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A sad fact is that good methods to elicit accurate probabilities of the outcome of some future process, e.g. who will win the next election, give you an incentive to influence that outcome, e.g. by campaigning and voting for the candidate you said was more likely to win. But with mind uploading and the 'right' theory of personal identity, we can fix this!
First, suppose that you think of all psychological descendants of your current self as 'you', but you don't think of descendants of your past self as 'you'. So, if you were to make a copy of yourself tomorrow, today you would think of your copy as fully you, but your 'main self' and the 'copy' would think of themselves as totally different people, and not care particularly much about the other one winning money.
Once you're happy with that, here's what you do: first, make your prediction about who wins the next election. Then, save your brain state right after making the prediction. Then wait for the election to happen, and after the result is known, instantiate a copy of you from that saved brain state, and reward or punish them according to how good the prediction was. At the time of making the prediction, you're incentivized to be right so that your future self gets rewarded, but after the prediction is made but before the election, you think of the person who gets rewarded/punished as not you, and therefore don't want to influence the election (any more than you already did).
(NB: this assumes that acausal trade isn't a thing.)
Ok, a much simpler way is to put yourself in storage right after making the prediction and revive you after the event happens (e.g. by not having the copy of you that hangs out between the prediction and the event). Then you don't need the weird theory of identity.
Rationality-related writings that are more comment-shaped than post-shaped. Please don't leave top-level comments here unless they're indistinguishable to me from something I would say here.