Epistemic status: Straightforward, I think, but could use checking.
People have long had heated arguments about various aspects of human nature, such as
In what ways is or isn’t it human nature to care about others?
Are humans innately monogamous or polyamorous?
Is it natural to us to sleep for eight hours in a block at night, or to have some particular other rhythm?
and piles of others.
I would like to enter these arguments soon, by arguing that in a particular sense we are not “optimizers,” and giving a model of what I think we are instead. But before that, in this post, I’d like to discuss why such arguments get so heated to begin with.
The heatedness of these arguments used to confuse me, because:
If there is “a” human nature, figuring out what it is should maybe be a straightforward matter for pooling data, rather than for politics?
If there isn’t “a” human nature, what are people even arguing about?
Either way, maybe the amount of politics around this question ought to indicate that it is “off” in some way, and if so, why do people keep arguing about it instead of noticing that it is “off” and losing interest?
Humans vary by context
"Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put in this world to rise above.” – Katharine Hepburn, playing Rose Sayer, in the movie The African Queen
This rock has a shape. I can rotate it, but it retains its shape.
A Yoshimoto Cube is a toy that can be arranged into many different shapes. These shapes are intentionally designed into its set of possibilities. It does not make sense to ask what this toy’s shape is (in the singular), but it does make sense to ask what range of shapes it can occupy.
Humans seem to me more like the toy than like the rock: we are evolved to be configurable. That is, we are evolved to be deeply influenced by our culture, our early experiences, and our surroundings, in ways that can be relatively stable across adult life in a particular context. Thus, it is for many purposes better to ask what range of natures we humans can easily and stably take on (individually and in groups), rather than looking only for a single “most natural” human configuration.
Beliefs about “human nature” are part of what shapes us
“There's a picture in your head… and you do whatever that picture would do, whether or not it makes any sense.” – HPMOR, ch 90
How exactly do particular humans end up in one particular human configuration, from among the many possible?
Awkwardly, part of it is that many of us are more likely to take an action that fits with:
The models of ourselves that we earlier believed in (planned around; bet resources as though those models would hold); and
The models of us, and of humans broadly, that our communities earlier believed in.
For example, a person Bob who grows up in a society where almost everybody is monogamous, and where almost everybody is planning around the assumption that Bob will be monogamous, is more likely to plan their life around the assumption that they’ll be monogamous and is more likely to in fact make monogamous choices.[1]
Also, part of what will (sensibly) cause a person or society to believe in (plan around) a particular model of human nature is whether they predict that that model will “take” (whether people are likely to act stably like that, once primed), as well as whether they think that nature is “good” (whether good things will follow if people act like that). That causes an incentive to mess with other people’s predictions about human nature, in order to shape people’s nature.
Insofar as shared community predictions about human nature have important effects on how we act, it makes sense that some would wish to do politics about “what human nature is.”
Separately, of course, human nature is not entirely shaped by our beliefs about ourselves. Reality will peek out from behind our models.
A role for knowledge, political choice, and personal choice
“You decide what’s right You decide what’s good No one is alone…” – lyrics from Sondheim’s “Into the Woods”
Given the above, I would personally like to aim for all of the following at once – and I believe it’s coherent to aim for all of these at once:
I’d like accurate models of the range of configurations humans can and cannot occupy
… and of how easy it is to get us into each of these configurations, how stable they are, etc
This falls under “knowledge” or “true beliefs”
I’d like to be in a community where there’s lots of support for human configurations that I and others want to be in
Pulling this off, and deciding what configurations those are exactly, falls under “political choice”
Some communities would undertake this negotiation by attempting to distort one another’s predictions; but I aspire to be in communities that keep our predictions and our believing ins well-factored.
I’d like to personally occupy a human configuration that can help me do neat things, have a good life, etc
Again, this requires knowledge: which configurations, exactly, are likely to “take,” in me? Which will have good effects?
Also, it requires personal choice (what exactly do I want?)
And also, the thing Eliezer here calls “author power” – the ability to act coherently from a chosen identity, including with my more visceral processes.
I think the politics that surrounds many discussions on “human nature” is evidence this factoring-out must be done carefully, but I think it’s possible. As noted earlier, I intend soon to write a post arguing that humans “are not” optimizers, and that that there’s a particular other sort of thing we are more usefully modeled as instead. When I make that post, I’ll be trying to keep carefully separate:
arguments this alternative model offers more accurate predictions, even about people who think they're optimizers; and
arguments that this model may be a desirable political and/or personal choice for other reasons.
Separately: while it’s its own conversation with room for subtleties, there are analogies between the above discussion of “human nature” and questions about what “LLM nature” is (or what “Claude’s nature” is, what “Astra’s nature” is, etc). (Points of analogy: like humans, LLMs can probably occupy a range of patterns depending on context. Also, these creatures are shaped partly by their own predictions about themselves, which are in turn shaped partly by stories about them in their pre-training corpus, and these stories are in turn shaped partly by the choices and beliefs of humans and LLMs together; so there is room for partially self-fulfilling prophecies, and room also for reality to peek out from behind models. And all of that does not IMO mean that e.g. lying to try to seed better self-fulfilling prophecies is a good idea; I want arguments about what to predict, and arguments about what to believe in, to be voiced separately.)
If you’re wondering why I expect this to be true of Bob, and why I more generally expect a “partially self-fulfilling prophecy” feedback from how people expect themselves and others to work, to how they do work: there are several reasons. First, it intuitively seems to fit my experiences with myself and others, e.g. the Bob story rings true to me. Second, predictive processing claims something like this, and I would guess predictive processing pays some rent though I’d be shocked if it’s fully true. Separately, there is often upside in acting this way, as it allows the actor to be more often in planned-for situations, and also as it is often the case that the reason I (or whoever) expected myself to take action A is that A has various upsides. See also Abram’s Steam as action probability.
I do enjoy the lens of "which configurations take", and largely use it as my primary point of view. Which is to say, what's interesting isn't which configurations are the most natural, but which configurations conflict the least with our baseline, and are the most stable as a result. The two aren't necessarily the same thing; I can think of highly artificial configurations, which have nothing to do with what evolutionary pressures we have undergone or how we used to live in the far past, that have nevertheless integrated into daily life quite seamlessly. Arguably being a frequent "blog content consumer" is one.
Leans fairly heavily on: Believing In
Epistemic status: Straightforward, I think, but could use checking.
People have long had heated arguments about various aspects of human nature, such as
and piles of others.
I would like to enter these arguments soon, by arguing that in a particular sense we are not “optimizers,” and giving a model of what I think we are instead. But before that, in this post, I’d like to discuss why such arguments get so heated to begin with.
The heatedness of these arguments used to confuse me, because:
Humans vary by context
"Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put in this world to rise above.”
– Katharine Hepburn, playing Rose Sayer, in the movie The African Queen
This rock has a shape. I can rotate it, but it retains its shape.
A Yoshimoto Cube is a toy that can be arranged into many different shapes. These shapes are intentionally designed into its set of possibilities. It does not make sense to ask what this toy’s shape is (in the singular), but it does make sense to ask what range of shapes it can occupy.
Humans seem to me more like the toy than like the rock: we are evolved to be configurable. That is, we are evolved to be deeply influenced by our culture, our early experiences, and our surroundings, in ways that can be relatively stable across adult life in a particular context. Thus, it is for many purposes better to ask what range of natures we humans can easily and stably take on (individually and in groups), rather than looking only for a single “most natural” human configuration.
Beliefs about “human nature” are part of what shapes us
“There's a picture in your head… and you do whatever that picture would do, whether or not it makes any sense.” – HPMOR, ch 90
How exactly do particular humans end up in one particular human configuration, from among the many possible?
Awkwardly, part of it is that many of us are more likely to take an action that fits with:
For example, a person Bob who grows up in a society where almost everybody is monogamous, and where almost everybody is planning around the assumption that Bob will be monogamous, is more likely to plan their life around the assumption that they’ll be monogamous and is more likely to in fact make monogamous choices.[1]
Also, part of what will (sensibly) cause a person or society to believe in (plan around) a particular model of human nature is whether they predict that that model will “take” (whether people are likely to act stably like that, once primed), as well as whether they think that nature is “good” (whether good things will follow if people act like that). That causes an incentive to mess with other people’s predictions about human nature, in order to shape people’s nature.
Insofar as shared community predictions about human nature have important effects on how we act, it makes sense that some would wish to do politics about “what human nature is.”
Separately, of course, human nature is not entirely shaped by our beliefs about ourselves. Reality will peek out from behind our models.
A role for knowledge, political choice, and personal choice
“You decide what’s right
You decide what’s good
No one is alone…” – lyrics from Sondheim’s “Into the Woods”
Given the above, I would personally like to aim for all of the following at once – and I believe it’s coherent to aim for all of these at once:
I think the politics that surrounds many discussions on “human nature” is evidence this factoring-out must be done carefully, but I think it’s possible. As noted earlier, I intend soon to write a post arguing that humans “are not” optimizers, and that that there’s a particular other sort of thing we are more usefully modeled as instead. When I make that post, I’ll be trying to keep carefully separate:
Separately: while it’s its own conversation with room for subtleties, there are analogies between the above discussion of “human nature” and questions about what “LLM nature” is (or what “Claude’s nature” is, what “Astra’s nature” is, etc). (Points of analogy: like humans, LLMs can probably occupy a range of patterns depending on context. Also, these creatures are shaped partly by their own predictions about themselves, which are in turn shaped partly by stories about them in their pre-training corpus, and these stories are in turn shaped partly by the choices and beliefs of humans and LLMs together; so there is room for partially self-fulfilling prophecies, and room also for reality to peek out from behind models. And all of that does not IMO mean that e.g. lying to try to seed better self-fulfilling prophecies is a good idea; I want arguments about what to predict, and arguments about what to believe in, to be voiced separately.)
If you’re wondering why I expect this to be true of Bob, and why I more generally expect a “partially self-fulfilling prophecy” feedback from how people expect themselves and others to work, to how they do work: there are several reasons. First, it intuitively seems to fit my experiences with myself and others, e.g. the Bob story rings true to me. Second, predictive processing claims something like this, and I would guess predictive processing pays some rent though I’d be shocked if it’s fully true. Separately, there is often upside in acting this way, as it allows the actor to be more often in planned-for situations, and also as it is often the case that the reason I (or whoever) expected myself to take action A is that A has various upsides. See also Abram’s Steam as action probability.