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Has @Eliezer Yudkowsky or others talking about decision theory here contended with/incorporated the insights from ideas of 'ratifiablility' in CDT? There seem to be some mistakes/misaprehensions (e.g., this thread with Yud) about not understanding how CDT deals with some problems (like rock-paper-scissors).
I treat ratifiable mixed strategy CDT as standard CDT. My objection to CDT is "the standard sophisticated variant ratifies bad bets" not "no known variant of CDT ever makes a choice".
Thank you for the explanation! Though, in the games you are talking about in that thread it seems there isn't a ratifiable solution or the solution CDTers would argue is ratifiable requires a slight restructuring which leads to the same solution as under FDT, or am I missing something?
Also, Joyce argues you should pretty much do backwards induction of the expectations for future choices and only consider the causality of current choices. "When considering an act whose performance you can ensure right now, you should treat it as an instrument for changing t... (read more)
Probably should have tagged @Caspar Oesterheld since Joyce is directly responding to his case.
Edit: to be clear Oesterheld does address ratifiablility in his article. But as Joyce describes, CDT necessities a choosing mechanism to have a solution (if it doesn't, the CDTer should never be able to pick either box). Under such a mechanism, as i noted in an older thread, the problem as Caspar set it up is impossible with true beliefs if there isn't some additional preference.