Epistemic status: Defining a concept to clarify my stance, which is probably in disagreement with it
The tragic disharmony between morality and politics
Libertarians believe (and I think they're right) that there are a significant number of social problems that the government shouldn't be trying to fix. [...] It's a common rhetorical device to then ALSO insist that these problems are harmless.
A premise of this post is that I believe that the moral and political frameworks reach incompatible conclusions, and this is tragic but inevitable. Here I'm trying to explore whether Kantian consent is the right political concept of consent, which I'm confused about, while having no doubt that it isn't the right concept from a moral point of view.[1]
Kant's definition
Marriage is the union of two individuals of different sex into life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual organs.
Metaphysics of Morals (1797)
Let's eliminate the contingent heteronormative and Christian aspects, and generalize the point:
Marriage is a contract through which two individuals waive their right to sue each other for violation of the right of not being raped.
Which is analogous to:
A sale is a contract through which two individuals exchange two items (one of them usually money) and waive their right to sue each other for violation of the right of not being robbed.
Or:
Entering a boxing gym is an implied contract through which two individuals waive their right to sue each other for violation of their right of not being punched in the face.
How could it be implemented?
I imagine something like a phone app, with a system of password (and delays, etc.) as complex as each individual wants, where all kinds of contracts could be specified with as much detail as each individual wants. If something happens which prima facie is a violation of a right, the verdict depends exclusively on the present of such a contract, with potential additions of establishing meta-crimes such as "systematically leading people on with obscurely formulated contracts", like to some extent is the case for commercial contracts.
Wouldn't this turn society into a bureaucratic mess?
People who trust each other don't need contracts. But people constantly interact with people who are, to different degree, strangers. Sometimes, they are unhappy with the interaction, and sometimes the unhappiness leads to using the state's tools to sue the other person for violated rights. It is for those cases that this notion of consent would apply, as opposed to other possible definitions (like whether "a normal person would have agreed with that", or whether "someone got hurt", etc.), and as opposed to the in my view incoherent system currently in place.
Epistemic status: Defining a concept to clarify my stance, which is probably in disagreement with it
The tragic disharmony between morality and politics
A premise of this post is that I believe that the moral and political frameworks reach incompatible conclusions, and this is tragic but inevitable. Here I'm trying to explore whether Kantian consent is the right political concept of consent, which I'm confused about, while having no doubt that it isn't the right concept from a moral point of view.[1]
Kant's definition
Let's eliminate the contingent heteronormative and Christian aspects, and generalize the point:
Which is analogous to:
Or:
How could it be implemented?
I imagine something like a phone app, with a system of password (and delays, etc.) as complex as each individual wants, where all kinds of contracts could be specified with as much detail as each individual wants. If something happens which prima facie is a violation of a right, the verdict depends exclusively on the present of such a contract, with potential additions of establishing meta-crimes such as "systematically leading people on with obscurely formulated contracts", like to some extent is the case for commercial contracts.
Wouldn't this turn society into a bureaucratic mess?
People who trust each other don't need contracts. But people constantly interact with people who are, to different degree, strangers. Sometimes, they are unhappy with the interaction, and sometimes the unhappiness leads to using the state's tools to sue the other person for violated rights. It is for those cases that this notion of consent would apply, as opposed to other possible definitions (like whether "a normal person would have agreed with that", or whether "someone got hurt", etc.), and as opposed to the in my view incoherent system currently in place.
Written at Inscribe.
Disagreements about my moral/politics division are of course welcome, but note that it is not argued, but presupposed here.