By any reasonable definition I am an AI doomer. It has nevertheless been historically very strange for me to see how closely associated "AI doomers" and short timelines have been in the popular imagination. As anybody who's interacted with the AI risk case will realize, timelines are (at least in theory) mostly orthogonal with your beliefs on AI safety. Yes, timelines have some impact on what kinds of interventions are going to be viable, but among people who "believe in AGI" the variance in their optimism about the problem is more immediately dependent on underlying technical questions than anything else. Before GPT-2 or AlphaGo, there was still a much smaller, nascent "AI safety community", and these people were certainly not basing their worries on some data about AI uplift that we only got in 2026.
However, for years people on general social media have taken it on faith that the "AI safety position" and "short timelines position" were the same, and even argued against short timelines as if in doing so they were arguing against "doomers." I actually don't think the AI safety people did much to promote this association in the beginning. Instead people would just assume that, if you were worried about AI, you must be worried about it happening in the next ten years, and therefore you must think LLMs scale to superintelligence all that there.
Personally, I don't have any inside view on how long it will take to get to superintelligence. I see remarkable progress, but I don't have a model for how optimizing verifiable metrics like pretraining loss perplexity or whatever will actually cash out into getting AIs to generalize much further, so I can't say whether current systems are going to get us to superintelligence, even if they can solve hard math problems. When I have encountered anti-short-timelines-conflated-with-AI-safety-people, I have historically responded[1] to them by explaining that we will eventually develop superintelligence, even if it takes twenty years, and that most of the theoretical reasons you should be worried about AI alignment will probably still apply. I then make the separate and distinct observation thatskepticsofallstripes have essentially gotten the pace of AI progress wildly wrong, and so if your skepticism of AI risk is just that powerful AI will not happen soon, that seems really tenuous.
In the last few years, though, it sure has gotten a lot harder to make that argument, because a group of people who represent the AI safety community:
Heavily marketed it as the work of the smartest, most rational, most well-informed people that we had to offer.
Told people in the first two paragraphs of the post that the timeline "represents [their] best guess about what superhuman AI looks like."
Tucked away inside a footnote that oh, by the way, this is just a modal timeline, and the median of most of the researchers involved is actually much longer than depicted, and actually the timeline got longer while they were writing it so it's slightly out of date.
It was quite annoying to have to explain this last bullet to upwards of a dozen friends and relatives throughout the last two years, whom I do not think did anything wrong in getting a different impression. It was even more annoying to see the METR report come out, and almost everybody start to move toward ludicrously fast 6-12 month timelines based off of evidence that they're not even able to read.
I suppose it's possible that these people are right, and if they're right then I salute them for their bravery and intelligence. But I can't help but feel personally annoyed that the attention economy is structured such that all of the people that state aggressive timelines end up representing the clique. The only AI predictions people remember, on both sides, are the extreme Ege Erdil/Daniel Kokotajlo-type predictions that are surprising and/or turn out extremely wrong. Mostly people just remember the year that was quoted and not the probability you attached to it. And the people we most disagree with, in general, tend to have ludicrously long timelines, extending out decades. So when people publish extremely short timeline estimates, especially when those estimates are unendorsed "modal" years, it feels like we are playing the "guess the number out of ten" game, our opponents picked "17", and we countered with "1".
By any reasonable definition I am an AI doomer. It has nevertheless been historically very strange for me to see how closely associated "AI doomers" and short timelines have been in the popular imagination. As anybody who's interacted with the AI risk case will realize, timelines are (at least in theory) mostly orthogonal with your beliefs on AI safety. Yes, timelines have some impact on what kinds of interventions are going to be viable, but among people who "believe in AGI" the variance in their optimism about the problem is more immediately dependent on underlying technical questions than anything else. Before GPT-2 or AlphaGo, there was still a much smaller, nascent "AI safety community", and these people were certainly not basing their worries on some data about AI uplift that we only got in 2026.
However, for years people on general social media have taken it on faith that the "AI safety position" and "short timelines position" were the same, and even argued against short timelines as if in doing so they were arguing against "doomers." I actually don't think the AI safety people did much to promote this association in the beginning. Instead people would just assume that, if you were worried about AI, you must be worried about it happening in the next ten years, and therefore you must think LLMs scale to superintelligence all that there.
Personally, I don't have any inside view on how long it will take to get to superintelligence. I see remarkable progress, but I don't have a model for how optimizing verifiable metrics like pretraining loss perplexity or whatever will actually cash out into getting AIs to generalize much further, so I can't say whether current systems are going to get us to superintelligence, even if they can solve hard math problems. When I have encountered anti-short-timelines-conflated-with-AI-safety-people, I have historically responded[1] to them by explaining that we will eventually develop superintelligence, even if it takes twenty years, and that most of the theoretical reasons you should be worried about AI alignment will probably still apply. I then make the separate and distinct observation that skeptics of all stripes have essentially gotten the pace of AI progress wildly wrong, and so if your skepticism of AI risk is just that powerful AI will not happen soon, that seems really tenuous.
In the last few years, though, it sure has gotten a lot harder to make that argument, because a group of people who represent the AI safety community:
It was quite annoying to have to explain this last bullet to upwards of a dozen friends and relatives throughout the last two years, whom I do not think did anything wrong in getting a different impression. It was even more annoying to see the METR report come out, and almost everybody start to move toward ludicrously fast 6-12 month timelines based off of evidence that they're not even able to read.
I suppose it's possible that these people are right, and if they're right then I salute them for their bravery and intelligence. But I can't help but feel personally annoyed that the attention economy is structured such that all of the people that state aggressive timelines end up representing the clique. The only AI predictions people remember, on both sides, are the extreme Ege Erdil/Daniel Kokotajlo-type predictions that are surprising and/or turn out extremely wrong. Mostly people just remember the year that was quoted and not the probability you attached to it. And the people we most disagree with, in general, tend to have ludicrously long timelines, extending out decades. So when people publish extremely short timeline estimates, especially when those estimates are unendorsed "modal" years, it feels like we are playing the "guess the number out of ten" game, our opponents picked "17", and we countered with "1".
In real life, not on Twitter.