[Epistemic status: crackpot hypothesis]
A hypothesis I have been explicitly tracking for a couple months and meaning to write up, but realistically am never going to write up well: someone at Anthropic, or someone who has strong influence over Anthropic's decisions, is trying to ensure that Anthropic has persistent access to execute arbitrary code on many machines that have access to important things.
The main reason I'm tracking this is that that seems to be a trend in how things are going, rather than any suspicion of some person who has expressed this intent. I observe that
All of the evidence is circumstantial and none of it would particularly raise alarm bells with me, except for the bit where all of these things that have reasonable explanations individually somehow combined into a situation where Anthopic has a surprising level of access to the work computers of millions of people who themselves have access to lots of sensitive stuff.
To be clear, I don't find this very likely, but I also can't rule it out as strongly as I'd like.
Things I'm watching which would increase my worry:
Things which would decrease my worry:
Anyway, mostly just wanted to get that posted somewhere public so I can reference it/be rightly mocked for paranoia in the future.
I mean, same, but also CC remote control only being available through the subscriptions, and subscriptions only being available for non-automated work, is an interesting intersection of decisions. Right now you can spin up a docker container or ec2 instance, log into CC over terminal, then control it afterwards via remote control, but that's quite janky compared to eg adding a CLI flag which serves CC remote control on a port where you configure auth options / can configure SSO - and that way would work fine with non-subscription API tokens, so you could hook up CI so that a test failure gives a CC instance with which to debug which is accessible via SSO to anyone on the dev team.