doing to" the social field, it's not an absence of action. It's a purposeful increase in internal/relational tension, and an increase in the strength of one's boundaries to reduce vulnerability (i.e. let less information through, like conspicuously not mentioning relevant stuff). So this to me looks like adversariality, i.e. polarization.
Yepp, this basically seems right (and insightfully phrased). I do consider my original reply (the "Is there something specific" one) to be pretty defensive, and a mistake for that reason (as was Zack Davis' original reply upthread).
I think the main problem with my other replies is that they weren't direct enough in owning that defensiveness. For example, me saying "in hindsight when I asked the question I was implicitly conflating "distasteful" with something stronger like "reprehensible"." was a kinda half-assed (and still defensive) attempt to say something like "lol that was a silly question for me to ask, point taken" and wrap up the thread. Obviously it totally failed to do that.
(Having said that, I don't endorse "maybe better not to reply since doing so is already energetically participating in the collective polarization pattern". People reread LessWrong for a long time, and ducking out is rightly seen as some evidence that you have no response to give. Better I think to just wait longer before replying, or take more time on a reply.)
There's something broader going on here where I would like to figure out a more trusting attitude towards LessWrong. One part of that is just becoming less defensive on an emotional levle, but another is that there's a bit of a clash in epistemic approaches. One way I've previously summarized it is that I'm more like a diffusion model and other rationalists are more like sequence models. That is, I'm starting off by trying to become confident about the highest-order bits, in a way that is locally less careful but IMO globally more careful (c.f. my comment above on "general-purpose suppressant of novel thinking"). I do think this lack of local carefulness has led me astray in the past (as I'll recount in some upcoming parts of my retrospective) and fixing it is one of my main priorities, but it also feels very helpful in jumping out of memetic traps. Probably the main action item here is to try to learn from people who have been both controversial and rigorous, like Charles Murray (other suggestions welcome).