I'll just publicly declare that I'm a panpsychist. I feel that panpsychism doesn't really need to be explicitly argued for. As soon as it's placed on the table you'll have to start interrogating your reasons for not being one, for thinking that experiential measure/the indexical prior is intrinsically connected to humanlikeness in some way, and you'll realise there were never really good reasons, it was all sharpshooter fallacy, streetlamp fallacy, the conflation of experience with humanlike language-memory-agency sustained under that torturous word "consciousness", and you'll realise that this dualist distinction between existence and experience isn't doing any work, and one day you'll wake up and find that instead of maintaining those two measures, you only use one.
And it's an irresistable position in the aesthetic realm as well, if forced there a panpsychist can start wearing jazzy colors, partying with animists, re-enchanting nature, and accusing their opponents of "anthropocentrism".
Do you have an operational definition of what properties you think makes you "panpsychist" rather than "non-psychist"?
Hmm, well. Maybe this is what you're looking for: (I'm opposed to calling it nonpsychism because it doesn't actually refute experience, but) I do not believe that one can perceive one's own experiential measure.
One can make reports about what one's experience would consist of, but one can't actually report how much experience (if any) there is. There is no way to measure that thing for the same reason there's no way to know the fundamental ... (read more)