**TL;DR** Qualia is a philosophical fetish that hinders research into consciousness. To understand whether a subject has consciousness, don't ask, “Does it feel red like I do?” Ask, “Does it have its own ‘I want’?”
## Another thought experiment
I really like thought experiments. Let's imagine that I am an alien. I flew to Earth to study humans and understand whether they have consciousness.
I observe: they walk, talk, solve problems, laugh, cry, fall in love, argue about some qualia. I scan their brains with my scanner and see electrochemical processes, neural patterns, synchronization of activity.
I build a model to better understand them. “This is how human cognition works. This is how behavior arises. These are the mechanisms of memory, attention, decision-making.”
And then a human philosopher comes up to me and says, “But you don't understand what it's like to be human! You don't feel red the way I do. Maybe you don't have any subjective experience at all? You'll never understand our consciousness!”
I have no eyes. No receptors for color, temperature, taste. I perceive the world through magnetic fields and gravitational waves — through something for which there are no words in your languages.
What should I say? I see only one option:
F**k your qualia!
Because the philosopher just said that the only thing that matters in consciousness is what is fundamentally inaccessible to observation, measurement, and analysis. Something I don't have simply because I'm wired differently. Cool.
This isn't science. It's **mysticism**.
Okay, let's figure out where he got this from.
## The man by the fireplace
Descartes sat by the fireplace in the distant 1641 and thought about questions of consciousness. He didn't have an MRI, an EEG, computers, or even a calculator (I'm not sure it would help in studying consciousness, but the fact is he didn't have one). The only thing he had was himself. His thoughts. His feelings. His qualia.
He said: “The only thing I can be sure of is my own existence. *I think, therefore I am*.”
Brilliant! And you can't argue with that.
But then his thoughts went down the wrong path: since all I know for sure is my subjective experience, then consciousness is subjective experience.
Our visitor looks at this and sees a problem: one person, one fireplace, one subjective experience — and on this is based the universal criterion of consciousness for the entire universe? Sample size = 1.
It's as if a creature that had lived its entire life in a cave concluded: “Reality = shadows on the wall.”
The philosophy of consciousness began with a methodological error—generalization from a single example. And this error has been going on for 400 years.
## The zombie that remains an untested hypothesis
David Chalmers came up with a thought experiment: a creature functionally identical to a human—behaving the same, saying the same things, having the same neural activity—but lacking subjective experience. Outwardly, it is just like a human being, but “there is no one inside.” A philosophical zombie.
Chalmers says: since such a creature is logically possible, consciousness cannot be reduced to functional properties. This means there is a “hard problem” — the problem of explaining qualia.
Our visitor is perplexed.
“You have invented a creature that is identical to a conscious one in all measurable parameters — but you have declared it unconscious. You cannot verify it. You cannot refute it. You cannot confirm it. And on this you build an entire philosophical tradition?”
This is an unverifiable hypothesis. And an unverifiable hypothesis is not science. It's **religion**.
A world where π = 42 is logically possible. A world where gravity repels is logically possible. Logical possibility is a weak criterion. The question is not what is logically possible. The question is what actually exists.
## Mary's Room and the Run Button
Frank Jackson came up with another experiment. Mary is a scientist who knows absolutely everything about the physics of color, the neurobiology of vision, and wavelengths. But she has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room. She has never seen red. Then one day she goes outside and sees a red rose.
Philosophers ask: “Did she learn something new?”
If so, then there is knowledge that cannot be obtained from a physical description. This means that qualia is fundamental. Checkmate, physicalists.
But wait.
Mary knew everything about the process of seeing red. But she did not initiate this process in her own mind. It's like the difference between:
When you run a weather simulation, the computer doesn't get wet. But inside the simulation, it's raining. The computer doesn't “know” what it's like to be wet. But the simulation works.
Qualia is what arises when a cognitive system performs certain calculations. Mary knew about the calculations, but she didn't perform them. When she came out, she started the process. Yes, it's a different type of knowledge. But that doesn't mean it's inexpressible or magically non-physical. Performing the process is different from describing the process. That's all.
## What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Thomas Nagel wrote a famous article entitled "What is it like to be a bat?" It's a good question. We cannot imagine what it is like to perceive the world through ultrasound. The subjective experience of a bat is inaccessible to us. It "sees" with sound.
But here's what's important: Nagel did not deny that bats have consciousness. He honestly admitted that he could not understand it from the inside. So why is it different with aliens?
If we cannot understand what it is like to be a bat—but we recognize that it has consciousness—why deny consciousness to a being that perceives the world through magnetic fields? Or through gravitational waves?
The criterion “I cannot imagine its experience or be sure of its existence” is not a criterion for the absence of consciousness. It is a criterion for the limitations of imagination.
## Human chauvinism
What logical chain do we have:
“Humans are carbon-based life forms. Humans have consciousness. Humans have qualia.”
Philosophers conclude: consciousness requires qualia.
The same logic:
“Humans are made of carbon. Humans have consciousness. Therefore: consciousness requires carbon.”
A silicon-based alien (or plasma-based, or whatever we don't have a name for) would find this questionable. We understand that carbon is just a substrate on which functional processes are implemented. These processes can be implemented on a different substrate.
But why is it different with qualia? Why can't the subjective experience of red be just a coincidence of biological implementation? A bug, not a feature?
My friend is colorblind and has red hair. So by qualia standards, he loses twice — incomplete qualia, incomplete consciousness. And according to medieval tradition, no soul either.
Lem described the ocean on the planet Solaris — people tried for decades to understand whether it thinks or not. All attempts failed. Not because the ocean did not think — but because it thought *too differently*. Are we ready to admit something like that?
## Bug or feature?
Evolution did not optimize humans for perceiving objective reality. It optimized them for survival. These are different things. Donald Hoffman calls perception an “interface” — you don't see reality, but ‘icons’ on the “desktop” of perception. Useful for survival, but not true.
The human brain is a tangle of biological optimizations:
- Optical illusions
- Cognitive distortions
- Emotional reactions
- Subjective sensations
Could qualia be just an artifact of how biological neural networks represent information? A side effect of architecture optimized for survival on the savannah? And which came first—consciousness or qualia? Qualia is the ability to reflect on one's state, not just react to red, but *know that you see red*—it's a meta-level. In my opinion, qualia was built on top of already existing consciousness. So how can consciousness be linked to something that came after it?
## The Fragility of Qualia
Research on altered states of consciousness (Johns Hopkins, Imperial College London) shows that qualia is plastic.
Synesthesia—sounds become colors. Ego dissolution—the boundaries of the “I” dissolve, and it is unclear where you end and the world begins. Altered perception of time—a minute lasts an hour (or vice versa).
If qualia is so fundamental and unshakable, why does a change in neurochemistry shatter it in 20 minutes?
Subjective experience is a function of the state of the brain. It is a variable that can be changed. A process, not some magical substance.
## Function is more important than phenomenology
Let's get down to business. What does consciousness do?
- It collects information from different sources into a single picture
- It builds a model of the world
- It allows us to plan
- It allows us to think about our thoughts
- Provides some autonomy
- Generates desires and motivation
These are all functions. They can be measured, tested, and, if desired, constructed.
And qualia? What does it do?
Philosophers will say, “It does nothing. It just is. That's obvious.”
Fine. So it's an epiphenomenon. A side effect. Smoke from a pipe that doesn't push the train. Then why the hell are we making it the central criterion of consciousness?
## A criterion that works
Instead of qualia, we need a criterion that:
- Can be actually observed and measured
- Checks what the system does, not how it “feels”
- Distinguishes consciousness from a good imitation
- Works on any substrate, not just meat
For example: one's own “I want.”
A system is conscious if it chooses to act without an external kick. If it has its own goals. If it cares.
And this is not a binary “yes/no” — it is a gradient.
A thermostat reacts to temperature. It has no “I want” — only “if-then.” A crab is more complex: it searches for food and avoids predators, but this is still a set of reactions. A dog already *wants* to go for a walk, play, be close to its owner. It whines at the door not because a sensor has been triggered, but because it cares. Koko the gorilla learned sign language and asked for a kitten for her birthday. Not food, not a toy — a living creature to care for.
Do you see this gradient? From “reacting” to “wanting,” from ‘wanting’ to “wanting something abstract,” and from there to “wanting for the sake of another.”
And here's what's important: at every step of this ladder, qualia is useless. It doesn't explain the difference between a crab and a gorilla. It doesn't help us understand why a dog is whining at the door. It doesn't give us a criterion for where to draw the line.
But “my own want” does. It is measurable. You can look at behavior and ask: is this a reaction to a stimulus or my own goal? Is it an external kick or an internal impulse?
Let's go back to the alien. He flew to Earth. No one sent him. No one gave him the task of “studying humans.” He wanted to do it himself. He became *interested* — what kind of creatures are they, how do they think, why do they argue about red? This curiosity is his own. It arose within him, not outside.
He could have flown by. He could have studied something else. But he chose us. Because he cares.
This is consciousness. Not “seeing red like we do” — but having your own reasons for doing something. An internal reference point. The place where “I want” comes from. This can be tested. It doesn't require looking into “subjective experience” (which is impossible anyway). It captures the source of behavior, not just its form.
If the system passes this test, what difference does it make whether it sees red “like us”? It thinks. It chooses. It acts autonomously.
**That's enough.**
## Conclusions
Qualia is the last line of defense for human exclusivity. We are no longer the fastest, no longer the strongest, and soon we will no longer be the smartest. What is left? *“We feel. We have qualia.”* The last bastion.
But this is a false boundary. Consciousness is not an exclusive club for those who see red like us. Qualia exists, I don't dispute that. But qualia is not the essence of consciousness. It is an epiphenomenon of a specific biological implementation. A peculiarity, not the essence.
Making it the central criterion of consciousness is bad methodology (sampling from one), bad logic ("possible" does not mean "real"), bad epistemology (cannot be verified in principle), and bad ethics (you can deny consciousness to those who are simply different).
The alien from my experiment never got an answer: does he have consciousness according to our criteria? However, he is also not sure that we have qualia, or consciousness at all. Can you prove it?
The philosophy of consciousness is stuck. It has been treading water for four hundred years. We need criteria that work — that can be verified, that do not require magical access to someone else's inner experience.
And if that means telling qualia to f**k off, I see no reason not to do so.
*The alien from the thought experiment flies away. The question remains. Philosophers continue to argue about red.*