Georg Simmel[1] once wrote, paraphrasing, that negative concepts are attractive because they offer infinity minus a small area of possibilities we don't like anyway: not being married means designing the life you want, without having to constantly reach compromises; not being single means designing the life you want, without having to feel lonely because no friend is available today.[2]
We could use the word "Simmel fallacy" for the situations where this happens in a conceptual debate: someone is arguing for anarchism, but their concept seems to be just a long list of negations, such that it is very difficult to understand how they would configure society. This is old hat.
I propose the term "inverse Simmel scenario" for a situation in which the speaker is aware of using a negative concept, dislikes the fact, but isn't able come up with the appropriate positive one.
A classic example is Geocentrism. The main intellectual opposition to it didn't have to do with the skies, but with the Earth. Many people were willing to say "sure, maybe the Sun moves around the Earth and the Bible shouldn't be interpreted literally in a couple of more places that we'll add to our list of thousands", but then added, "but how come I don't see the Earth leaving me behind when I jump, checkmate you smarty-pants". Copernicus didn't have a positive concept of Geocentrism; he only had a negative concept of non-Heliocentrism. Galileo came up with the analogy with being in a ship and not noticing its movements, thus offering a positive definition of Geocentrism as "the Earth moves through space like a ship through the sea, so we don't notice the Earth's movement just like people on a ship don't notice theirs". And then of course Newton and the later history of Physics came up with ever better positive concepts of Geocentrism.
a long list of concepts like manipulation, empowerment, corrigibility make sense in the fake free will ontology
we haven't found a good way to explain these things inside a non free will ontology
these concepts seems to be extremely helpful in daily life
Many (possibly infinitely many) ontologies can be described as "not the free will ontology". What we would like is to find one specific, positively defined one, that explains how these daily concepts actually do make sense in a transformed one. Or, at the very least, a specific, positively defined ontology that explains why it so appears as if these concepts made sense. More speculative: maybe we should concentrate on finding a Galileo who gives us an intuition of what a positively defined ontology could look like, before embarking into mathematical descriptions of it?
A daily manifestation of this inverse Simmel scenario is a conversation that runs something like this:
Me: (Rambling, confused speech on how I can't really explain what the real ontology looks like, but there is enough arguments that the epistemically appropriate and even daring stance is to reject it)
Listener: Well, if you are right, then I'll just inject heroing non-stop.
(Me, dreaming about a flourishing humanity but not knowing if this concept makes sense in a non fake ontology): Hm...
Listener: You won't tell me I'm acting wrong, right? There is no acting. There is no I.
A subtler variation:
Addiction may be biological, but no one ever claims that getting clean is biological. "When I hit 45, my testosterone levels fell which also lowered the dopaminergic activity in the reinforcement pathways of the brain, so I was able to get off dope." Wait, is that true? HA! No. It's a decision, made at that time in those circumstances. I know it's a hard decision, but like every other decision in life it is ultimately a binary one. Biology is pulling you towards 0, learning pulls you towards 1.
The Last Psychiatrist, Saddly Porn
I empathize with this feeling. It reminds me of this:
Paraphrasing:
Chicken A: If there is no free will, then I am determined to take heroin.
Chicken B: Or you might be determined to be a coward unable to face ridiculously small obstacles!
I feel that I want to be Chicken B; I want people to assume responsibility. But is this position coherent? Can I find a coherent concept in which an agent is a pattern in a universe made up of smaller elements, but such that the pattern is still a relevant unit of analysis of the causal chains of the universe, and not just in a metaphorical way? Maybe one day, but I don't have it now.
I'm reminded that in the 1600s there was a dispute inside the Catholic Church about whether determinism or free will was true. The Church decreeded that neither doctrine was dogma, and both were within the Overton window of orthodoxy, except that determinism wasn't allowed to be taught in the vulgar way that leads the common folk to give themselves up to debauchery.
Hence Mark Manson's advice, when having to take a decision, of choosing which problems will annoy you less: do you prefer being alone often, or do you prefer noticing your partner's shortcoming often? That's the choice.
Georg Simmel[1] once wrote, paraphrasing, that negative concepts are attractive because they offer infinity minus a small area of possibilities we don't like anyway: not being married means designing the life you want, without having to constantly reach compromises; not being single means designing the life you want, without having to feel lonely because no friend is available today.[2]
We could use the word "Simmel fallacy" for the situations where this happens in a conceptual debate: someone is arguing for anarchism, but their concept seems to be just a long list of negations, such that it is very difficult to understand how they would configure society. This is old hat.
I propose the term "inverse Simmel scenario" for a situation in which the speaker is aware of using a negative concept, dislikes the fact, but isn't able come up with the appropriate positive one.
A classic example is Geocentrism. The main intellectual opposition to it didn't have to do with the skies, but with the Earth. Many people were willing to say "sure, maybe the Sun moves around the Earth and the Bible shouldn't be interpreted literally in a couple of more places that we'll add to our list of thousands", but then added, "but how come I don't see the Earth leaving me behind when I jump, checkmate you smarty-pants". Copernicus didn't have a positive concept of Geocentrism; he only had a negative concept of non-Heliocentrism. Galileo came up with the analogy with being in a ship and not noticing its movements, thus offering a positive definition of Geocentrism as "the Earth moves through space like a ship through the sea, so we don't notice the Earth's movement just like people on a ship don't notice theirs". And then of course Newton and the later history of Physics came up with ever better positive concepts of Geocentrism.
I feel in an inverse Simmel scenario regarding free will. Luckily for me Steve Byrnes wrote recently a great post, so I just have to summarize it:
Many (possibly infinitely many) ontologies can be described as "not the free will ontology". What we would like is to find one specific, positively defined one, that explains how these daily concepts actually do make sense in a transformed one. Or, at the very least, a specific, positively defined ontology that explains why it so appears as if these concepts made sense. More speculative: maybe we should concentrate on finding a Galileo who gives us an intuition of what a positively defined ontology could look like, before embarking into mathematical descriptions of it?
A daily manifestation of this inverse Simmel scenario is a conversation that runs something like this:
A subtler variation:
I empathize with this feeling. It reminds me of this:
Paraphrasing:
I feel that I want to be Chicken B; I want people to assume responsibility. But is this position coherent? Can I find a coherent concept in which an agent is a pattern in a universe made up of smaller elements, but such that the pattern is still a relevant unit of analysis of the causal chains of the universe, and not just in a metaphorical way? Maybe one day, but I don't have it now.
I'm reminded that in the 1600s there was a dispute inside the Catholic Church about whether determinism or free will was true. The Church decreeded that neither doctrine was dogma, and both were within the Overton window of orthodoxy, except that determinism wasn't allowed to be taught in the vulgar way that leads the common folk to give themselves up to debauchery.
Written at Inscribe.
The Psychology of Pessimism.
Hence Mark Manson's advice, when having to take a decision, of choosing which problems will annoy you less: do you prefer being alone often, or do you prefer noticing your partner's shortcoming often? That's the choice.