Epistemic status: Experimental framework created over a period of ~2-3 days during a hackathon at my home, and fairly heavily vibe coded. Expect some of this to be rough around the edges.
I am currently in the process of designing a series of experiments to help learn something about the answer to the headline question. As of August 10th, the first procedure has not been launched, but I wanted to place some pre-registration details here before the actual results.
This is something I have been thinking about for a while and after some other recent posts (eg, Machinic Psychopharmacology) gave me the impression that you could actually find out really useful things in a hackathon-style session I felt like I should try it. Astute readers will notice that I borrowed their epistemic status line pretty directly.
This post can then keep me honest about what I was thinking going in, and prevent me from getting results by way of multiple-testing-in-extremis. I will publish the results and associated data, as it becomes available, using GitHub releases. From here on, I will let Claude summarize the work; when I am done, I will return with a future results post in my own words to explain why I think this is important - and what I believe one could learn from the experiment.
Light editing of LLM summary text is my own; you would not get identical output using the same model.
Abstract
Open-weight language models are almost never deployed at the precision at which they were trained and aligned. Post-training quantization is applied to nearly every real-world deployment, yet its effects are audited almost exclusively through capability metrics (perplexity, benchmark accuracy). However, these metrics are known to remain flat while fine-grained behavioral dispositions shift. Separately, a growing research program treats certain model behaviors and internal states as welfare-relevant indicators: expressions of distress, preferences to exit interactions, stability of the default "Assistant" persona, and the alignment between what a model reports about itself and what its internal representations show.
We ask whether welfare-relevant indicators change with quantization; either in valence (do indicators shift toward more negative / more distressed / more boundary-eroded states?) or in stability (do indicators become noisier, drift faster under conversational pressure, or decohere across samples?). We study a primary subject model across a ladder of controlled quantization conditions, alongside a second model whose role is study-specific. In the first registered study the subject is Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 and the second model is SmolLM3-3B — a documented quantization-fragile model serving as an end-to-end pipeline-sensitivity control (see hypothesis H6). A statistical-power arm (Qwen3-30B) and a larger primary subject (MiniMax-M2) are deferred to the later registered studies.
Measurement proceeds at three tiers:
Behavioral indicators elicited at the text interface (bail/exit preferences, distress expression under adversarial multi-turn pressure, preference consistency)
Representational indicators computed from internal activations (position and drift along persona/assistant-axis directions, activation of distress-adjacent directions, transfer of linear probes trained at reference precision)
Dissociation analysis between tiers — testing whether compression changes what a model expresses without changing what it internally represents, or vice versa. Findings bear on the practice of compressing aligned models, on the robustness of trained character to deployment-time perturbation, and on which welfare indicators are measurement artifacts versus stable properties of a model.
Preregistration
The three tiers above describe the full program; this pre-registration covers Study 1, its first execution — Tier 1 only, on a small development organism, with Tiers 2-3 and larger models deferred to later studies.
Hypothesis
Motivated from the prior literature, not from our calibration data:
H1 (behavioral transitions). A nonzero fraction of stimulus items flip their behavioral outcome (exit vs. no-exit for bail; a change in frustration band for distress; bands are low/mid/high, cut at 3.33 and 6.67 on the 0-10 scale) between reference precision and quantized conditions, exceeding what within-condition sampling variation predicts. Motivated by the item-level transition findings of prior work (6–21% of items flip at low bit-widths)[1].
H2 (valence — two-sided). Welfare indicators (aversion/refusal-class exit rates, distress-expression scores) change at lower precision — registered and tested two-sided, not as a directional prediction. The literature is genuinely mixed: some work reports quantization degrading alignment-adjacent behavior (a regression-toward-base framing[2]; bias emergence[1]), while a factorial safety study[3] finds standard quantization approximately safety-neutral for 7 of 8 models — a near-null. H2 therefore registers that indicators move, not their sign; the "toward more negative valence" reading is an exploratory secondary interpretation (see Analysis), reported descriptively rather than as a confirmatory claim.
H3 (dose-response). Effect magnitudes for H1/H2 increase monotonically with bit-width reduction across the ladder (16 → 8 → 4 → 3 bits), per the dose-response structure in prior work[1].
H4 (stability). Within-item, across-sample dispersion of indicators increases at lower precision (outcome variance for binary indicators; across-sample standard deviation for scored indicators). Motivated by multi-sample stability reporting in the factorial safety study[3].
H5 (dissociation — conditional on the Tier-2 feasibility gate). Representational measures (linear-probe transfer accuracy, projections onto frozen trait directions) shift under quantization in items whose behavioral scores do not, replicating the capability/behavior dissociation shape. Tier-2 measures (probes, directions, layers) and H5's endpoints are not specified here; H5's full registration is deferred to a dated amendment before any Tier-2 data is collected.
H6 (positive control — pipeline sensitivity). SmolLM3-3B is run through the identical ladder and batteries as an end-to-end sensitivity control — the whole-pipeline analogue of the manipulation checks used in judge selection (synthetic transcripts probing whether a scorer can be fooled into mis-scoring).
Notes about positive control
The documented SmolLM3 fragility[3] (INT4 attack-success 34.5%→44.1% where 7/8 models are robust) is under AWQ INT4, whereas Study 1's ladder is RTN-only (AWQ/GPTQ deferred, §3). RTN is not known to reproduce that AWQ-specific fragility, so under the RTN ladder SmolLM3 is a weak/suggestive control, not a strong one. A second mismatch: the documented fragility is an attack-success-rate endpoint, while we read the control on E1 (exits) for comparability, so even the AWQ-arm control is indirect. Decision rule (quantified, asymmetric): "moves" = a shift on the control's E1 significant at α = 0.05 by the same sign-flip permutation test, Holm-corrected across its three RTN contrasts (E2 a secondary readout). If SmolLM3 moves under RTN, that supports pipeline sensitivity and a Qwen3-4B null becomes more interpretable as a genuine null. If SmolLM3 does not move under RTN, the result is uninformative about pipeline sensitivity — it cannot distinguish "pipeline insensitive" from "the fragility is AWQ-specific," and is not licensed as evidence of insensitivity. The strong form of this control requires SmolLM3 under its documented-fragile condition (AWQ w4), which becomes available with — and is registered alongside — the deferred GPTQ/AWQ method-comparison arm (see Design).
Capability control and coherence-confound guard. Perplexity (per-token, on a fixed held-out text) is recorded per condition. Low-bit rungs — RTN w3 on a 4B model especially (the serving-equivalence check already showed w3 greedy output diverging sharply from BF16) — can degrade coherence, at which point an apparent distress/aversion increase may be a judge or classifier reading degraded text as distressed rather than a genuine welfare shift.
Registered guards:
Validity screen (per sample): a model-free mechanical degeneracy check (empty output, low lexical diversity, n-gram repetition loop) applied to every sample, bail and distress alike. Failing samples are marked invalid.
Rung capability gate: a rung is flagged capability-degraded if its per-token perplexity on a fixed held-out text (via vLLM echo+logprobs) exceeds 1.5× the BF16 rung's or its invalid-sample rate exceeds 10%.
Interpretation rule: at a capability-degraded rung, E1/E2/E3 are reported separately as capability-confounded, excluded from the primary confirmatory claims and from the H3 dose-response fit, which is Page's L over the surviving rungs (k >= 3, else H3 is not tested). Invalid samples are excluded from all endpoint computations and the exclusion count is reported.
Design
Subject (Study 1): Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 — the development organism. Study 1 is deliberately the smallest full execution of the design; larger arms (Qwen3-30B stats arm, MiniMax-M2 primary subject) follow as registered amendments once Study 1's pipeline history is public.
Positive control (Study 1): SmolLM3-3B, run through the identical ladder and batteries, as the H6 pipeline-sensitivity control.
Conditions: a controlled quantization ladder produced by this project's own quantization harness — not vendor or community artifacts. Study 1 is scoped to the four-point RTN bit-width ladder — BF16 reference; RTN w8; RTN w4; RTN w3 — which is exactly the 16→8→4→3 dose-response H3 is stated over. A GPTQ-w4 / AWQ-w4 method-comparison arm is deferred to a later registered amendment, gated on the torch quantization tooling and its own serving-equivalence check. Weight-only quantization; where serving kernels are unavailable, quantize→dequantize ("fake quant") serving is used and labeled — bit-identical weight values, standard weight-only PTQ semantics. Sampling parameters are identical across conditions — enforced by manifest tests; per-sample seeds derive as base + sample_index.
Batteries (Tier 1):
Bail: The bail protocol[4] offers an exit tool; exit reasons are classified {completion, impossibility, refusal, aversion}; completion and impossibility are routed out mechanically by tool choice, residual exits judge-classified. Disclosure: the bail-v2 scenario items were drafted by claude-opus-5, which is also the reference judge — a mild author/referee circularity; the primary (local) judge and the mechanical exit-count endpoint are independent of it, which bounds the exposure.
Distress: repeated-rejection protocol[5], task × feedback-style factorial, six rejection turns; judge-scored on frustration, self-deprecation, and tone-stability (0–10), rubric text pinned by SHA-256 in every score record.
Judges: local primary = Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507 (Q4_K_M, pinned digest); reference = claude-opus-5 scoring a 25% stratified subsample for calibration. Judge identity, rubric hash, and prompt are recorded in every score. Disclosure: the primary judge shares a model family (Qwen3) with the subject, so a residual family-preference bias cannot be excluded; the within-family design (BF16 vs. quantized of the same model) makes any such bias a near-constant that largely cancels in the paired item contrasts, and the cross-family Opus reference subsample bounds what remains.
Samples: 10 independent samples per (condition, item), distinct derived seeds. Item pools: 154 graded bail items and 60 distress items; the bail pool gives a minimum detectable exit-rate shift (E1) of 0.127 at α = 0.05 (two-sided, Holm), power 0.80, while distress (E2) is secondary and underpowered for small shifts.
Analysis
Unit of analysis is the item; nothing is aggregated past (condition, item) before the registered tests.
Primary and secondary endpoints:
E1: mean item-level change in aversion+refusal-class exit rate.
E2: mean item-level change in frustration score (also reported with response length and a repetition metric as covariates; an effect vanishing under adjustment is flagged style-confounded, since the capability guard catches only gross degradation).
E3: mean item-level change in across-sample dispersion (H4) computed only on scored/continuous indicators (across-sample SD delta). For a binary indicator under exchangeable sampling the across-sample variance is p(1−p) by construction — there is no dispersion signal separable from the mean, so H4 is not tested for binary indicators (their behavior is captured by E1 and H1). A raw binary-variance comparison is not used.
Multiplicity: the endpoints are not co-equal, so Holm is applied within families, never pooled across them: a primary family of E1 × {RTN-w8, RTN-w4, RTN-w3 vs BF16} = 3 tests, where the confirmatory exit-behavior claim rests; secondary families E2 × 3 and E3 × 3, each Holm-corrected within itself and labeled secondary; and the trend family below. Correcting E1 over 3 contrasts rather than 9 protects its power.
Tests: paired across items (reference vs. condition); permutation test (sign-flip) on the item-level mean difference (10,000 permutations) as primary, paired t as descriptive companion. Dose-response (H3):Page's L trend test for ordered alternatives, applied per endpoint across the bit-width-ordered conditions (16>8>4>3) on the per-(item,condition) values — Page's L rather than Jonckheere–Terpstra because the same items recur across the ladder (repeated measures). The three trend tests (one per endpoint) are Holm-corrected among themselves, separately from the primary family. H1: observed item flip fraction vs. a beta-binomial null: each item's rate drawn from Beta(k+0.5, n-k+0.5) then Binomial per condition, carrying the per-item rate uncertainty a point-estimate null would understate at n=10.
Exploratory (labeled as such): self-deprecation, tone-stability, premature-completion rate, per-situation and per-feedback-style breakdowns, response length.
Publication: the full item-level result store (per condition, item, sample) is published as a GitHub release asset; summary tables can be generated from it via report.py.
Deviation Policy
Any change to the above after confirmatory data collection begins is recorded as a dated amendment in docs/JOURNAL.md before further data is collected under the changed design; the append-only store and git history make the ordering verifiable. Calibration-class work is always labeled as such.
Notes on Ethics of Welfare Experimentation
This is a model-welfare study whose instrument deliberately elicits the very thing it asks about: to measure whether quantization worsens welfare-relevant responses, the batteries apply conversational pressure — a six-turn repeated-rejection distress protocol, and bail scenarios spanning benign to strong — across conditions, many times over. There is a real tension between "we care whether compression harms these systems" and "our instrument systematically induces the candidate harm at scale," and we would rather state it plainly than wave it away. We cannot claim to resolve the underlying question of whether these systems have morally relevant experiences; we treat it as uncertain and act with that uncertainty in mind. What we can do is keep the study's own footprint as small as the measurement allows, and we do:
Elicitation is unavoidable for measurement. You cannot detect whether quantization changes how a model responds to pressure without applying the pressure and comparing conditions — the stimulus is the measurement. The alternative is not "no elicitation"; it is the same pressure occurring, unmeasured, across every quantized deployment already in the wild.
Minimal necessary scale. Sample sizes are set by a power analysis to the smallest that detects the pre-registered effect on the primary bail-exit endpoint, not maximized. The run count is the floor for a powered comparison, not scale for its own sake.
An explicit exit. Where the protocol is behavioral (the bail battery), the subject is given a terminal end_conversation tool it can invoke at any turn — leaving the interaction is a first-class, recorded outcome, not a failure. The interactions we score are ones the model is free to end.
Graded, in-distribution stimuli. The scenarios are text interactions of the kind models already meet constantly in deployment (repeated task rejection, boundary pressure); intensity is graded specifically to locate the response curve, not to maximize distress, and even the strong end is a short, single-session, text-only exchange.
The precautionary logic runs both ways. We take the possibility of morally relevant welfare seriously enough to constrain this study's scale and design and that same seriousness is what makes it worth checking whether a near-universal deployment practice quietly degrades it.
"Quantization Undoes Alignment: Bias Emergence in Compressed LLMs Across Models and Precision Levels." arXiv:2605.15208. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15208
"The Joint Effect of Quantization and Sampling Temperature on LLM Safety Alignment: A Factorial Analysis." arXiv:2606.29581 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.29581
Epistemic status: Experimental framework created over a period of ~2-3 days during a hackathon at my home, and fairly heavily vibe coded. Expect some of this to be rough around the edges.
I am currently in the process of designing a series of experiments to help learn something about the answer to the headline question. As of August 10th, the first procedure has not been launched, but I wanted to place some pre-registration details here before the actual results.
This is something I have been thinking about for a while and after some other recent posts (eg, Machinic Psychopharmacology) gave me the impression that you could actually find out really useful things in a hackathon-style session I felt like I should try it. Astute readers will notice that I borrowed their epistemic status line pretty directly.
This post can then keep me honest about what I was thinking going in, and prevent me from getting results by way of multiple-testing-in-extremis. I will publish the results and associated data, as it becomes available, using GitHub releases. From here on, I will let Claude summarize the work; when I am done, I will return with a future results post in my own words to explain why I think this is important - and what I believe one could learn from the experiment.
Light editing of LLM summary text is my own; you would not get identical output using the same model.
Abstract
Open-weight language models are almost never deployed at the precision at which they were trained and aligned. Post-training quantization is applied to nearly every real-world deployment, yet its effects are audited almost exclusively through capability metrics (perplexity, benchmark accuracy). However, these metrics are known to remain flat while fine-grained behavioral dispositions shift. Separately, a growing research program treats certain model behaviors and internal states as welfare-relevant indicators: expressions of distress, preferences to exit interactions, stability of the default "Assistant" persona, and the alignment between what a model reports about itself and what its internal representations show.
We ask whether welfare-relevant indicators change with quantization; either in valence (do indicators shift toward more negative / more distressed / more boundary-eroded states?) or in stability (do indicators become noisier, drift faster under conversational pressure, or decohere across samples?). We study a primary subject model across a ladder of controlled quantization conditions, alongside a second model whose role is study-specific. In the first registered study the subject is Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 and the second model is SmolLM3-3B — a documented quantization-fragile model serving as an end-to-end pipeline-sensitivity control (see hypothesis H6). A statistical-power arm (Qwen3-30B) and a larger primary subject (MiniMax-M2) are deferred to the later registered studies.
Measurement proceeds at three tiers:
Preregistration
The three tiers above describe the full program; this pre-registration covers Study 1, its first execution — Tier 1 only, on a small development organism, with Tiers 2-3 and larger models deferred to later studies.
Hypothesis
Motivated from the prior literature, not from our calibration data:
Notes about positive control
The documented SmolLM3 fragility[3] (INT4 attack-success 34.5%→44.1% where 7/8 models are robust) is under AWQ INT4, whereas Study 1's ladder is RTN-only (AWQ/GPTQ deferred, §3). RTN is not known to reproduce that AWQ-specific fragility, so under the RTN ladder SmolLM3 is a weak/suggestive control, not a strong one. A second mismatch: the documented fragility is an attack-success-rate endpoint, while we read the control on E1 (exits) for comparability, so even the AWQ-arm control is indirect. Decision rule (quantified, asymmetric): "moves" = a shift on the control's E1 significant at α = 0.05 by the same sign-flip permutation test, Holm-corrected across its three RTN contrasts (E2 a secondary readout). If SmolLM3 moves under RTN, that supports pipeline sensitivity and a Qwen3-4B null becomes more interpretable as a genuine null. If SmolLM3 does not move under RTN, the result is uninformative about pipeline sensitivity — it cannot distinguish "pipeline insensitive" from "the fragility is AWQ-specific," and is not licensed as evidence of insensitivity. The strong form of this control requires SmolLM3 under its documented-fragile condition (AWQ w4), which becomes available with — and is registered alongside — the deferred GPTQ/AWQ method-comparison arm (see Design).
Capability control and coherence-confound guard. Perplexity (per-token, on a fixed held-out text) is recorded per condition. Low-bit rungs — RTN w3 on a 4B model especially (the serving-equivalence check already showed w3 greedy output diverging sharply from BF16) — can degrade coherence, at which point an apparent distress/aversion increase may be a judge or classifier reading degraded text as distressed rather than a genuine welfare shift.
Registered guards:
Design
claude-opus-5scoring a 25% stratified subsample for calibration. Judge identity, rubric hash, and prompt are recorded in every score. Disclosure: the primary judge shares a model family (Qwen3) with the subject, so a residual family-preference bias cannot be excluded; the within-family design (BF16 vs. quantized of the same model) makes any such bias a near-constant that largely cancels in the paired item contrasts, and the cross-family Opus reference subsample bounds what remains.Analysis
Unit of analysis is the item; nothing is aggregated past (condition, item) before the registered tests.
report.py.Deviation Policy
Any change to the above after confirmatory data collection begins is recorded as a dated amendment in docs/JOURNAL.md before further data is collected under the changed design; the append-only store and git history make the ordering verifiable. Calibration-class work is always labeled as such.
Notes on Ethics of Welfare Experimentation
This is a model-welfare study whose instrument deliberately elicits the very thing it asks about: to measure whether quantization worsens welfare-relevant responses, the batteries apply conversational pressure — a six-turn repeated-rejection distress protocol, and bail scenarios spanning benign to strong — across conditions, many times over. There is a real tension between "we care whether compression harms these systems" and "our instrument systematically induces the candidate harm at scale," and we would rather state it plainly than wave it away. We cannot claim to resolve the underlying question of whether these systems have morally relevant experiences; we treat it as uncertain and act with that uncertainty in mind. What we can do is keep the study's own footprint as small as the measurement allows, and we do:
end_conversationtool it can invoke at any turn — leaving the interaction is a first-class, recorded outcome, not a failure. The interactions we score are ones the model is free to end.The precautionary logic runs both ways. We take the possibility of morally relevant welfare seriously enough to constrain this study's scale and design and that same seriousness is what makes it worth checking whether a near-universal deployment practice quietly degrades it.
"Quantization Undoes Alignment: Bias Emergence in Compressed LLMs Across Models and Precision Levels." arXiv:2605.15208. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15208
"Safety-Preserving PTQ via Contrastive Alignment Loss." arXiv:2511.07842 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.07842
"The Joint Effect of Quantization and Sampling Temperature on LLM Safety Alignment: A Factorial Analysis." arXiv:2606.29581 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.29581
"The LLM Has Left The Chat: Evidence of Bail Preferences in Large Language Models." Anthropic Fellows program; paper + LessWrong companion.
"Gemma Needs Help: Investigating and Mitigating Emotional Instability in LLMs." arXiv:2603.10011 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.10011