“Bear Witness, Justice will be Served!” This saying, in its multitude of forms and other such phrases, can be heard frequently among the Palestinians amidst the ongoing genocide. These are not irrational sentiments but logical and pragmatic belief systems that are born and infect those under oppression across history and lands. Using this case study, I argue for the following:
Premise 1: Words representing ideologies that prove to be pragmatic and pragmatic beliefs are rooted in our psychology through evolution.
Premise 2: The material environment scaffolds our affective mind. Ideologies in our environment are just as powerful in doing the same.
Premise 3: Emotions are interpretations and judgments ascribed to events. The perceived cultural dissimilarity of the expression of emotions arises from the alternative interpretations of the events, bringing about different emotions in response to these events. Thus, there is an outward appearance of different ‘expressions of emotions’ in the face of similar events.
Conclusions: Words can scaffold the affective mind, which could lead to a difference in expressing emotions among different cultures, yet emotions are universal in their essential experience.
To argue for premise one, I briefly go over the pragmatic belief by the Naturalist-Prgamatist theories of Darwin and Pierce and then introduce the argument by Colombetti and Kreuger for the material’s ability to scaffold the affective mind (2015). Afterwards, I use Palastenian’s response to grief as a case study to illustrate these points in my argument. In the case study, I first define the terminology ‘Shahied' and what ideology this word represents. To further clarify the reason behind the widespread attachment to this philosophy, I explain its pragmatism that appeals to the oppressed. This argument brings with it questions about the nature of emotions, which is where my second premise comes along, and there in section III. I introduce Nussbaum’s Emotions as Judgments argument to clarify under which emotional framework I am working. In section IV, I bring the discussion back to the possible objection to my argument regarding the nature of emotions. I then raise a vital disclaimer to be aware of the danger of claiming the difference in experiencing emotions across cultures.
I.
Firstly, I shall start with Darwin's Natural Evolution hypothesis, which claims even our psychological intuitions are naturally selected through evolution. Leading us to believe what helps increase our chances of survivability; this includes notions of the afterlife and free will. These intuitions may not be scientific. But as long as there is wiggle room for the thought of “we do not know for sure if it is or is not true”, and it helps us survive through the birthing resilience to fight death, then it is logical to be safeguarded by our genes and inherited to their offsprings. Building on that, Pierce suggests that since belief is soothing and doubt is irritating, we want to believe rather than live in doubt. Those beliefs form habits that decrease our need to critically reflect on every incident that happens to us, leading to less need for self-reproach when we find ourselves in unfavourable situations.
In further studies of psychology and where the ‘mind’ lies, Clark (2008) presents the Extended mind theory. This theory hypothesis is that the mind is an extension of the material world surrounding it and is not just the flesh of the brain. The scaffolded mind concept by Sterenly (2010) is based on the claim that organisms change their environment to increase and maintain their chances of survival. In turn, this change in the environment also causes cognitive changes to the agent. Likewise, by creating an epistemic climate around the agent, this environment engineers the agent’s behaviour in adaption to the new environment. Furthermore, the community also creates behaviours per the environment. Colombetti and Kreuger find Sterenly to be a middle ground between Adams and Aizawa’s (2001) that the environment casually enhances the mind, and on the other end, Hytto and Myin’s (2013), the mind can only be situated within its external environment. Sterenly’s scaffolded mind can also be combined with Griffiths and Scarantino's (2009) view on emotions in arguing for the scaffolding of the affective mind. Griffiths and Scarantino claim emotions are a communicative tool for building communities through influencing the behaviours of other individuals, creating what we call ‘social norms’ that adhere to the cultural rules and changes with the material world.
The materially scaffolded mind talks of three dimensions for integrating environmental tools into a person’s mind. The degree of ‘trust’ the agent puts in it, the level of ‘individualisation’, and the group employment of it. Examples include a phone from a professional maker, customised to a person’s preferences, and a ‘shared experience’ with a society due to its communicative functions. (2015, 1162)When translated to the affective mind, trusted ‘tools’ are those actions that we know will influence our mood, like a piece of chocolate, comfort movies, or specific genres of music. Individualised practical tools can be seen with professionals and their tools of the trade; for example, an Olympic figure skater and their skates, an artist and their brushes, a cook and their knives. (2015, 1164) These tools are reliable and, through extended usage, have been customised to fit their user, whether by the mould of the shoe, the wear and slant of the brush's tip, or the imprints in the knife's grip. They give their owners a sense of security and confidence when in use, causing a (2015, 166) “performative enrichment”, where the tool is experienced as an extension of the body and not an independent object.
The scaffolding of an affective mind module can also be applied to interpersonal relationships. (2015,1167) We spend time with those we ‘trust’ to make us happy or leave a pleasant feeling. Familiarity is vital to this domain's sense of ‘trust’. We trust those we are familiar with because we have a sense of knowledge of their affective interaction with us. Not necessarily that we know how they will act, as much as we trust that they have and maintain a pleasant attitude towards us. (2015, 1170) We further individualise those interpersonal relationships by acting differently with the parents than the friends and the children. We adopt different body language, manner of speech, jokes, and behaviourism amidst each group. After a long time, this social back and forth becomes a familiar and trusted pattern.
(2015, 1172) Colombetti and Krueger conclude with how material culture influences a group of people's emotional and noncognitive aspects. This is clarified through an example of the church setting. The church’s interior design has been the subject of change, as per the public's needs from the religion. In want of equal standing with God and the priest, the altar changes from a sacrificial stone table to a wooden dining table and is brought down amidst the pews rather than above the followers. In a need for the follower to feel heard, the priest now faces the masses instead of ‘leading’ them in a mimicry of an open conversation. This is a practical implementation by the heads of the religion of using the surrounding environment to scaffold the followers' mood, attitude and affective mind.
II.
Thus, the mind perceives what is around it. Amidst the technological, colourful, and musical environment, we also hear what others say. These words they utter reflect their ideologies and personal philosophies in life. My theory, therefore, claims that once we find these ideas helpful in our daily lives, we adopt them. If, through critically thinking over these ideologies, they prove to be pragmatic, we are less likely to discredit them or find a need to change them. Especially if we find ourselves in a difficult spot where the rest of the world feels detached from our reality. We then hold fast to what little brings us comfort.
Through Colombetti and Kreuger, we have established that external factors can scaffold the affective mind. It is not a stretch to say that words and rituals have a similar effect. A ritual is a representation of entire ideologies and philosophies. Some traditions are words in phrases repeated at certain intervals associated with specific events. This immediate association of significant ideas and concepts demarcated with quick words linked to active events is more likely to be an effective scaffold than depending on music or other external factors created under non-associated circumstances to affect a person’s mood under distress.
These rituals are ‘trusted’ through familiarity. The tradition never changes. They are ‘customisable’ because each individual approaches these rituals from a personal mindset. They are integrated into our interpersonal dimensions because rituals are shared through a community. They are creating a connection between otherwise two strangers based on shared “ideology” or “spirituality”.
This can be seen in the case study of the Palestinians and one of their many rituals in the face of oppression and unjust death, the concept of Martyrdom. One idea I must clarify first: in Arabic, there are two synonyms for martyr: Fidaí and Shahied. The former denotes anyone who has willingly died for a cause, and its best English equivalent is a ‘martyr’. The latter is the more imperative one. It is broader in use and denotes anyone who has died an unjust, unfair death. It translates into “Thou who bears witness” or “testifies”. It is used on both fidaís (for example, soldiers who die in the line of duty) and any “collateral damage” that dies in violent attacks, drowning, burning, false accusations, and some further categories. When looking at Shahied’s transliteral translation to “bear witness”, one might be confused about why a verb of action is being demoted to those who are dead, gone, no longer alive to do anything, never mind speak or testify. Looking into the area, the Middle East’s rich history of monotheistic religions (no less than 22 known religions) and the associated phrases with that term, one can understand the following from the concept Shahied: ‘The dead bears witness, testify their unjust death to the Supreme Devine Court on judgment day, in the afterlife.’
This aligns with the social norms of the Palestinians in the - at the time of writing this essay- ongoing genocide, which might be perceived as odd from an outsider’s perspective. I need to stress that, in this case, it does not matter what the person’s level of religious beliefs is for one person by themselves. When they are in an enclosed circle with those who shout phrases along those lines frequently, it is enough to hear the phrases repeatedly for those words to hold power over the bereaved, who are already in a weakened state of mind and cannot think objectively.
A group of people under constant 76 years of oppression, frequent massacres and displacement have been conditioned into finding it hard to dream of a future when tomorrow might be their last day; it becomes a pragmatic ideology to believe in a life beyond the current reality they are stuck in. To soothe their aching souls, they dream of paradise after death. Facing the reality of being neglected by world leaders, having a self-proclaimed humanitarian government deem there is no proof of war crimes happening against them while simultaneously being backstabbed and thrown to the wolves by their ‘brothers,’ the Arab leaders birth the necessity of a belief of a higher supreme court that is reliably justice and will avenge them appropriately. The belief that as big of a threat their oppressor is, it is still not the most significant threat in existence and that a more extensive power can and will oppress their oppressor one day becomes their last straw to hold on to life or risk falling to hopelessness. There is no life without hope; such a life is the definition of a walking dead. In that sense, the Palestinians have no choice but to believe something, anything that brings relief, giving simple words that speak of hope in spite of their suffering the power needed to modify their way of thinking and feeling. One, the concept of their beloved not having died a cheap death and that they continue to exist and flourish in a non-physical world is a beautiful lie to believe in that lets them live alongside the rest of the grievers around them. Two, it does not truly matter what happens after death to the dead. If there is no afterlife, they have ceased to feel the injustice they were living in; that is in itself a mercy. Those beliefs are meant to help the survivors move on, alleviate some of their survival guilt, and console themselves.
Consequences of this belief are iconic phrases turned rituals, which are repeated frequently in association with every death. The following is a selection of those phrases: “The Shahid (martyr/witness) are God’s beloved”, “Blood is never wasted”, and “Judgment day must come.” “O Shahied (martyr/witness), testify to God about the injustice you witnessed here (on earth).” These are not passive statements spoken about the dead, but they are speaking to the dead, ordering them to do something that only they can do now that they are no longer bound to the material world. To reinforce this theme, there are differences in the burial rituals between average deaths and a Shahied’s death under injustice. Typically, the dead are washed and then wrapped in a white shroud. A Shahied is instead buried in the state they died in, as if ready to be examined by Devine forensics to document evidence against their killer to be trialled on judgment day. An atheist stuck on those grounds with those conditions around those people is better off, for their sanity, believing what the tide around them believes in as well. It is not a matter of objective truth; it is simply more rational to believe in what helps you live through the day and face tomorrow. Hence, it is pragmatic.
If materials in the environment can rewire the mind, such as when music and the blues and white of a hospital’s wall can calm you down, or the orange in a fast food restaurant can open up your appetite. Then, when words represent ideologies that are proven to provide psychological relief, these words become tools to scaffold the affective mind, as well.
Looking at this case study, we are faced with an objection. Are we claiming emotions as judgments or universal bodily experiences? If they are universal, then why does one who grieves in the East differ from one who grieves in the West? To start answering this, I shall first summarise critical aspects of Nussbaum’s essay Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance.
III.
(2014, 187) Although emotions can feel like tidal waves unrelated to the self, they are nonetheless about something. Grief is sadness about the loss of a loved one and is not just sadness for the sake of being sad, or else that can be transferred over to a psychiatrist to investigate hormonal imbalances. (2014, 188) Those emotions are not simply just about anything as much as they are about an intentional object. The deliberate object in grief is the interpretation of Death as a long-term separation from an individual. Thirdly, emotions are ladened with beliefs by themselves. As Nussbaum explains, anger is charged with the sense of being wronged and that the wrong was done willingly against the agent. In grief, it is the belief that through death and this separation from their beloved one, they will not be able to continue living their lives as they have, or at all. (2014, 189) Lastly, these objects are charged with value. The dead being grieved are loved, not just a stranger on the side of the road. To grieve a stranger on the side of a highway is to grieve the concept idea of human life lost and a possibility ended. To grieve a loved one is to grieve the person you know and shared moments of your life with, whom you have planned a future for and with. It is to grieve someone who was part of your daily life, whether in their presence or influence upon you, who will no longer be around to continue their influence actively.
She furthers her claim by using the Greek’s eudaimonistic theory. (2014,190) Emotions reflect what we perceive to be essential for our flourishing on a personal level, unaffected by ‘rational’ or ‘utilitarian’ theories of what is needed to live a happy life. The feeling of being loved and loving someone is, on its own, important enough to live a fulfilling life without any other attached importance to this relationship. Therefore, when one grieves, their personal world has been injured, and the very conception of their fulfilling life is ruined.
She returns to the stoic view on emotions and explains its basis. (2014, 191)Emotions are of two stages: an initial wave that hits and an appearance that awaits judgment. Then there are three paths to be taken after an event has occurred: we either approve that things are as they seem, death is an eternal loss, we either hold off judgment altogether, or we do not know what happens, and thus we stick with what affects us, the current separation. Or we reject that death is but a temporary separation with a promised eventual reunion to be had later, birthing hope in the face of the adversary.
(2014, 193 )As such, the conclusion is that judgments are both essential and sufficient for the constitution of emotions. Are they all the parts found in an emotion? (2014, 195)Nussbaum claims there are no such elements in refutation to the Neo-stoic theory of emotions and the added requirement of a non-judgmental aspect of emotion. The bodily reaction and upheaval in grief is only a direct representation, a mimesis, of the internal thought process of such knowledge.
IV.
Returning to our case study and my argument in section II, the objection might arise on the nature of emotions and whether they are universal if the Palestinian is experiencing the same emotion of grief that a Dutch person would, although one finds hope in death while the other sees despair. I claim that emotions, which are judgments, are universal in their experience between cultures and religions across the globe. The difference arises in interpreting of events, resulting in different emotions altogether, rather than a difference in feeling emotions among different cultures.
To those who believe in an afterlife, the separation at death is momentary, with a promised reunion. In an abstract form, it can be likened to a parent who misses their children leaving the nest, knowing they are living well somewhere out of their sight with the possibility of visits in the future. On the other hand, the obliteration of the afterlife concept leaves the bereaved with the notion of permanent loss, with no hope to ever interact with them ever again beyond what remains of their memories. In essence, these two become different judgments and, therefore, different emotions, making the dissimilar expression of those emotions natural.
Claiming that grief is ‘felt’ differently across cultures is a slippery slope that risks dehumanisation, as has happened in the case of Captain James Cook. He and his crew landed in Tahiti in 1769, where, although they were first impressed by the local’s expressions of grief, they doubted their sincerity when their leader, the mother of the dead, was quick to uphold a professional attitude in the face of the colonisers. “William Bligh: “The woman had no sorrow for her child, as her grief could not so easily have subsided if it was the case she regretted the loss of it” (Levy 1973: 98). Because Cook and his crew were unaccustomed to such a well-controlled handle on emotions, they dismissed it for being ‘unlike their own’ way of grieving, that the experience of emotions, namely grief, was different between the westerns and the Tahiti’s. These differences can falsely justify the superiority of one race over the other because one has the ‘right’ method of feeling emotions while the other is childlike and unreliable. (Levy 1968: 39) And as history has proven, that is the minimum requirement to rationalise and support colonisation movements by claiming they are doing the uncivilised a favour by teaching (indoctrinating) them in their ways.
There are, yes, different expressions and engagement with grief by ideologies and cultures, and perhaps the grief's dimensions in the face of death are also conditioned by these ideologies. Still, the emotion felt at the moment of loss is universal. That tidal wave of upheaval is shared universally (Nussbaum, 2015, 195). What differs is the interpretation of what death means to each and how they react to those judgements and notions.
In conclusion, I have introduced the argument that the psychology of a person is a result of an evolutionary process (Darwin). Hence, people generationally hold onto pragmatic beliefs because they prove to be imperative for survival (Pierce). The environment influences the mind, and objects can affect our mood (Colombetti and Kreurger). Therefore, value-laden words are more entitled to have a compelling impression on the affective mind. This suggests that emotions directly result from judgments and do not have non-cognitive elements (Nussbaum). It is essential to be careful not to claim that various cultures experience emotions differently, as has been suggested by Captain Cook’s encounter with the Tahiti, lest we risk misunderstanding the working of the emotions at play.
I used the Palestinians’ case study and their concept of a martyr/Shahied to drive home most of my claims about the environmental effect on a person’s belief system and how those result in a different outlook on death. Instead of the expected feeling of despair in the face of constant death, their pragmatically evolutionary inherited belief of an afterlife and a Judgment day changes their interpretation of death as a ‘permanent loss of the beloved’ into a ‘momentary separation where their loved ones are in a better place.’ Leading to the morphing of the emotion in grief from despair to hope.
The theory is broken down into the following:
P1: Pragmatic beliefs are inherited through an evolutionary process. - These are represented by words and rituals.
P2: Environment scaffolds the mind and the affective mind. - Surrounding ideologies are part of this environment.
P3: Emotions are a result of cognitive judgments. - Ideologies influence judgments.
Conclusion: Words influence judgments, in turn scaffolding a person’s emotions. This results in the various interpretations of one event (death), thus resulting in different emotions.
Bibliography:
Darwin, C. The Origin of Species (1859) p190
Pierce, C. The Essentials of Pierce: What Pragmatism is (1905) p.331-345
Nussbaum, M. (2004). “Emotions as judgments of value and importance.
Colombetti, Giovanna & Krueger, Joel (2015). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind.