THE TEMPORAL PARADOX OF DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE

Jazz Maurizzi

ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a novel paradox challenging the coexistence of perfect omniscience and perfect omnipotence within a temporal framework. It argues that absolute foreknowledge of future events logically conflicts with the capacity for absolute freedom to change those events. Through a structured logical analysis, it demonstrates that divine perfection as traditionally conceived may involve internal contradiction. Anticipated objections are addressed, with the broader implication that certain classical theological models may require re-examination.

INTRODUCTION
The attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have been fundamental to theological conceptions of God across millennia. Classical thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard explored these attributes, often emphasizing their harmony. However, a critical question arises when considering these attributes in the context of temporality: Can a being know the future with absolute certainty while also possessing the genuine power to change it? This paper formulates and defends a paradox — conceived independently by the author — that suggests the traditional synthesis of omniscience and omnipotence is internally incoherent when applied to the dimension of time.

FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PARADOX
If God knows the future in absolute terms (omniscience), then the future is necessarily fixed. If God can change the future freely (omnipotence), then the future is not fixed. Thus, the attributes of perfect omniscience and perfect omnipotence cannot coexist coherently in relation to time.

LOGICAL STRUCTURE
The logical structure of the paradox centres around the fundamental incompatibility between divine omniscience and omnipotence, particularly when framed within the context of time.

Premise 1: Omniscience entails knowledge of all true propositions, including propositions about future events.
 Omniscience, by definition, means a being knows all truths. If God is omniscient, He knows all propositions, past, present, and future, and this knowledge is infallible. Future events, by their very nature, are unknowable unless they are already predetermined. In classical theism, God's knowledge of the future is not contingent on time but is seen as perfect and unchanging.

Premise 2: Omnipotence entails the ability to bring about or prevent any event at will, including future events.
 Omnipotence is the ability to do anything, including altering the course of events in time. This would imply that God has absolute freedom to change any situation, regardless of what the future holds, and can affect future events at any time.

Premise 3: If the future is known infallibly, it must necessarily occur as known.
 This premise establishes that if something is known with certainty (i.e., God's knowledge of the future is infallible), then the event must happen exactly as known. For something to be known, it must already have a fixed truth value. A past event is known because it has already happened, and a future event must necessarily happen because it is known.

Premise 4: If the future can be changed, it was not infallibly knowable.
 If God can alter future events, then the future is not fixed. For instance, if God knows an event will occur and later changes it, that event was not guaranteed to happen in the first place. Therefore, God's foreknowledge is called into question, as it could be shown to be false, contradicting the notion of omniscience.

Conclusion:
 If God has perfect omniscience regarding the future and omnipotence to change it, these two attributes cannot logically coexist. The perfection of omniscience (knowledge of a fixed, unchangeable future) contradicts the nature of omnipotence (the ability to change a future event). Therefore, God cannot possess both attributes simultaneously in relation to time.

EXPANDED ANALYSIS
This paradox hinges on the nature of time, knowledge, and power, and how they intersect in relation to divine attributes.

1. The Temporal Nature of Omniscience
The core assumption in many traditional theological models is that omniscience is exhaustive and encompasses all truths, including the future. However, for an event to be known in advance, it must already have a determinate truth value. This implies that the future is "set," and its events are already decided, which means the future is fixed. If God knows the future, the truth of these future events exists in the present for God; it is already determined in His knowledge. For example, if God knows that Person X will decide to do Action Y tomorrow, the knowledge that this event will occur gives it a determined, fixed status. This conflicts with the notion of omnipotence because the future is already set by God’s knowledge.

2. The Paradox of Omnipotence
Omnipotence is often defined as the ability to do anything, even logically impossible things. However, in this case, changing the future could be seen as a contradiction. If the future is already known to God, then it is fixed and unchangeable. But omnipotence implies that God has the power to change it. This creates a logical paradox: If the future is fixed and known, it cannot be changed; if it can be changed, it wasn’t fixed in the first place. For example, if God foreknows that a person will commit a specific act (say, an immoral act), and God then decides to intervene and prevent that act, His original foreknowledge becomes false. But for omniscience to be perfect, His knowledge cannot be mistaken, which makes the intervention incompatible with His supposed omniscience.

3. Addressing Determinism vs. Free Will
This paradox also mirrors the classic determinism vs. free will debate. If the future is known and fixed, human beings have no real freedom to change it. However, if humans do have freedom (which the concept of omnipotence would allow), it would mean that the future is not predetermined, leading to the same logical contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES

Objection 1: God Exists Outside of Time
One of the most common defences against the logical paradox is the claim that God exists outside of time, and therefore, temporal logic (i.e., the concept of a fixed future) doesn’t apply to God. If God is timeless, then His knowledge of the future isn't bound by temporal constraints. This means that God doesn't "know" the future in a chronological sense; rather, He possesses atemporal knowledge, seeing all time — past, present, and future — as a single, unchanging reality.
 Response:
 While it is plausible to argue that God transcends time, the nature of divine knowledge still presents a problem. If God’s knowledge of the future is eternal (i.e., all points in time are equally known), then this presupposes the determinacy of all future events in the eternal present. The question here is not about the passage of time for God but about the truth value of propositions about the future. If the future is known, it must be set and fixed as a truth — for a future event to be known before it happens implies it is unchangeable in that moment of knowing. This leads us back to the paradox: God knows the future, yet His omnipotence (the ability to alter events) implies the future is changeable. If the future is changeable, it wasn't truly known in the first place. The concept of timelessness raises the issue that omniscience and omnipotence, when conceived together, lead to this contradiction regardless of God's relationship to time. Even outside of time, eternal knowledge of the future must involve knowing a future that is immutable, which is in direct contradiction to the possibility of omnipotence acting on that future.

Objection 2: God's Foreknowledge Does Not Cause Events
Another defence argues that foreknowledge does not entail causality. In this view, God can know the future without causing it. That is, God's knowledge of future events is passive — He sees the future unfold without determining it. This is sometimes called middle knowledge, where God knows all possible outcomes (including what free agents would choose in any given circumstance) but does not directly cause those choices.
 Response:
While it is true that foreknowledge does not necessarily cause an event, the issue is not causality, but the truth value of future events. If an event is foreknown by God, that event already holds a determinate truth — it will happen, and this knowledge is infallible. The act of knowing the future makes it a necessity, because it is logically impossible for God to know an event that does not occur. If we accept that God knows all possible outcomes (middle knowledge), the issue remains that these "possible" events must somehow be actualized. God’s knowledge, as it pertains to future events, must either be speculative (in the sense that He knows possibilities, not actualities) or deterministic (in that He knows a fixed future, making the event necessary). The notion of free will also becomes more complicated here — if the future is truly open (as middle knowledge implies), then God's omniscience seems partial, because He only knows what might happen, but not what will. This reduces omniscience in a way that some theists would find untenable.

Objection 3: The Future is Open — God Knows Possibilities, Not Necessities
Some theologians defend the notion that God’s omniscience encompasses all possibilities, not a fixed future. In this framework, God does not know exactly what will happen but knows all the potential outcomes and the conditions under which each possibility could unfold. In essence, God’s foreknowledge is dynamic, consisting of a knowledge of what could happen, rather than what will happen.
 Response:
This model introduces the concept of open theism, which seeks to reconcile omniscience with human freedom by suggesting that the future is not fully determined. While this might allow for a more flexible view of God’s knowledge, it creates significant theological problems:
 1. Limited Omniscience: Open theism suggests that God is not all-knowing in the traditional sense, as He would not know the future with absolute certainty. This challenges the classical understanding of omniscience as knowing all truths, not just possibilities.
 2. God’s Knowledge of the Future: Even if God knows all possibilities, the fact remains that He must still possess knowledge of actualized future events in some sense. If the future is genuinely open and undetermined, God’s knowledge could be flawed or incomplete. This undermines His perfect omniscience.
 The challenge here is that the doctrine of omniscience in classical theism involves knowing actual future events, not just potential ones. The more we move away from this traditional view, the more we risk diminishing God’s perfection and consistency in knowledge. God’s knowledge, then, would not be flawless if it were to leave out the fixed truth of the future.

Objection 4: Human Logic Is Inadequate to Comprehend Divine Attributes
A theological objection often raised is that human logic is not suited to comprehend divine attributes. In this view, the contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence is simply a result of finite human understanding, and the paradox may be dismissed as a logical problem that only arises when we attempt to impose human reasoning on divine nature.
 Response:
While this objection calls into question the ability of humans to fully understand God, it fails to address the core issue: the logical coherence of divine attributes. If God is to be described as omniscient and omnipotent, then these attributes must be logically coherent in relation to each other. The attempt to shield theological concepts from logical scrutiny leads to an abandonment of meaningful discourse about the divine nature. Furthermore, the rejection of logical consistency risks undermining the very rationality of theistic belief. If God's nature cannot be logically understood or defended through reason, it raises profound concerns about the rational grounds for belief in God. Why believe in a God whose attributes are inherently contradictory or beyond comprehension? This is not to say that God must be fully comprehensible to us, but His attributes should at least not involve a logical contradiction.

Objection 5: Divine Omnipotence Includes Power Over Logic
Some proponents argue that omnipotence means that God can do the logically impossible, such as creating contradictions or changing the laws of logic themselves. This would imply that God could, in fact, change the future after knowing it, because He could bend the very structure of logic to His will.
 Response:
This objection radically departs from traditional theological views and risks reducing omnipotence to absurdity. If omnipotence means the ability to violate logical principles, then God could do anything — including logical contradictions. But this undermines the very notion of God’s perfection. If God can do the logically impossible, then His actions lose meaning and purpose, and His omnipotence becomes a concept devoid of real power. A God who can act illogically or contrary to the laws of reason is not a perfect being, because rationality and consistency are inherent to any meaningful conception of omnipotence. Logical consistency is a necessary condition for omnipotence to have any substance. A God who can change logical truths cannot be said to be fully omnipotent, because his very essence would be arbitrary and unpredictable.

Conclusion of the Counterarguments
The paradox of omniscience and omnipotence demonstrates the logical limits of classical theism when both attributes are applied simultaneously in relation to time. While various counterarguments offer ways of reconciling these attributes, each brings with it significant theological and philosophical issues, whether it be a reduction in the scope of God’s knowledge (open theism), a rejection of logical consistency, or an invocation of mystery that undermines meaningful discourse. Ultimately, the paradox challenges the classical notion of a perfect, timeless, omniscient, and omnipotent deity, suggesting that these attributes may be logically incompatible or that the divine nature may need to be rethought considering temporal considerations. This analysis highlights the importance of logical consistency in theology, and invites further exploration into the nature of divine knowledge and power in a world governed by time, free will, and contingency

CONCLUSION
The Temporal Paradox of Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence challenges the coherence of traditional theological attributes within temporal reality. It suggests that perfection, when defined as simultaneous absolute omniscience and omnipotence, may involve unavoidable contradiction. Rather than diminishing the concept of divinity, confronting this paradox invites deeper philosophical and theological reflection — encouraging a humbler, more nuanced approach to metaphysical inquiry.

References

1. Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy.
2. Nelson Pike. “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action” (1965).
3. Richard Swinburne. The Coherence of Theism.
4. William Lane Craig. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.
5. Augustine. Confessions (Book XI).
6. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica