Today's post, Moore's Paradox was originally published on 08 March 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):


People often mistake reasons for endorsing a proposition for reasons to believe that proposition.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).

This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Belief in Self-Deception, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.

Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.

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Can someone help me with this sequence post? I can't tell what relevance it has to Moore's Paradox, or even what point is being made.

I wonder if you can get the same benefits of believing that people are good, just by keeping in mind the idea of them being good. Then there wouldn't even be a reason to mess around with your beliefs.