How do lies affect Bayesian Inference?
(Relative likelihood notation is easier, so we will use that)
I heard a thing. Well, I more heard a thing about another thing. Before I heard about it, I didn't know one way or the other at all. My prior was the Bayesian null prior of 1:1. Let's say the thing I heard is "Conspiracy thinking is bad for my epistemology". Let's pretend it was relevant at the time, and didn't just come up out of nowhere. What is the chance that someone would hold this opinion, given that they are not part of any conspiracy against me? Maybe 50%? If I heard it in a Rationality influenced space, probably more like 80%? Now, what is the chance that someone would share this as their opinion, given that they are involved in a conspiracy against me? Somewhere between 95% and 100%, so let's say 99%? Now, our prior is 1:1, and our likelihood ratio is 80:99, so our final prediction, of someone not being a conspirator vs being a conspirator, is 80:99, or 1:1.24. Therefore, my expected probability of someone not being a conspirator went from 50%, down to 45%. Huh.
For the love of all that is good, please shoot holes in this and tell me I screwed up somewhere.