I mostly agree with this post, in the sense that if someone says “I’m going to do WBE research”, and they don’t say any details, my guess will be that they’re going to do something that I judge net-harmful. But it’s a weakly-held guess and I would mostly want to ask follow-up questions.
Because I also think there exist certain activities that are simultaneously “a part of WBE research” and “net positive”.
I think whole-brain connectomics would fit in that Venn-diagram overlap, and I think that certain more specific connectomics projects would be not only net positive, but indeed one of the things I’m most enthusiastic about. (See Connectomics seems great from an AI x-risk perspective which you cited.)
The specific area where I disagree with the OP is, umm, the sorta generic nature of the arguments. I don’t want to talk about whether something is or is not a PBE, but rather what it is and what it enables and what can be learned from it.
If the plan is “delay AGI as long as possible”, then I guess the situation is simpler because you can be universally opposed to everything in neuroscience and AI, and the only question is whether you’re extremely opposed to it (e.g. unravel the secrets of human intelligence) versus only infinitesimally opposed (speed up the autocomplete on google maps). But a different plan is “prepare for AGI by solving the alignment problem”, and then we face a much harder task of trying to sort out what are the critical pathways for capabilities and for alignment, and push on the technical directions where you can make progress on the latter much more than the former.
I guess that might be the crux: “delay AGI as long as possible” versus “try to solve the alignment problem”? I think we’re both in favor of both, but differ a lot in how much of one we’re happy to trade off for an increment of the other. Like, the probability of capabilities side-effects and timeline-shortening from even my dream connectomics project would be more than zero, and I’m sad about that, but I think the probability is sufficiently low that it’s well worth it, because the project is pretty likely to teach us important things about the alignment problem. Happy to argue about what the tradeoff curve should be, but maybe I should stop at this point and let you respond.
The specific area where I disagree with the OP is, umm, the sorta generic nature of the arguments.
That's true & fair; my argument involves very strong / broad statements. I largely stand by its breadth.
I don’t want to talk about whether something is or is not a PBE, but rather what it is and what it enables and what can be learned from it.
I think this makes sense. However:
If the plan is “delay AGI as long as possible”, then I guess the situation is simpler because you can be universally opposed to everything in neuroscience and AI, and the only question is whether you’re extremely opposed to it (e.g. unravel the secrets of human intelligence) versus only infinitesimally opposed (speed up the autocomplete on google maps).
Yeah, I think this is roughly where I am.
(Though, it doesn't make me net-opposed to all neuroscience and AI in practice. E.g. improving harnesses to improve certain kinds of narrow performance for AI models seems probably to contribute basically nothing to AI capabilities and to in some cases make AI more useful for good work. (Though I'm pretty sharply opposed to basically any non-negligible AI capabilities advances.) For neuroscience, I'm only opposed to stuff that non-negligibly erodes the security-through-obscurity that we currently enjoy for human brain algorithms. I mean, I'd make tradeoffs here. BCIs may require some significant degree of improving some kinds of access to the brain; but that could easily be worth it if there were a good way to increase human intelligence via BCIs (though I don't actually see how). General neuroscience, especially that might tell us how to do HIA, seems great.)
But a different plan is “prepare for AGI by solving the alignment problem”, and then we face a much harder task of trying to sort out what are the critical pathways for capabilities and for alignment, and push on the technical directions where you can make progress on the latter much more than the former.
Right, I think this task is probably too hard for at least two reasons:
(I don't think this extreme set of beliefs I have should be quite a crux for the OP's argument; I think that the OP's argument goes through under somewhat weaker assumptions, though IDK what the boundary is.)
I guess that might be the crux: “delay AGI as long as possible” versus “try to solve the alignment problem”? I think we’re both in favor of both, but differ a lot in how much of one we’re happy to trade off for an increment of the other.
This is sounding maybe right? I'm not sure if it should actually be a crux. If I thought there was a non-negligible chance of solving alignment; and I also thought that a big connectomics project would noticeably increase that chance; actually I'm still unsure even in that world. Like, this kinda reminds me of "we should make frontier AI systems and then study them in order to solve alignment, and accept the tradeoff that we're accelerating capabilities a bit, in the name of differential acceleration". It's not the same structure of justification, but it's close enough.
Like, the probability of capabilities side-effects and timeline-shortening from even my dream connectomics project would be more than zero, and I’m sad about that, but I think the probability is sufficiently low that it’s well worth it, because the project is pretty likely to teach us important things about the alignment problem. Happy to argue about what the tradeoff curve should be, but maybe I should stop at this point and let you respond.
As I mentioned earlier in this comment, my arguments don't primarily address a connectomics-only project. I think I know enough to say that a connectomics-only project by itself wouldn't produce a WBE; I don't know whether it would contribute to AI capabilities, though if the MICrONS dataset is already high-quality that's some kind of argument (though maybe human cortex is different enough to add new capabilities ideas, or add new shitty-but-capable-after-training emulations, IDK!). The trick I get to pull when I say "project aimed at creating WBEs" is to screen off my uncertainty about which exact kinds of research contribute more or less to the WBE's eventual capabilities, and therefore potentially contribute to AI capabilities beforehand. I'm much more confident that if a project gets a true human WBE, then it got dangerous capabilities some time beforehand, than I am of any specific type of research producing capabilities.
All that said, we might be able to disagree productively about connectomics? Not sure. I mean, I'll have to defer to you (or AI or the future) a lot, so maybe it's more like an interview. I would wonder:
If there's a research project / organization with the goal of creating true human WBEs…
We’re in agreement on this part, which I understand is the main point of the OP.
But also happy to keep talking about the connectomics thing (even if it’s kinda a tangent). Here it is in bold: The rest of this comment is a tangent that should not be construed as disagreement with the OP.
this kinda reminds me of "we should make frontier AI systems and then study them in order to solve alignment, and accept the tradeoff that we're accelerating capabilities a bit, in the name of differential acceleration". It's not the same structure of justification, but it's close enough.
I agree that many people have said that they are trading off a pinch of timelines-shortening for a pound of alignment progress, but where the results have been bad. I think you’re reacting to that history by saying “anyone suggesting that they’re doing such a thing is not to be trusted, they’re probably just rationalizing or wrong”.
But that’s an overreaction. You have to actually evaluate the argument. Otherwise you’re making the same mistake as the people who say “previous apocalypse prophecies haven’t come true, so I’ll just ignore them all”, and so on.
It’s impossible to publish work on alignment if you’re avoiding even the faintest possibility that there will be even a tiny timelines-shortening externality. E.g. you yourself are a coauthor on the logical induction paper, which clearly-to-me fails that standard. (But I don’t want to accuse you of hypocrisy because maybe your opinions have changed in the intervening decade?)
It’s fine (indeed, good) to have a default-skeptical allergic reaction to people saying that they’re OK risking timelines-shortening and we’re just haggling over the price. I think the price should be high but not infinite, and I think we should skeptically scrutinize the argument but not rule it out a priori. (And I really think I’m more neurotic about this issue than almost anyone!!)
In other words, we should observe the failures and then try to do better. (Relevant meme :-P )
For example, some of the arguments that people have made on this topic are just really bad. Like, they’ll figure out X, and note that X is required for alignment, and so they publish X, without pausing to note that X is also required for building AGI in the first place, and so someone is bound to publish X sooner or later, and that will still be before AGI. I’ve been ranting about this particular mistake for years.
By contrast, I’m working in RL & search—see RL & search is a terrifying way to build AGI (an FAQ). If we divide RL & search into “what’s the reward / cost / objective function” versus “how do we build an AI that optimizes that”, then the former is (almost entirely) not required for creating AGI, and indeed usually not even slightly helpful for creating AGI. That’s why practically everyone in those fields ignores the question altogether. (See We need a field of Reward Function Design.) So progress on that question doesn’t have to happen before AGI, or ever. Instead, if we want progress, we have to push on it.
But a different plan is “prepare for AGI by solving the alignment problem”, and then we face a much harder task of trying to sort out what are the critical pathways for capabilities and for alignment, and push on the technical directions where you can make progress on the latter much more than the former.
Right, I think this task is probably too hard for at least two reasons…
I won’t argue with “it’s hard”—I expect us to fail, and I think we’re likely doomed. But I don’t see an alternative that isn’t also likely to fail. We need to be judging options on whether they’re the least-bad choice, not whether we’re happy about them.
On the margin there are ways to lengthen and shorten timelines, but lengthening them to infinity does not seem to be an option. How would you get to infinity? IMO it would require shutting down AI-related basic research everywhere on Earth. That really seems extremely unlikely to me, or at least sufficiently unlikely that we should not be planning around it. (If someone wants to make a Hail-Mary attempt, fine.) As points of comparison, it’s still perfectly legal everywhere on Earth to do basic R&D that might enable novel inexpensive uranium enrichment technology, or that might enable making super-plagues in your garage. It’s nobody’s job to check, and never has been. Also, the USA once tried to put export controls on an algorithm, and it was not only totally ineffective but struck down as unconstitutional.
Given that, we need to plan for ASI alignment to happen sooner or later. I presume your response would be that human-intelligence-augmentation will make this less perilous. I have a couple responses. First, as I was arguing here, I expect that the HIA humans will be doing better alignment research and better capability research, leaving us in a similar overall situation. Second, the HIA people will not be radical superintelligence, and will still have limitations on serial time (1,2) and may still benefit from relevant experimental data. Thus, doing ASI alignment research right now, and kicking off relevant long-serial-time research programs like connectomics right now, is still important. Finally, if we compare worlds-where-HIA-succeeds versus worlds-where-it-doesn’t (because ASI comes too soon, or because of unforeseen biological obstacles, etc.), I interpret your stance as “we should roll over and die in the latter worlds, if fighting would even infinitesimally harm are chances in the former worlds”. If so, that seems like a bad trade to me. I don’t think the latter worlds are that much more doomed than the former, nor that they’re less likely.
I would wonder:…
I think the cortex is running a big uniform-ish learning algorithm, and the concern (from my perspective) / exciting opportunity (from other people’s perspective) is that people will figure out how it works well enough to run something functionally similar on a computer. It’s true that there are things that MICrONS didn’t measure, but a large-scale project like a whole-brain connectome is very unlikely to measure something about a cortical column that a smaller-scale study had not already measured long ago on a small PI grant. There are just thousands of studies like this one where they look at some kind of motif that you find throughout the cortex, and try to learn everything about the receptors and functional relationships and so on. And we already have atlases of gene expression for every kind of cell in the mouse cortex, which tell us (in principle) about neuropeptide receptors and much else. Etc. In other words, I think there are a lot of things you’re concerned about, where from my perspective, that horse has left the barn long ago.
I think we shouldn’t be so concerned about emulation-without-understanding, not only for the various reasons here but also because it’s totally impractical. As I discuss here, if you simulate the individual transistors in a chip, the fastest modern computer available can’t even emulate Pong (1972) in real time. So it’s all about understanding the logic of the algorithm.
And more specifically, I think we shouldn’t be concerned with what an animal or person knows, but rather how an animal or person figures out something new. After all, we already have LLMs, which are virtuosos at applying already-existing knowledge. If you take a snapshot of a cortex, you can (maybe in principle) decode what the animal knows, but that wouldn’t be very helpful for unraveling how the animal figures out something new.
Likewise, a “low-fidelity emulation” would not be a concern if it didn’t incorporate the ability to figure out something that’s never been figured out before. Again, we already have LLMs, which are a kind of low-fidelity emulation of what people already know.
Meanwhile, the “Steering Subsystem” is the part of the brain containing the core logic of human innate drives. If it’s possible for humans to be nice, and to make the future better, then it’s possible for a sufficiently-human-like AGI to be nice, and to make the future better. But reverse-engineering (the relevant parts of) the Steering Subsystem is quite different from reverse-engineering the cortical algorithm. It’s not a big uniform-ish learning algorithm, rather it’s a tangled web of a few thousand idiosyncratic neuron groups doing idiosyncratic things like tracking loneliness. Every year another ~10 of those neuron groups gets carefully characterized by some grad student in one of the handful of groups that specialize in this type of work (e.g. Catherine Dulac group or Dayu Lin group). We need some kind of mass-production to make headway faster. Hence my advocacy for connectomics. The connectomics wouldn’t replace the artisanal studies, but rather complement them by helping us know which cell groups are the most critical to study. This is still a heavily-theory-laden challenge—a connectome dataset doesn’t just spontaneously announce what hypothalamic cell groups are responsible for compassion—but I have ideas of what to look for.
I agree that many people have said that they are trading off a pinch of timelines-shortening for a pound of alignment progress, but where the results have been bad. I think you’re reacting to that history by saying “anyone suggesting that they’re doing such a thing is not to be trusted, they’re probably just rationalizing or wrong”.
I'm almost saying that, yeah. Also note that, beyond just the history of people saying that with bad results, there's also the history of grantmakers not being able to tell that that would happen, and funding significantly more harmful stuff. That's an additional knowledge problem. In other words, if you're about to fund X, consider that it's not feasible to fund X while having a good impact. It's sad because, yes, somewhere in the used car lot there's probably a good deal. It's just that you actually can't tell, so you'll have to go someplace else.
But that’s an overreaction. You have to actually evaluate the argument.
Evaluating the object-level argument is helpful of course, and may turn up good used cars. But I'll stand by keeping the prior with a pretty substantial degree of control over the decisions, even after you've done some amount of object-level evaluation.
Otherwise you’re making the same mistake as the people who say “previous apocalypse prophecies haven’t come true, so I’ll just ignore them all”, and so on.
I think they're doing a somewhat rational move! And then you're supposed to argue the object-level convincingly enough to overcome that.
It’s impossible to publish work on alignment if you’re avoiding even the faintest possibility that there will be even a tiny timelines-shortening externality. E.g. you yourself are a coauthor on the logical induction paper, which clearly-to-me fails that standard. (But I don’t want to accuse you of hypocrisy because maybe your opinions have changed in the intervening decade?)
(I was not in fact remotely cruxy for that paper, but in any case:) Yes, I agree that it fails the standard, and in fact probably shouldn't have been published (which I certainly didn't say or think at the time). That's a change of mind with benefit of hindsight, yeah.
If we divide RL & search into “what’s the reward / cost / objective function” versus “how do we build an AI that optimizes that”, then the former is (almost entirely) not required for creating AGI, and indeed usually not even slightly helpful for creating AGI.
With this as an example, I'm like "yeah that sounds probably safe to work on, and worth someone doing, but also it won't work partly because it's safe to work on--in other words, it probably will not really address problems such as reflective stability, which are ~necessary to address, because it is avoiding thinking about the cores of how intelligence works, and therefore probably can't figure out the cores of reflective stability in intelligent minds".
On the margin there are ways to lengthen and shorten timelines, but lengthening them to infinity does not seem to be an option. How would you get to infinity? IMO it would require shutting down AI-related basic research everywhere on Earth. That really seems extremely unlikely to me,
I agree with this literally, but it sounds like we may have disagreements in space in between? I think one could plausibly significantly push it back significantly through a combination of international treaty, professional norms, academic norms, social stigma, public consensus, and similar. Yes, you can't stop people doing conceptual research. But you can make them afraid to talk about it or share it, and make them feel guilty for doing it. That doesn't last anywhere close to forever, but it could quite significantly increase timelines.
I interpret your stance as “we should roll over and die in the latter worlds, if fighting would even infinitesimally harm are chances in the former worlds”.
This is pretty straw of course. My stance is
With this as an example, I'm like "yeah that sounds probably safe to work on, and worth someone doing, but also it won't work partly because it's safe to work on--in other words, it probably will not really address problems such as reflective stability, which are ~necessary to address, because it is avoiding thinking about the cores of how intelligence works, and therefore probably can't figure out the cores of reflective stability in intelligent minds".
Based on reading your blog over the past years, I feel like the thing you have in mind for what a solution to alignment would look like is not just hard but impossible and unnecessary. Like, suppose (as a thought experiment) ASI were impossible in our universe, along with other x-risks. We would be passing the torch to the next generation of humans, just as every previous generation has. What will that next generation do with their powers? We don’t really know. It could be good, it could be bad. We can and should fight to try to make it better. But we don’t say to ourselves that we need to “solve reflective stability” for future humans, and if we don’t, then we have failed.
The future humans will learn new things we can’t imagine (presumably), and then make decisions, and the end-results might be good insofar as the humans have “good” dispositions and are able to solve coordination problems etc. We can and should try to anticipate and preempt problems. But we mostly can’t micromanage the outcome.
Likewise, I think it’s hard but possible to make an ASI with a “good” disposition, but if we do, we won’t be able to anticipate what it will wind up deciding to do, without being superintelligent ourselves. But that shouldn’t count as “alignment failure”.
I think one could plausibly significantly push it back significantly through a combination of international treaty, professional norms, academic norms, social stigma, public consensus, and similar. Yes, you can't stop people doing conceptual research. But you can make them afraid to talk about it or share it, and make them feel guilty for doing it. That doesn't last anywhere close to forever, but it could quite significantly increase timelines.
This is a thing that could happen in principle, and I opportunistically do outreach to try to help on the margin [for my part I’m not spreading the message “these people suck” but rather “here’s why ASI is dangerous”], but getting to the place you describe seems extraordinarily unlikely to me. It seems to me that people have been raising the alarm on AI doom since Turing, and basically nobody cared until superintelligence seemed plausibly around the corner. Now that it is, people are somewhat more receptive to a narrowly-targeted restriction of that specific kind of ASI that they think is around the corner. Almost everyone on both sides continues to view “ASI is right around the corner” as a crux on the question of whether we should be worried about ASI at all.
I also think you’re insufficiently cynical about how deftly people can brand their capabilities research as “safety”-positive. Copying from here:
Thus, those researchers I mentioned, who are messing around with new paradigms on arXiv, are in a great position to twist “Pause AI” type public advocacy into support for what they’re doing!
“You don’t like LLMs?”, the non-LLM AGI capabilities researchers say to the Pause AI people, “Well how about that! I don’t like LLMs either! Clearly we are on the same team!”
This is not idle speculation—almost everyone that I can think of who is doing the most dangerous kind of AI capabilities research, the kind aiming to develop a new more-powerful-than-LLM AI paradigm, is already branding their work in a way that vibes with safety. For example, see here where I push back on someone using the word “controllability” to talk about his work advancing AI capabilities beyond the limits of LLMs. Ditto for “robustness” (example), “adaptability” (e.g. in the paper I was criticizing here), and even “interpretability” (details).
I think these people are generally sincere but mistaken, and I expect that, just as they have fooled themselves, they will also successfully fool their friends, their colleagues, and government regulators. Well, the government regulators hardly matter anyway, since regulating the activity of “playing with toy models, and publishing stuff on arXiv and GitHub” is a hell of an ask—I think it’s so unlikely to happen that it’s a waste of time to even talk about it, even if it were a good idea all-things-considered.
(Just yesterday I was poring over a paper by a guy who went from doing the worst kind of capabilities research in academia, to MATS (!!), and then straight back to the worst kind of capabilities research but now with higher salary at a nominally-AGI-safety-focused nonprofit. His personal website emphasizes how his research is helping AGI safety.)
AGI is more likely to come >20 years from now than <20 years from now. (I assume you disagree because no one agrees with this.) Therefore burning a 30 year pause down to a 28 year pause is not worth a +.1% chance of alignment within 10 years. (Sorry these may be straw numbers.)
Yeah I do think >20 years is <50% likely (although not <<50%). I disagree with the idea that a connectomics dataset is only relevant if ASI happens soon. For one thing, these are long-serial-time projects; the idea is to develop the experimental methods today in order to have a bare-bones human connectome in like 2040, or even 2050 or later if funding is less generous or technical difficulties arise. Then that dataset would be an input into research, and it may take years to digest, and we might want to iterate, etc. Anyway, if it’s HIA people in the distant future trying to solve alignment, I think they too would benefit from having this kind of data. Again, more generally, solving technical alignment requires serial time (1,2); even if HIA people will be working on technical alignment in the future, their odds will be better if we are also working on technical alignment right now.
To the point:
Maybe we should table this? I'm not sure what the cruxes are. If we were to continue, it might be helpful for us to make up numbers in order to find the most obvious disagreements (and/or change our numbers to become more internally coherent).
E.g. I'm like (these aren't very considered numbers, may revise; I'm trying to illustrate the process-level point, but not completely made up):
(Maybe I should think this through more seriously anyway, though seems hard and IDK if likely to change most of my actions.)
More reactions:
Based on reading your blog over the past years, I feel like the thing you have in mind for what a solution to alignment would look like is not just hard but impossible and unnecessary. Like, suppose (as a thought experiment) ASI were impossible in our universe, along with other x-risks. We would be passing the torch to the next generation of humans, just as every previous generation has. What will that next generation do with their powers? We don’t really know. It could be good, it could be bad. We can and should fight to try to make it better. But we don’t say to ourselves that we need to “solve reflective stability” for future humans, and if we don’t, then we have failed.
I disagree with this. You don't ~need to understand reflective stability because of anything about guarantees or a high bar, let alone impossible. You ~need to understand it because otherwise you don't understand about what values even are. (Cf. re/ the importance of reflective stability: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Ht4JZtxngKwuQ7cDC/tsvibt-s-shortform?commentId=koeti9ygXB9wPLnnF ) I mean, this could be wrong. I don't think I would even tell people to make "understand reflective stability" a focus of their research. I would say "understand what values are". And then they would fail to consider reflective stability, perhaps because they are not considering the cores of intelligence which make reflective stability an especially sharp problem, and therefore they would probably be failing to understand what values are.
So what's the deal with human successors? We ~know they have our values because they're human! Figuring out how to make a de novo mind with values we like (or some kind of quasi-value structure that ends up doing things we like) is a whole different challenge.
In other words, the point I was trying to make was "if your research isn't grappling with the cores of intelligence, it probably won't understand [what sorts of things really drive the ultimate effects of a very intelligent mind]".
The future humans will learn new things we can’t imagine (presumably), and then make decisions, and the end-results might be good insofar as the humans have “good” dispositions and are able to solve coordination problems etc. We can and should try to anticipate and preempt problems. But we mostly can’t micromanage the outcome.
Likewise, I think it’s hard but possible to make an ASI with a “good” disposition, but if we do, we won’t be able to anticipate what it will wind up deciding to do, without being superintelligent ourselves. But that shouldn’t count as “alignment failure”.
(I'm kinda confused--I take it griceanly that you think I disagree with this or haven't priced it in somehow, but also confused that you would think I disagree with this or haven't priced it in somehow; if that's actually true of me, I don't get it yet from these paragraphs.)
I also think you’re insufficiently cynical about how deftly people can brand their capabilities research as “safety”-positive.
Maybe, but not sure why you think this. I'm not saying you can get an infinite pause with no leaks with high probability. I'm saying you can "plausibly significantly push it back significantly". Yeah, part of that would have to be extreme skepticism about safetywashing, which is not easy to implement.
Sure, let’s table. Except for one little thing:
extreme skepticism about safetywashing
I don’t think safetywashing is the right term for what I was referring to in the block-quote in the grandparent comment. @Adam Scholl coined “safetywashing” in analogy with “greenwashing”, e.g. Chevron buying a small environmental preserve and advertising it on TV. Some company has something it wants to do anyway, that’s generally bad for the environment, and they find some way to portray themselves as environmental anyway.
By contrast, I’m talking about something closer to environmentalists who oppose nuclear power and renewable energy projects, thus harming the environment, because they’re rationalizing, or just bad at thinking things through. There was never an ulterior motive; the motive was environmentalist all along, it’s just that environmentalists can be spectacularly counterproductive at achieving their own goals. For example that MATS guy I mentioned, the one trying to develop a new AI paradigm, he really thinks that what he’s doing will help pave the way to safer AI. But I think it’s just awful, pure timelines-shortening with no safety benefits whatsoever. We can speculate about whether he had a subconscious ulterior motive of some sort (e.g. constructing elegant theories about AI is fun and prestigious), but it’s equally plausible that he really did care about safety from the start, just in a spectacularly counterproductive way (according to me). And he started doing that work while in academia, so there wasn’t any organization-level ulterior motive either.
In this context the term "generative" simply refers to generating neuron morphologies via an algorithm as opposed to measuring the morphology of existing neurons. None of the existing research on this topic uses machine learning.
Examples:
One Rule to Grow Them All: A General Theory of Neuronal Branching and Its Practical Application https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000877
ROOTS: An Algorithm to Generate Biologically Realistic Cortical Axons and an Application to Electroceutical Modeling https://doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2020.00013
Several years ago I talked with the lead author of the TREES algo and they mentioned that their current research was a new morphology generating algorithm that operated by modeling the tips of the dendrites, which is where they grow from. In this way they would achieve more realistic results, and more importantly, using only local communication between dendrites and their immediate surroundings. The prior art (cited above) relies on global coordination between distant dendrites, which is not biologically possible.
Thanks! Interesting.
I don't think that's actually how the 2025 report is using "generative" though. I think they mean, generative electrical models of neurons from structural information about neurons. This probably does involve ML (trained on performance at imitating animal models, I think).
Here are the sentences containing that word in the report:
In other cases where discontinuities or non-smoothness arise (e.g., certain spiking resets), generative methods can learn to map recordings to model parameters without needing direct backpropagation through each spike event.
Then I'll just quote a whole subsection:
Structure to function
For larger mammalian brains, though, comprehensive, whole-brain functional data remain beyond present technology, making it impractical to learn all parameters directly from raw observations. Consequently, biophysical priors – such as those embedded in multi-compartment Hodgkin–Huxley or simpler spiking models – remain crucial to reduce parameter space and keep simulations biologically plausible. Yet even these more traditional approaches struggle to scale up to billions of cells; far more extensive measurement capabilities would be required to fit every neuron and synapse. A promising strategy for bridging the structure-to-function gap is to develop generative models that link morphological and molecular data to neuronal function. In smaller, more experimentally tractable organisms such as C. elegans or larval zebrafish, one can gather both a molecularly annotated connectome and rich functional data (e.g., through optogenetic perturbations and whole-brain recordings). These models learn how specific structural attributes translate into core biophysical parameters like channel conductances or short-term plasticity kinetics by correlating neuronal responses with ultrastructural features, such as synapse size, receptor distributions, and dendritic geometry. Once validated in systems with abundant ground-truth data, the same approach can be extended to large mammalian brains, where whole-brain functional measurements remain infeasible. In this context, Holler et al stands as a landmark demonstration of how morphological information alone can inform functional predictions: by combining slice electrophysiology with electron microscopy, they showed that synapse size reliably predicts synaptic strength in mouse somatosensory cortex (Holler et al., 2021). Their work exemplifies how structural features can serve as powerful proxies for synaptic function. Incorporating molecular-level data into such pipelines would enable generative frameworks to infer parameters with even greater precision and scale, providing a viable path toward biologically grounded simulations of large neural circuits. The necessary condition for that is an extensive database of slice synaptic electrophysiology data, such as Campagnola et al, 2022. In this way, integrating high-resolution structural data with targeted functional measurements can progressively narrow – and ultimately bridge – the gap between brain structure and brain function. This will require substantial investments in such aligned datasets.
[I have not read your post in detail; I read up until "Filling in gaps with learning creates the capabilities expropriation pipeline" and skimmed the rest. Apologies if this leads to some central misunderstandings, I've tried to check for those but may have missed some]
[caveat, I am not a neuroscientist]
My main-line expectation for PBE/WBE development in the short-term routes through
I expect the PBEs made by hill-climbing with this research agenda to look like "t-humans" where "snapshots" are created that emulate human behavior over "t" seconds, and e.g. you could generate some artifacts like approximate HCH with this method.
I'd like to make a few claims:
Expanding on this:
Also I generally expect it to be somewhat difficult to distill insights from the brain with either of these methods. More the foundation model esque approach than the "image all the neurons in a bunch of detail and reconstruct local interactions & get accurate global models as a result"
Non-invasive ultrasound + contrast (e.g. microbubbles) can reconstruct vasculature throughout the cranium. Merge is also working on tooling to increase the fidelity of ultrasound-based methods (see Mikhail Shapiro's past research (cofounder of Merge) on e.g. gene therapies for acoustic phosphorescence) that would potentially provide single-neuron level resolution throughout the brain as well.
(There are also some other modalities people are exploring, but these are just the ones I've heard the most about that can image deeply)
you could generate some artifacts like approximate HCH with this method.
Is there a strong statement you would assert with substantial confidence (IDK, like >20% or something), like "Some 30-second humans in some feasible HCH structure would be able to save the world in 5 years."? I think this might be a crux for me as to whether connectomics-forward WBE research is net harmful. (I also wonder how a 30-second human improves over a modern AI (allowed to run for a range of times >30 seconds) in this regard.)
connectomics-based WBE methods, on the other hand, might not? (here I'm using "connectomics" as a stand-in for any data-collection mechanism that has e.g. single-neuron resolution). Or at least they're more hopeworthy than the vibe I get from reading this post
I think connectomics-based WBE research is a somewhat safer approach compared to the approach you outlined, yeah. And also more likely to work to create a 30-second human. One issue is something like:
mechanistic understandings of e.g. Steering Subsystem seems potentially much more differentially useful for alignment
I'm pretty skeptical of this being a significant effect, but I'd guess it's not a crux (unless it's a huge effect) for whether [connectomics research aiming to quickly produce a human WBE] is net harmful. WBE research would be trying to get a whole brain connectome, including cortex. (I guess you're somewhat agreeing with that?)
True WBE with amplification (the last two entries on your scale) is almost inevitable going to produce a society with a large degree of inequality between the most amplified WBEs and everyone else. Humans are not perfectly aligned to other humans (see https://www.lesswrong.com/s/QypaioYFd3CMFhefn/p/4gGGu2ePkDzgcZ7pf for more discussion), and history has demonstrated at great length that human societies with high levels of inequality rarely treat the less-powerful members of the society well. So WBE with enhancement is itself (even without other AGI) a major alignment/power concentration risk. So I think the blue line on your first graph is too optimistic (or you need two such lines, one for inherent risks and one for benefits). So I think your argument actually understates the case for your conclusions.
I think I mostly disagree - any decent WBE project would not and should not jump to directly emulating the human mind. That seems dumb and not something I'd do if I was in charge. It seems obvious to me that you start with smaller non-AGI brains like fruit-flies, then mice, then maybe small primates first. I'm not saying this would completely eliminate all the other issues.
But brains have evolved (and thus similar to each other). Things like whether or not protein complexes and brain flow is important can be found out much much earlier that we ever get close to putting a general intelligence capable of self-modifying on a computer.
I'd like to at some point write-up why I now think WBE is probably a much better way to get to safe world than other things, but I think something like this in order of importance:
- WBE is much more easier to see progress in than AI / human intelligence enhancement.
(A) You have faster feedback loops with a scanned brain, than something like bio-humans where you have to wait a few years to administer your first tests, and potentially much longer to see long term effects.
(B) You can actually tell if you're making progress as opposed to AI alignment. Non-genius existing humans can administer and verify a battery of tests to ensure e.g your mouse brain emulation is high-fidelity.
Even if you do human enhancement first, you'd probably want them to pursue something like a high-fidelity WBE first rather than setting up a AGI. Regular non-enhanced humans wouldn't be able to tell if what they're doing is safe anyway. Or you have to wait long enough for all humans to be enhanced over maybe multiple generations or more.
With a very high probability, I'd claim that an emulated mouse brain would not lead to runaway ASI no matter how long it's run. And I think that's mostly true even upto chimp level given we know the speeds they're running at. If you can emulate a chimp (or even a lower level primate at high fidelity), then you can probably have a safe human WBE without understanding anything more (again claimed with no evidence). Maybe you've unlocked some powerful learning algorithms while emulating a monkey, and. this leads to the AICo co-opting this idea. Which brings me to my next point:
In a realistic world, I think a big problem you bring up - better emulations somehow leaking into AI co's capabilities is mostly moot. The AI companies are having zero problems producing capability increases anyway. Either we ban AI research completely, and then this point is moot, or we don't ban it, and we get the AI labs creating superintilligence anyway. I think this is more of a what happens next? Once we ban AGI research, I think subsidizing / funding WBE is still the safest thing to do.
I'd claim that an emulated mouse brain would not lead to runaway ASI no matter how long it's run
This is not my claim. My claim is more like this:
While you were scaling to a human brain, someone else could take the mouse brain, or reconstruct it using similar methods. Then they could multiply the mouse cortex by
You might think scaling a mouse brain like that can't feasibly lead to major increases in AI capabilities. I disagree, but ok. So next you do a small primate. Are you going to also claim that the small primate, scaled up by
In a realistic world, I think a big problem you bring up - better emulations somehow leaking into AI co's capabilities is mostly moot. The AI companies are having zero problems producing capability increases anyway. Either we ban AI research completely, and then this point is moot, or we don't ban it, and we get the AI labs creating superintilligence anyway. I think this is more of a what happens next?
I don't think it's moot. Part of why it may be very difficult to pause for a very long time is that new powerful AI algorithms will keep being discovered because it's hard to track theoretical / conceptual / small-compute research. But maybe we can use strong social norms to prevent people from trying to do conceptual AGI research. Ok, but then this WBE research is a kind of covert AGI algorithms research, exactly the sort of thing that erodes the pause despite best efforts.
I don't think the AI companies have "zero problems" producing capabilities. I mean, that kinda contradicts the whole WBE plan, doesn't it? Like, the WBE plan, at least in my head, is:
This plan assumes that there's strategically decisive headroom in intelligence, available to a WBE, but not yet acquired by the AIs at AI companies. So, even the initial WBE has abilities not yet acquired by the AIs (namely, the ability to quickly increase their own intelligence through self-modification). So if you do a bunch of research and create a WBE, you have at some point figured out how to put that novel capability, not held by AI companies, into a computer.
Once we ban AGI research, I think subsidizing / funding WBE is still the safest thing to do.
But WBE research is AGI research.
| Are you going to also claim that the small primate, scaled up by , can't be ML trained to be superhumanly intelligent? Ok. What about the chimp you do as a test? That can't be made superhuman with scaling up and training? This kinda beggars belief, though maybe I'm missing something?
My claim is more that if we do get a chimp running at 10^3 and it somehow turns into ASI, I believe the resulting ASI is likely to be much more aligned, and we probably all get to live rather whatever we get scaling GPT6 etc.
I think that timelines for WBE if we're trying to compete with the current AI companies in the free-market are substantially unlikely to happen (<5%). There's a lot of tech missing for mass-manufacturing scanners etc, and to your point, I'm not sure the mouse-AI leads to immediate returns / revenue that you can go and get a bunch of VC funding for it anyway. Not enough to get to a human WBE fully funded by existing market mechanisms.
| I don't think the AI companies have "zero problems" producing capabilities. I mean, that kinda contradicts the whole WBE plan, doesn't it?
I think a human brain would have decisive headroom compared to current AIs. Potentially whatever is needed for RSI doesn't exist in current AI or maybe never under the current regime, but it does exist in the human mind.
I also feel that a neuron-level scanning and emulation would not lead to any direct intelligence-algorithms breakthroughs. I think I could buy this argument pre LLMs. But we have current AIs where already know every single activation, and we don't have any level of algorithmic understanding of what's going on inside that leads us closer to any theory of intelligence.
My claim is more that if we do get a chimp running at 10^3 and it somehow turns into ASI, I believe the resulting ASI is likely to be much more aligned, and we probably all get to live rather whatever we get scaling GPT6 etc.
Ok but I don't think this is very relevant? My point is that, before you get something powerful & aligned, before that point, you got something that someone else could turn into something powerful & not-aligned by doing non-safe machine learning with your thing as a component / ingredient.
I think a human brain would have decisive headroom compared to current AIs. Potentially whatever is needed for RSI doesn't exist in current AI or maybe never under the current regime, but it does exist in the human mind.
So then if a project gets a true full human WBE, before that point it created capabilities, not already present in an AI, but yes in a computer. At that point, those capabilities could be expropriated and trained on by AI capabilities researchers.
could be that some kinds of "WBE research", especially ones such as connectomics that don't try to reverse engineer the brain's learning algorithm, are net-helpful. See Byrnes 2023: "Connectomics seems great from an AI x-risk perspective". I a little bit believe this regarding connectomics. I don't strongly believe this about connectomics or about any research, a priori, because either it doesn't lead to true, extremely helpful, human WBEs, or else it does and it's powerful and therefore it throws off powerful PBEs on the way there.
How do you feel about PBE type projects like this specifically for the purposes of solving alignment?
If they make it significantly easier for someone to make an actual PBE, that's bad. Publishing a connectome probably makes that significantly easier.
While you were trying to get dregs of information for alignment from the mouse brain (which I don't think will work much), someone else could take the mouse brain emulation, and multiply the mouse cortex by
(I played some role in that IFP essay being created … which btw got cited by a white house document on funding priorities so hope it’s wise 🤞)
Mostly see my other comment.
I guess a relevant aspect here is that I don’t think the connectome would actually be that helpful for making a mouse-y intelligence, since the hard and important part of mouse-y intelligence is the cortex, and there are already tens of thousands of papers on the mouse cortex from decades of study, including the MICrONS dataset, and I don’t really see what new useful things you’d learn about the cortex from a full connectome given what’s already known. I think the cortex is mostly about learning, and a connectome gives you a snapshot, not a learning trajectory. (I don’t claim it would be zero helpful, just that it would be only marginally helpful, whereas it would be strongly helpful for some alignment-relevant questions.)
I agree with this. I doubt very much that connectomics and brain emulation research is going to help very much with AI capabilities/intelligence. I think there is a higher probability that this type of research could help with AI alignment, but that it is still probably unlikely to help very much there, e.g. because progress for non-brain inspired AI seems to be progressing so rapidly.
(My personal interest in WBE is primarily because I think it could be a method for revival following structural brain preservation, so I have learned some about the space, but I’m certainly not an expert in it. I expect that this mostly won’t be done until we are past some serious AI transitions, or will never be done if we don’t survive them.)
Graphical abstracts
Summary
A true human whole brain emulation would be very helpful to humanity. The WBE could increase their own intelligence through self-modification and then somehow prevent AGI from killing everyone. However, if a research project made any serious progress towards WBE, it would likely contribute to existential risk from AI by contributing to AI capabilities progress.
Here is the argument that a successful WBE research project would accelerate AI capabilities:
In other words, solving approximately everything about WBEs would be great. Solving anywhere between 5% and 95% of the problems leading up to WBEs would be quite bad. The latter is much more likely to happen from a given WBE research program, if it makes much progress at all. It's much easier to get some capabilities out of the brain and into the computer than to get all of them into the computer.
This situation induces a bad "knee curve" of utility for WBE research: It's net-negative up until it fully succeeds, and it's difficult to fully succeed. Thus, WBE research is net-harmful by default.
Prior art (not necessarily in concurrence):
Caveats
I don't imagine this article will materially impact too much. But if it did, I would think that impact to be at significant risk of being mistaken, unless there was appropriate pushback somewhere (here in the comments or elsewhere).
I state arguments fairly strongly in this article. My hope is to do this in the spirit of debate, rather than shutting anything down. I stand by the arguments I make here, but this is coming from mostly recently formed opinions. In particular, I haven't spent a lot of effort trying to find a workable WBE plan that responds to the critique I make here; maybe such effort would bear fruit.
I'm not remotely close to being an expert in neuroscience.
Some of the ways this article could be wrong
There are some settings of background strategic variables that would make WBE research good even if everything argued in this article is true. For example, if you think all of:
Then a crash project to get WBEs could make sense.
It could also be that making a quasi-WBE that emulates electrical structure only (no learning) is already useful and pretty easy.
It could be that some kinds of "WBE research", especially ones such as connectomics that don't try to reverse engineer the brain's learning algorithm, are net-helpful. See Byrnes 2023: "Connectomics seems great from an AI x-risk perspective". I a little bit believe this regarding connectomics. I don't strongly believe this about connectomics or about any research, a priori, because either it doesn't lead to true, extremely helpful, human WBEs, or else it does and it's powerful and therefore it throws off powerful PBEs on the way there. However, see the next paragraph:
It could be that Flourish or Astera Neuro or another group will have already cracked the dangerous brain algorithms, but not yet have finished turning that into a world-destroying AI. In that case, a WBE project couldn't add much dangerous information, so it could be worth trying to race and get a WBE by filling in the human connectome and other needed information. (It's hard to imagine that information not being dangerous, because it would unlock a powerful WBE. However, it may be more feasible to get a WBE quickly in this scenario, making a siloed project more feasible.)
It could be that PBEs are much less expropriatable than I think they are.
Things I'm not saying
Context: AI capabilities research expropriates any partial understanding of intelligence
If someone were to build superhuman artificial general intelligence, then most likely humanity would be wiped out. Research towards creating AGI nevertheless has been initiated, and has continued for the past 70 years through two winters.
More recently, many researchers have set out with the intention of decreasing the risk of extinction due to AGI. One of the main plans they've tried is to create an AGI that is extremely useful (as an artificial general intelligence) but does not kill everyone. This research is called AI alignment, AI safety, AI control, or Friendly AI research. To have a chance at succeeding, this research has to pass through expropriatable AGI capabilities.
Order-dependency: AGI alignment research passes through partial understanding of intelligence
Some of that AI safety research engaged, in public, with AGI precursors. That is, it produced and shared ideas that engaged with the conceptual or computational elements that will lead to AGI, such as deep learning systems, theories of powerful agentic or epistemic engines, and so on.
AI safety research that didn't engage publicly with AGI precursors did not succeed at figuring out how it would be possible to create aligned AGI. Such research probably cannot feasibly do that. You can't understand AGI well enough to make an aligned one without also understanding new things about AGI; and that knowledge, once found, tends to get out into the broader sector of people trying to advance AGI capabilities. And if it doesn't get out, then you probably won't understand enough to actually figure out AGI alignment, because you're isolated and on your own, and the problem is too hard to solve by yourself (or within your small group).
AI safety research that did engage publicly with AGI precursors has also failed to figure out aligned AGI. However, this research has meaningfully accelerated AI capabilities.
This pattern comes from two basic facts:
There is a parallel fact pattern for WBEs: You can't get to WBEs without producing partial brain emulations, which make dangerous AI capabilities available to AI capabilities researchers.
What is whole brain emulation research?
By whole brain emulation, I mean a computer program running on a computer that behaves "truly as a human", even over long timescales. (But the WBE is allowed to behave "truly as a human who is running as a computer program", and in particular they're allowed to modify themself.)
The contention of this article is that research that aims at, or progresses towards, whole brain emulation is likely to be very net-harmful to humanity.
The harm caused by WBE research is not because whole brain emulation would be bad. Whole brain emulation does carry large risks: An uploaded human would be in a unique and extreme state of being both very powerful (through fast, self-modified cognition) and also disconnected from humanity. However, a WBE would constitute aligned or mostly-aligned AGI, in a sense. That person or group of people might have a solid shot at ending the acute risk of unaligned AGI, and navigating to a good future for humanity. Given the risk already posed by the possibility of AGI, the risk of WBEs would probably be well worth it.
The harm caused by WBE research comes from the fact that, in order to get to WBEs, you have to pass through partial understandings of the human brain. Just as in the case of AI safety research, these partial understandings are highly dangerous. If they are not powerful, they aren't very far along the way to WBEs. If they are powerful, they will likely be expropriated by the AI capabilities research sector. Accelerating AI capabilities increases the chances that humanity will be wiped out by AGI.
Thus, for the purposes of this article, we have this functional definition of WBE research:
Is this a fair definition of WBE research? Isn't that a somewhat differently-expressed goal than WBE research that is aimed at emulating a whole person?
The following sections will argue that researchers are very unlikely to be able to get an actual whole brain emulation without many steps along the way of partial brain emulation (PBE). That is, at many points along the way to WBE, the WBE research community will have produced enough knowledge to emulate parts or aspects of the human brain in silico, without being at all able to emulate a whole human brain.
(To be clear, a PBE need not look much like a WBE in any "phenotypic" way; it may not speak, think, or learn. A PBE is anything that embodies some of the aspects of the human brain that make human brains very powerful in the world. A PBE could be, for example, a very accurate long-term simulation of a single neuron. I also use "PBEs" as a metonymy for "PBEs or methods, tools, and other knowledge that can be used to create PBEs".)
On the other hand, I expect genuine WBE to be a very difficult research goal to achieve. My guess is that it's difficult enough that the normal course of neuroscience research is fairly unlikely to produce PBEs. In other words, normal research seems fairly unlikely to produce dangerous in silico emulations of intelligence-producing algorithms copied from the brain, any time soon. However, WBE research specifically is aimed at a goal that must pass through PBEs. So, the goal of WBE is a dangerous goal, because the research it prioritizes has dangerous outputs if successful.
There are many ways to have strictly partial brain emulation
My claim is that, on the way to WBE, research will produce partial brain emulations (PBEs)—or at least, tools and understanding sufficient to make various sorts of PBEs. Subclaim: There are many ways to have PBEs that aren't WBEs. In other words, there are many intelligence-load-bearing aspects of human brains that we could figure out how to emulate, without figuring out how to emulate a whole human brain.
There are at least two reasons there are many points of PBE, lying in the field of possibilities between here and WBEs. One is that there are many different elements of a WBE. You'd likely have to emulate, for example:
The other reason is that, for each of these dimensions, we could make partial progress without complete comprehensive success. Because of these two reasons, there are many ways we can end up with the ability to emulate substantive (and dangerous) elements of the brain, without WBEs. For example, we might have:
There will be incremental progress towards WBEs with many stages of partial understanding
What will most likely happen is that scientists will, over time, incrementally gain more and more access to brain anatomy, functioning, and abstract algorithms. Correspondingly, scientists will incrementally gain more and more ability to emulate more and more aspects of the brain in silico (PBEs).
(Aside: This may sound somewhat tautological. Of course science proceeds incrementally, gradually gaining more information and dissolving more and more questions, right? But the counterfactual is imaginable: It could hypothetically be the case that, in the course of developing a brain scanning method, for the first 95% of the research you have 0 brain scan data (but some other kind of progress, e.g. design or fabrication of the scanning apparatus); and then at the end of the research, you suddenly get 100% of the data about the brain that you wanted. This seems very unlikely (which is my point), but it's possible. And indeed, this is the hypothetical that is seemingly being posited, if we say "We can just build actual human WBE, and not build PBEs which will be dangerously expropriated into AI capabilities.". That leap would be nice, but is implausible.)
In other words, we won't observe zero data and zero ability to emulate aspects of brain functioning, followed by a breakthrough where we get all the data and a WBE. Rather, we'll observe a messy, long process of expensive, noisy, partial results; followed by cheaper, higher-signal, more complete results; and this will proceed along many dimensions of progress. There has been, and probably will be, an expanding pareto frontier of brain scanning devices in terms of expense, spatial resolution, time resolution, and depth; and an expanding frontier of cell modeling in terms of expense, functional accuracy at different timescales, and dependence on high-level / end-to-end reference data.
There is a wide spectrum of access difficulty for brains and algorithms
There is probably a wide spectrum of difficulty of access, for various aspects of brains. This is a slightly stronger statement than just the prediction of incremental progress by default. In particular, there are many aspects of the brain that will be hard to access.
An implication of the difficulty spectrum is that even with some more concentrated effort, but in the absence of a truly hugely resourced, very concentrated effort, there will likely be many holdouts. You'll accelerate the incremental progress, but you won't skip to the end in one jump. You'll land somewhere along the spectrum, and a bunch of the aspects of brains that are harder to access will still be out of reach for some time.
(A stronger version of this section might pull from historical attempts to model a single living cell in detail, well enough to predict most or all behavior in a wide range of environments and timescales. I suspect this is a better vague anchor point for the difficulty of WBEs compared to, say, the difficulty of reading out a computer program off of an extremely inconvenient hard drive and then running it.)
I'm going to give lots of examples here. Feel free to skim or skip. But I want to hammer this point very firmly, because this point provides much of the force for my argument that quite substantive PBEs will inevitably come before WBEs. Examples of difficulty spectra:
The brains of different species have different sizes.
Different brain elements are more or less uniform and therefore generalizable.
Different brain areas are more or less easily accessible.
Different scanning (and recording) methods trade off scale (how much of the brain is covered), spatial resolution (how small a region is lumped together), time resolution, signal/noise ratio, expense, and type of scanning (or recording).
Different brain elements have very different sizes and other physical properties.
Different brain elements have very different characteristic timescales.
Different brain elements have different rarities.
Different brain elements are more or less well-understood scientifically.
Different brain algorithms are more or less complex.
Different brain elements require more or less compute to emulate.
Meta: different difficulty spectra will fall at different times.
Filling in gaps with learning creates the capabilities expropriation pipeline
A central pillar of the argument in this article is that some aspects of the brain will be difficult to build accurate emulations of. If it's actually the case that creating WBEs is fairly easy, or has a very direct path with a jump from nothing to WBE without intermediate PBEs, then such WBE research may be net-helpful rather than net-harmful.
Part of the case that some brain aspects are difficult to emulate is that there's a wide spectrum of how difficult it is to get useful data that directly pins down neural mechanisms. Some people respond to this case by saying something like:
I've heard this argument made in person. It also seems to be suggested by the State of Brain Emulation Report 2025 as a plausible element of a research pathway; I'll describe that report a tiny bit here, as it's relevant in general to this article and in particular it hints at this "fill in the gaps with training" strategy. In the "Overview" section, that report states:
I think their plan centers around generalizing from models of animals and single human neurons. I'll address this in a later section. For the purposes of the present section, I take it that some of the feasibility of this plan is meant to come from the possibility of machine learning. For example, "develop... generative models" is I think supposed to come from causal / perturbation data, but also presumably from search over a space of computational models not strictly tied to biological structure. (If instead it is tied to biological structure, then we're back to this project being very difficult.) They give a tepid endorsement of this possibility:
(It seems their preferred alternative is inferring the function of neurons from their observable physical structure. However, the main example they cite is Holler et al., 2021, which only recovers a specific parameter of electrical behavior—which, even if generalized to all such electrical parameters, would not be sufficient for a WBE-worthy neural model. The remaining aspects of neural behavior, such as gene-regulatory and morphological changes at the minutes / hours / days timescale, would be harder to discover. Maybe I'm reading too much into their mentions of black box learning, and it's more accurate to say that they simply don't state a plausible plan for discovering those aspects of neural behavior. Their notion of minimal brain emulation, the bar for them calling something an emulation, does not seem to have any requirement for modeling plasticity.)
That report later cites, for example, Lappalainen et al., 2024 and Cowley et al., 2024 as prominent recent examples of Drosophila brain emulation (though not necessarily as an endorsement of that strategy). Both of those papers trained parameters of their models based on some sort of overall functional behavior (Cowley) or on overall task performance (Lappalainen).
Later, in their table on "Gaps and opportunities" in human brain emulation, they describe the problem:
It's true that the paucity of data can be made up for using machine learning and by generalization of mechanisms from smaller units. However, this strategy increases the likelihood of producing dangerous PBEs and non-human WBE-like emulations.
Whenever a WBE project fills in gaps in their ability to directly emulate the mechanisms of a human brain by training on signals of end-to-end functionality, the project degrades its safety case. Instead of copying all the algorithms from the human brain, you're admixing some additional, non-human-brain capabilities into the partial human brain capabilities that you got from studying human brains. One could imagine creating a kludge almost-WBE, which is just like a human on the scale of 30 seconds, but slowly diverges as it applies inhuman learning algorithms trained to be functional peers to the learning ability of human neurons—leading to a gradually more alien general intelligence.
In short, the more you use machine learning to fill in unknown aspects of your brain emulation, the less you maintain the alignedness-by-default property of human brains.
To say this another way, when you use ML to fill in gaps, you're likely to increase capabilities while only slightly (or not at all) increasing the degree to which you've accurately emulated the human mind. It's much easier to find some functional algorithm-elements, than to find the appropriate human functional algorithm-elements. It's much easier to get training signals for usefulness than for being human-like or good; and even if you train on imitation, as we've seen with LLMs, it's much easier to get somewhat-accurate imitation than to get something that's mechanistically human in a way that generalizes like humans do.
Thus, what you're really doing is taking the human algorithm-elements that you did more directly recover from brain data, and then adding non-human stuff, to produce something more competent. In other words, you've constructed a PBE to AI capabilities pipeline. That pipeline turned a human PBE into a more powerful AI that's less human on average; and that pipeline could continue doing so, as you improve the PBE. You've also demonstrated to AI capabilities researchers that they could do similarly.
Avoiding emulating some neural details doesn't make WBEs easy
There's a sister argument to "we'll fill in the gaps with ML". This sister argument also supports the idea that, actually, it's not as hard as it may seem to get a working WBE; and therefore maybe we actually can get there in one leap. The argument is something like this:
This argument holds some water. Indeed, it would be extremely hard to get WBEs if the only way were to simulate every protein and lipid molecule in every brain cell. The actual level of difficulty is somewhat below that level of difficulty.
However, I think this argument just isn't very strong. How are you going to get an emulation of a neuron that includes all the functional consequences of lipid membrane shape changes? (This is just an example for illustration; pick something else such as surface protein varieties and densities, or gene-regulatory states of brain cells that affect hours-long changes in millisecond-scale functional properties, if you think membrane shapes don't matter too much.) The approaches I see are:
Generalizable models of small components would be dangerous PBEs
A third sister argument, which tries to support that WBEs aren't so hard, goes like this:
Problems:
A siloed one-shot leap to WBEs is highly implausible
Making WBEs is a big, complex, difficult, many-years technoscientific research project. A true human WBE would be far and away the most complex structure ever created by humans. The foregoing text argued that a project aimed at WBEs is likely to take a long time or stall out partway through, and in the meantime, if the project had any actual chance at making WBEs, it would have produced PBEs expropriatable by AI capabilities research.
But, what if the WBE project did the hard research all in one go? You could have a single, large, well-resourced, well-contained project that goes all the way to WBEs. As long as it doesn't leak, you don't contribute to AI capabilities.
There is a big basic problem with this plan: It's somewhat implausible to have a leakproof silo like this that goes all the way to WBEs. There are just too many serious practical difficulties:
What if you entirely avoid making dangerous, expropriatable PBEs in the first place?
One broad strategy you could try to take would be "copy only". You avoid understanding anything about the brain, you avoid extracting any abstract algorithms, you avoid compressed descriptions of how aspects of the brain work, you avoid highly accurate emulations of small chunks of the brain. You just... Well I don't really know what this looks like in practice. But it's logically coherent at least; e.g. if you had a hypothetical atomic scanner, you could scan all the atoms in a human brain and then run an atom-level simulation of the brain. And if you don't get the atom-level simulation, you dissolve your project and don't share any discoveries.
In practice, though, a project would not be successful while sticking to copy-or-bust. The copy-only method wouldn't work. (I'm asserting this without much argument. But consider that counterarguments to "WBEs are extremely hard to make" usually come in the form of some proposal for a method to gain efficiency—by moving away from copy-only.) So, to have any chance of succeeding, the project would be forced to use learning to fill in gaps, use small emulations to test its current draft algorithms, build partial models of neurons and other structures, assemble partial datasets, and so on.
More importantly, even if you don't create PBEs as such, you're still creating the tools to create PBEs. If you figure out how to "copy" the whole human brain, then you also figured out how to "copy" a small chunk of the cortex. If at some point you made a true WBE, then probably some significant time before that point, it was feasible to make a PBE—which, when copied and trained as part of AI capabilities research, would be very dangerous. This kind of knowledge—methods, tools, confident knowledge that something can be done—is, I think, pretty prone to diffusion of personnel and to stimulus diffusion.
This is similar to the situation with AGI alignment and AGI capabilities: There's no practical way from A to C without passing through (P)B(E).
Getting a powerfully intelligent WBE requires emulating powerful algorithms
One way to avoid creating PBEs on the way to WBEs is to avoid getting a detailed model of the learning / updating dynamics of neurons. A pastiche of arguments that I've heard could go like this:
But in this scenario, the "emulation of a whole human brain" that we get is not really a WBE. It may be accurate at the 1 second or 30 second timescale, but it will not be accurate at the 10 minute timescale, let alone the 10 hour or 10 day timescale. Without the longer-term neural dynamics of neurite changes, gene-regulatory changes, and so on, you don't get learning, you don't get thinking, you don't get new concepts and new long-term memories, and so on.
Such an emulation is just not that useful. I would imagine that a one-minute-human would be comparably useful to a modern LLM, really, for roughly the same reasons; and we already have those.
In general, I expect that there are many different brain algorithms (at various levels of abstraction) that a WBE must have, in order to be a powerful mind the way a human is a powerful mind. Imagine deleting certain kinds of brain cells, certain kinds of circuits, certain long-term neural dynamics, certain brain regions, and so on. Some of them might leave behind a somewhat-functioning mind, but many of them would be pretty damaging. You need to get all of those.
So, you could avoid creating the dangerous PBE stuff that comes with unlocking neural dynamics. But then you also give up much of the usefulness. This isn't a coincidence; to make a true WBE, you have to make something very powerful, so you probably made something kinda powerful first.
Getting a truly human WBE is probably a very high bar
The idea of making WBEs is that humans are aligned with human values. So if your WBE is basically a human, you've made an aligned general intelligence. That person, being in silico, can much more easily self-modify and self-improve and think fast, compared to an organic human. They can use their increased cognitive capacity to get humanity out of danger.
A WBE modifying themself in order to self-improve is a pretty risky process. They could mess up their values accidentally through self-modification. Even if they don't, they could become very superhumanly intelligent, and thence corrupted by power. But it could probably be done well, with safeguards, and may be well worth the risk given the high default risk of extinction by AGI.
In order for the safety case to go through, the WBE has to at least start off being basically a human. How close? I think there are probably many different aspects of human brains that a WBE must have, in order to be aligned. In other words, there are many brain aspects such that if a WBE is missing that aspect, the WBE doesn't have humane values and is not even safe to run, let alone likely to save humanity. Consider:
These are all somewhat fanciful, mainly just to illustrate the sort of thing I mean. (A better version of this section would cite actual cases of people having genetic, anatomical, chemical, or other kinds of brain abnormalities, and consequently having unusual and harmful interactions with other people.)
Perhaps one such aberration is not enough to render a WBE net-negative in expectation. (Though keep in mind that even a true human WBE would then be under immense pressure in a very unusual, unstable, destabilizing situation.)
But WBE research starts with nothing emulated, and has to work hard, counting up from zero, figuring out how to emulate various brain aspects more and more accurately, until it gets almost all of these things right. That leaves a large region of ways that WBE could get partial, but far from complete, emulation of brain aspects that are needed to be humanely human.
To be very clear: I'm not saying "WBEs would be risky because they might be missing some human elements; therefore we must have very stringent validation of accuracy for WBEs.". That's a reasonable argument to make; I think WBEs would hypothetically be worth the risk, though of course also you'd want lots of stringent validation. My point here is not that WBEs might accidentally fail to be quite good enough. My point here is that the bar is high, therefore getting there is very difficult, therefore you're far more likely to land somewhere partway to WBEs—making dangerous PBEs available to AI capabilities researchers—rather than getting all the way to WBEs.
To summarize this section in a different way: It seems very unlikely that goodness / humanness on the one hand, and pure effectiveness / intelligence / capability on the other hand, are so tightly coupled that you either fail to make something useful or else make something that's basically a human. It seems much more likely that you'd get stuck or bogged down in your research after having made something that is kinda functional, and dangerous if expropriated by AI capabilities research, but far from being a human.
Brain elements will be expropriated by AI capabilities even if they haven't been historically
I make no strong claim about the history of ideas flowing from brains and neuroscience to AI research. My impression is that there has not been much flow, and this is not a crux for my viewpoint.
My explanation for the lack of transfer so far would simply be: brain emulation is hard, neuroscience is hard, and it hasn't progressed very far in an absolute sense. So not much has been made available for AI capabilities to steal from brains, so far.
My argument is that if, hypothetically, a research project were getting close to making a true WBE, then well before that point, they would have (intentionally or not) made dangerous brain elements much more available for expropriation. That is, they would have made it much easier for other people to take elements of the brain (whether they be actual PBEs, or methods for making PBEs, or brain algorithms, or other such information) and use those brain elements to significantly accelerate AI capabilities.
Indeed, apparently, there is already a company, funded to the tune of five hundred fucking million dollars, called Flourish. One of the neuroscientists there says they "want to do data collection across the nano, micro, and meso scales to support the discovery of the core algorithm" of the brain. If there were cheaper, easier, more accurate ways to get at some aspects of brain function, these people and others would jump at the chance to expropriate those methods, get brain elements, and incorporate those elements into AI systems to increase capabilities. There is another group, Astera Neuro, with a similar plan and similar level of funding.
As a general rule, the AI capabilities research sector is better equipped to find useful, albeit supremely dangerous, applications of elements of intelligent cognition. This seems to have been somewhat borne out by the history of "AI safety" research. That's the job of people in that sector—finding ways to apply stuff to the task of making AI / AGI. Further, the technological ecosystem itself is already somewhat built out for that purpose. Thus, the AI capabilities research sector volatilizes elements of intelligent cognition, making them liable to react with other preexisting elements.
Just because Flourish and Astera Neuro and future groups are trying to do the bad thing, doesn't mean pursuing WBE research is fine or good. It can still hurt. Indeed, if you are especially insightful and determined, and then you attempt a moonshot that most others don't believe in, you might succeed surprisingly much (though probably still not all the way). ...And this is exactly the sort of research output that later gets expropriated and accelerates AI capabilities even though you didn't want to do that.
I don't have much faith in the idea of having good people do dangerous research. One could argue that it's fine, since bad people might do it anyway; and by being good, they won't use their ideas dangerously and their ideas won't get expropriated to accelerate capabilities. But that's not how it seems to have gone overall in the realm of "AI safety" / AI capabilities, and on reflection it doesn't seem like the world has to work that way, even if the world ought to work that way. Maybe there's some way to make it robustly workable, but I'm skeptical.
What to do instead of WBE research