The "problem of qualia" comes about for today's materialists, because they apriori assume a highly geometrized ontology in which all that really exists are point particles located in space, vector-valued fields permeating space, and so on. When people were dualists of some kind, they recognized that there was a problem in how consciousness related to matter, but they could at least acknowledge the redness of red; the question was how the world of sensation and choice related to the world of atoms and physical causality.
Once you assume these highly de-sensualized physical ontologies are the *totality* of what exists, then most of the sensory properties that are evident in consciousness, are simply gone. You still have number in your ontology, you still have quantifiable properties, and thus we can have this discussion about code and numbers and names, but redness as such is now missing.
But if you allow "qualia", "phenomenal color", i.e. the color that we experience, to still exist in your ontology, then it can be the thing that has all those relations. Quantifiable properties of color like hue, saturation, lightness, can be regarded as fully real - the way a physicist may regard the quantifiable properties of a fundamental field as real - and not just as numbers encoded in some neural computing register.
I mention this because I believe it is the answer, when the poster says 'I still feel like there is this "extra" thing I'm experiencing ... I personally can't find any way to relate this isolated "qualia of redness" to anything else I care about'. Redness is cut off from the rest of your ontology, because your ontology is apriori without color. Historically that's how physics developed - some perceivable properties were regarded as 'secondary properties' like color, taste, smell, that are in the mind of the perceiver rather than in the external world; physical theories whose ontology only contains 'primary properties' like size, shape, and quantity were developed to explain the external world; and now they are supposed to explain the perceiver too, so there's nowhere left for the secondary properties to exist at all. Thus we went from the subjective world, to a dualistic world, to eliminative materialism.
But fundamental physics only tells you so much about the nature of things. It tells you that there are quantifiable properties which exist in certain relations to each other. It doesn't tell you that there is no such thing as actual redness. This is the real challenge in the ontology of consciousness, at least if you care about consistency with natural science: finding a way to interpret the physical ontology of the brain, so that actual color (and all the other phenomenological realities that are at odds with the de-sensualized ontology) is somewhere in there. I think it has to involve quantum mechanics, at least if you want monism rather than dualism; the classical billiard-ball ontology is too unlike the ontology of experience to be identified with it, whereas quantum formalism contains entities as abstract as Hilbert spaces (and everything built around them); there's a flexibility there which is hopefully enough to also correspond to phenomenal ontology directly. It may seem weird to suppose that there's some quantum subsystem of the brain which is the thing that is 'actually red'; but something has to be.
Cross-posted from my roam-blog. Nothing new to anyone who's read about these ideas, meant to be a reference for how I think about things.
If you come up with what you think is a decent and useful theory/partial-theory of consciousness, you will be visited by a spooky daemon who will laugh and inform you that you merely dabble in the "easy problem of consciousness" and have gotten nowhere near "The Hard Problem of ConsciousnessTM"
Chalmers put the hard problem like this:
The idea goes that even if you explained how the brain does everything it does, you haven't explained why this doing is accompanied by subjective experience. It's rooted in this idea that subjective experience is somehow completely isolated from, and separate to behavior.
This supposed isolation is already a little suspicious to me. As Scott Aaronson points out in Why Philosophers Should Care About Complexity Theory, people judge each other to be conscious and capable of subjective experience after very short interactions. From a very short interaction with my desk I've concluded it doesn't have subjective experience. After a few years of interacting with my dog, I'm still on the fence on if it has subjective experience.
So when I hear a claim that "subjective experience" and "qualia" are divorced from any and all behavior or functionality in the mind, I'm left with a sense that Chalmers is talking about something very different from my subjective experience, and what it seems like to be me. My subjective experience seems deeply integrated with my behavior and functioning.
Colors of Experience
To explore this more, let's briefly look at a classic puzzler:
To talk about color, I'm first going to talk about Enums.
Enums for Illumination
Often when you code you assign "values" to "variables", where the "value" is the actual content that the computer works with, and the "variable" is a English word that you use to talk about the value.
In this pseudo-code example, you can see it matters what value the
healthvariable has, because there's code that will do different things based on different values.Most languages also have a thing called "Enums". Enums are like variables were you don't care what the value is. You just want a set of English words to be able to differentiate between different things. Another pseudo code example:
Under the hood, an actual number will be substituted for each Enum. So
WHEN SEE Color.ORANGE: FEEL HAPPYwill becomeWHEN SEE 15: FEEL HAPPY. The computer still needs some value associate withColors.ORANGEso that it can check if other values are equal to it. It's just that you don't care what the value is.I bring up Enums because they are a very concrete example of a system where an entity only has meaning based on it's relationship to other things. Under the hood
Colors.ORANGEmight be assigned 2837, but that number doesn't capture the meaning ofColors.ORANGE. The meaning is encapsulated by it's relationship to other colors, and what visible lightwaves get associated with it, and what the rest of the code decides to do when it seesColors.ORANGEas opposed toColors.PURPLE.Color Swap
Now let's use Enums as a model to think about the color problem. There are some ways that we could "see different colors" that would easily be discovered, and others that might not. Check this image: read the tables as "when I see light in the wavelength of the right column, I have the experience I associate with the color in the left column. Normal is how we all see colors, and #1 and #2 are proposed ways that someone else could "see colors differently".
If your vision worked like normal and mine worked like #2, it would be EASY to tell. My vision has a fundamentally different structure. If you saw a violent in the grass, I'd be insisting that the violet and the grass were the same color. Because the "shape" of my experience is fundamentally different from yours, we wouldn't even be able to agree on a consistent naming schema.
If your vision worked like normal and mine worked like #1, we could totally end up agreeing on names for different experiences. Since to both of us, light with wavelength in the range 380-450 nm feels like a cohesive thing, we could both end up calling that feeling "red", even if the subjective experiences were "different".
Thinking about this, I'm imagining as if colors work the same way as my Enums example. The "code" in our heads would treat the same sort of light in the same sorta way*. We'd have similar regularities in our experience, because all of the "code" only uses
Colors.ORANGEas a way to differentiate from other colors. In this metaphor, the concrete value ofColors.ORANGE(say, 44003) would be your qualia/subjective-experience. If everyone has more or less the same code for their color enums, everyone could have different concrete values associated with the same Enum, but it wouldn't effect anything that actually matters about color.It does seem to be a thing that different cultures can have quite different naming schemes for color experiences, but I've never seen evidence that the fundamental "shape" of experience is different.
Well, that isn't quite true. As a djmoortex pointed out in a comment, the experience of a color is deeply related to all of the associations you have with a color.
So it seems like there's a part of people's experience of color (the fact that similar wavelengths feel similar, and far away wavelengths feel more distinct) that I expect is fairly uniform, and at the same time there's another important aspect of the experience of color (what associations you have to different colors, what they make you think and feel) which can vary wildly.
Outro
The more I think about qualia, the more I feel like the only meaning I can find in any of my subjective experiences is in how they relate to everything else in my head. It's the patters of what sorts of things out in the world lead to what sorts of subjective experience (different colors correspond to how hot something will get in the sun). It's the particular associations I have with different experiences (blue makes me think of a cool breeze). It's that certain subjective experiences imply others (I can normally tell if something will feel rough based on if it looks rough).
I'll admit, when I think about color this way, dwelling on how the meaning of "red" is deeply intertwined with the patterns of things I see as "red", I still feel like there is this "extra" thing I'm experiencing. The "redness" that is separate from all those connections and patterns. So I can see why one might still want to ponder and question this "mysterious redness".
Now, I do agree that there is in fact a "problem" that is the hard problem of consciousness (this comment explicates the ontological issues involved). I don't think this post has "dissolved the question". It's just that I personally can't find any way to relate this isolated "qualia of redness" to anything else I care about. All of the meaning I find in my own experience is stuff that I can related to behavior and function, the "easy" problems of consciousness. Given that, I think I want to rename Chalmers' categories as the "Boring" (hard) and "Interesting" (easy) problem of consciousness.